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ERNST & ERNST

v.
HOCHFELDER, et al.
ERNST & ERNST

Cert CA
(Swygert,

~
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Castle, Sprecher)
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v.
MARTIN, et al.

Timely

~~

l,l~..r t4..-=~

Petitioner, an accounting firm, seeksreview of the
c ourt of appeals reversal of a district court's grant of a
motion for summary judgment in a l Ob-S action.

Respondents

assert that petitionets failure to comply with local Seventh

j

/

-~

2.

Circuit rules and notify the lower courts of the int ention
to seek certiorari at this stage has resulted in the district
court's moving forward with the action, and that certiora ri
should be denied for that and other reasons.
Facts:

The essence of respondents' claim as plaintiffs

in the lOb-5 litigation is that petitioner's failure adequat e ly
to audit a small brokerage firm's accounts and practices over
' the 21 years in which it was

employed by the firm allowe d

the president of the company to perpetuate a fraud against them.
Respondents asserted that proper auditing would have uncovered
the fraud that caused the loss.

The action sterns from the

activities of Mr. Nay, President of First Securities Company
of Chicago and owner of 92% of its stock.

Respondents were

brokerage clients of First Securities, and each received
investment counseling from Nay knowing him to be president.
Nay persuaded each to invest funds in a fraudulent "escrm.;r "
account which he represented would produce a high rate of return.
Some respondents began to invest as early as 1942, and the last
of the escrow transactions was consummated in 1966.

The whole

scheme fell apart when Nay committed suic ide and left a note
describing his misdeeds.

-

As a result of the scheme, the Seventh Circuit held
that Nay had violated the Securitie s Exchange Act and that
First Securities was chargeable with Nay's fr~ud as an. ai~er
and abettor.

3.

Securities & Exchange Commission v. First Securities Co. of
Chicago, 463 F. 2d 981 (1972).

With Nay gone and First

Securities in receivership, however, these respondents have looked
for another pocket of adequate depth to satiate their financial
Ernst & Ernst, an accounting 'finn that had audited

wounds.

First Securities for some 21 years without ever discovering
the fraud, was selected.
The action was predicated on the theor~ th~~ the
-·· .•. ....·----.....
_..............
negligent auditing of Ernst & Ernst aided and abetted Nay's
~ . --~

lOb-S violation.

----

~

··-·~-·~ ..

Respondents, plaintiffs below, contend that

had Ernst & Ernst properly audited First Securities the fraud
would long ago have been uncovered.

The District Court ruled

in Ernst & Ernst's favor on a motion for summary judgment,
finding that the statute of limitations had run and apparently
determining that petitioners were additionally entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.

The court of appeals reversed this

ruling and remanded for trial in accordance with the rather
elaborate theories of law that it outlined.
Relying on its previous ruling in Hochfelder v. Midwest
Stock Exchange, 503 F. 2d 364 (CA 7 1974), cert denied 419 U.S. 875
(Douglas, J., dissenting)[See pooi memo in 73-1828] the
Court fo.und that the statute of limitations had been tolled
against the negligent party, petitioner herein, by fraudulent

----

actions of Nay.

-

The court thereafter found a statutory duty

of inquiry imposed by the Securities Act that ran to respondents'

4.
.,

I

benefit.

The court defined that duty to be one to audit in

accordance with the generally accepted auditing standards and
looked to the definitions of The American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants to ascertain that standard.

The court

determined that factual issues existed concerning petitioner's
compliance with those standards and also ruled that factual
questions were presented relating to a theory of estoppel
that might preclude respondents' recovery.

It remanded for

trial on those issues.

-------

Contentions:

Petitioner's

contentions will be discussed

separately and not in the order in which they are presented in
the petition.

Anyone wishing to suggest a limited grant must

(.

'"--"

be careful to identify the questions in the order they are

\

presented in the petition rather than in the order of discussion
in this memo.
1.

Statute of Limitations (Question # 2 in petition)

Petitioner challenges the court of appeals' detexmination that
the three-year statute of limitations would be tolled against it,
an allegedly negligent party, on account of the fraudulent
actions of Nay, who was not a party to the lit igation.

I

The

court relied on its previous ruling in Hochfelder to hold that
the tolling doctrine is an equitable one with sufficient
flexibility to reach this case.

The court held in each case

that the tolling doctrine would toll the statute of limitations
against a party whose alleged negligence was as s erted to have

5.

facilitated the concealment of the fraud that caused the
injury.

As in the case of an action against the party who

perpetrated the fraud, the statute would be tolled

ag~~st

one whose alleged negligence facilitated its concealment
until such time as the plaintiff obtained knowledge of the
fraud or in the exercise of due diligence should have obtained
such knowledge.
Petitioner claims thlt this extension of the tolling
doctrine is unique to this case and to Hochfelder, and
that it is in direct conflict with the Fifth Circuit opinion
in Cato v. Southern Atlantic & Gulf Coast Dist. of Int'nl.
Longshoremen 's Ass'n., 364 F. Supp. 489 (S.D. Tex. 1973), aff'd.
sub nom, Cato v. International Longshoremen ' s Ass 'n. , 485 F. 2d
583.

In that case the statute of limitations was asserted by

the defendant employer who was being sued under the Railway
Labor Act.

Plaintiff there argued that the statute should

be tolled as to defendant employer by the misrepresentations
of certain co-defendant union representatives.

The District Court

specifically refused to allow the misrepresentations of one
defendant to toll thestatute of limitations as to another,
364 F. Supp., at 493, and theCA 5

~curiam

affirmance

specifically mentioned its agreement with that ruling.
F. 2d, at 583.

485

Petitioner additionally asserts that the ruling

in this case is contrary to the general characterizations
of the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, which points to

6.

fraud perpetrated by the person a gainst whom the statute is
tolled.

See Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 49S F. 2d 448, 460

(CA 2 1974).

Petitione r additionally urges that theCA 7 rationale

is contrary to the basic premise of the statute of limitations,
which is fairness to defendants.

See Burnett v. New York Central

R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (196S).
2.
petition)

Scienter Requirement under lOb-S (Question if 1 in
Petitioner challenges the assumption of CA 7 t ha t

---

a lOb-S action can ever be maintained in the absence of
allegations of facts amounting to intent to defraud, reckless
disregard for the truth, or knowing use of a device to defraud.
Petitioner asserts that an allegation that merely charges
negligence, as this one does, cannot be maintained under lOb-S.
CA 7 relied on its previous ruling in Hochfelder, which it said
indirectly decided the issue.

The court held that a lOb-S cause

of action could be satisfied by a showing of the following
elements:
"The foregoing elements comprise a flexible
standard of liability which s h ould be amplified
according to the peculiarities of each case.
Accordingly, where, as here, it is urged that
the de fendant through action as well as inaction
has facilitated the fraud of another, a claim for
aiding and abetting is macle on demonstrating; (1)
that the defendant has a duty of inquiry; (2) the
plaintiff was a beneficiary of that duty of inquiry;
(3) the defendant breached the duty of inquiry;
(4) concomitant with the breach of duty of inquiry
the defendant breached a duty of discl.osure; and
(S) there is a causal connection between the breach
of duty of inquiry and disclosure and the facilitation
of the underlying fraud; that is, adequate inquiry
and subsequent disclosure would have led to the
discovery of the underlying fraud or its prevention."

I

7.

Petitioner claims that CA 7's negligence standard is
in direct conflict with rulings of the Second, Sixth, and Tenth.
Circuits.
(CA 2

See Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F. 2d 1277, 1302-1305

~bane

1973);

Clegg v. Conk, ____F. 2d _____ , 1973-74 CCH

Fed. Sec. L. Rep. ' 94,897 (CA 10 1974).

Petitioner notes, on

the other hand, that dicta in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits
suggest that those courts of appeal may fall in line with the
decision he seeks to have reviewed.

See Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.

2d 718, 734-735 (CA 8 1968), ~· denied, 390 U.S. 591;
Vanderbloom v. Sexton, 422 F. 2d 1233, 1239 (CA 8 ), cert. denied,

- - ·- - -

400 U.S. 852 (1970); White v. Abrams, 495 F. 2d 724, 736
(CA 9 1974).

{

Petitione r asserts that this issue is one of

substantial consequence to the determination of the permissible
reach of Section lOb-5.
3.

Defense of Estoppel- (Question # . 3 in petition).

Petitioner seeks to have the Court review the question of whether
he was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on the estoppel
issue.

The facts of the case indicate that petitioners mai 1 _d

some of the respondent plaintiffs confirmation forms, requesting
that they as customers of First Security verify the accuracy
of the details of their accounts, and moreover, expressly
requesting that the customers note any differences or exceptions
between the accounts specified on the form and the actual account
that the customer maintained.

Petitioners indicate that none of

the respondents who received the confirmation form notified them
of the unlisted escrow account and that the lower court erred

8.

in not ruling that this failure estopped them as a matter of law.
The court of appeals indicated that any number of factual
contex ts might arise in which the affirmative defense of estoppel
might not properly be asserted.

It

s~ated,

for example, that

the plaintiffs failure to report the unlisted escrow account
might not be unreasonable if a reasonable investor should not
have known from the confirmation form that he was to report
the es.crow account.

This was, in the view of the court of appeals,

) a factual question that should be resolved by the jury.
4.

Exercise of

Du ~ ·

Dilli~ence

(Question :fl: 4 in petition)

,to

Petitioners claim that they were entitled a judgment as a matter
A

of law on the question of their exercise of due diligence.

They

claim to have satisfied the generally accepted accounting standards
in auditing this account; they thus assert that they could not be
found to be negligent.
The court of appeals relied on the standards of the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, of which
petitioners are members, for the proposition that responsible
auditing procedures should encompass some check on the audited
firm's system of internal accounting controls.

The court of

appeals observed that a factual issue seemed to exist over
whether adherence to such an au diting procedure might not

... t .

.•

'

'

9.
1

have discovered Mr. Nay's "mail rule,"

and thus altered a

responsible accountant to the possibility that something was
amiss in the company.

Petitioners maintain essentially that

the accounting rules referring to monitoring of internal
accounting mechanisms are not designed to detect such fraud.
The court of appeals considered that to be a factual question.
Respondent's Late Filing Argment - · Respondent does
not really contest petitioners

characterization of the possible

significance of the issues or of the existence of a lower court
•

split as to some of them.

Respondent does, however, assert

that the important questions would be further illuminated by
allowing the trial to go forth and taking the questions later.
Respondent notes in this regard that the Local Rules of the
Sixth Circuit indicate that a mandate will not be stayed to await
filing of a petition for certiorari absent a showing that there
is probable cause to believe that petition is not frivolous
or filed for delay.

He

clai~s

that petitioners waited until

the 90th day to file for certiorari in this case and that they
failed to notify the court · of appeals of their intention to file.

1. The "mail rule" was a firm rule laid down by
.
I'IOOJ'I e.,
Pres1dent
Nay t h atA~
was to open correspondence addressed to
him personally, or to his attention. Nay apparently insisted
that his mail was not even to be open ed in cases in which he would
be away from the office for a substantial period of time.

' .

10.

Respondent asserts that, as a result, the mandate has long since
issued and the case is pending for trial before the District
Court.
Discussion:

Respondent's reliance on the Local Rule

appears to be a makeweight; surely the case has not advanced
significantly toward trial during the period required for filing
and consideration of cert.

His claim that the issues would

benefit from trial on the merits seems better taken in the case
of the questions of estoppel and the petitioners'
of the due diligence standard.

-------------

s~isfa9,_tion

Those are more fact-specific

and, in any event, do not appear to be the more significant
issues presented by the petition.
Both the statute of limitations question and the
question of liability for negligence under lOb-S were previously
decided in Hochfelder, on which the Court recently denied
certiorari.

But the pool memo on the case reveals that neither

of those issues was presented in that petition for certiorari.
Petitioners' claim of the existence of a split on these issues
appears to be correct.
""----

~

-

e

the Solicitor General.

He recently sought certiorari to urge

a negligence standard for SEC injunctive actions under Section lOb.

Au;rvV \)

rv-

-

Anyone interested in this case might seek the views of

~

~

~~ ~}(V~[i' (.

See SEC v. Coffey, 493 F. 2d 1304, 1316-1317, _pool memo
. denied January 27, 1975.

0
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August 21, 1975

No. 74-1042, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, et al

The purpose of this memo, dictated during the summer,
is to aid my memory as to the issues presented, and to record
my quite tentative reaction after a preliminary reading of the
opinions and briefs.

* * * * * * *
Leston B. Nay ("Nay"), president of a small brokerage
firm in Chicago, committed suicide after perpetrating frauds upon
respondents and other customers of the firm over a period of many
years.

The frauds were accomplished through "escrow" investment

accounts which Nay personally managed, and from which he misappropriated customer funds.

His company, First Securities, was

registered with the SEC as a broker-dealer, and was a member of
the NASD.
Following Nay's suicide, the SEC initiated receivership
proceedings, and various claimants -- including these respondents
-- prosecuted claims against First Securities which were duly
allowed.

See SEC v. First Securities Co., 463 F."2d 981 (CA7,

1972), cert.denied, 409

u.s.

880.

The present litigation was instituted on February 19,
1971 (Nay's suicide having occurred in June 1968), by respondents

No. 74-1042
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against the accounting firm of Ernst & Ernst, petitioner here
("Ernst").*

The sole basis for federal jurisdiction was an

·---------------------------------

alleged violation of Section lO(b) of the Act of 1934 and

Rule lOb-5 thereunder, the complaint alleging that Ernst "aided
and abetted"

in the fraud perpetrated by Nay.

The complaint does not allege that Ernst committed, or

ft ?1 I

had knowledge of, any fraud; nor does it charge Ernst with reck-

If .. -

less or willful conduct f:te A. 81, 85-86; see also amended complaint).

Rather, the substance of the complaint is that Ernst

·

negligently failed to exercise proper care in its auditing procedures, and particularly that it failed to comply with generally
accepted accounting standards.**
The case was submitted on motion for summary judgment,
supported by affidavits and depositions.

The charge of negligence

focused on the failure of Ernst to make an adequate inquiry into
the way in which Nay personally handled the escrow accounts.

It

appears that Nay imposed a rule within his firm to the effect
that only he could open mail addressed to him or to the firm

*

The first count in this suit was against the Midwest Stock
Exchange, and is not here involved.

**

The term "negligence" is not used in the complaint, but -absent fraud or reckless conduct -- there is no other basis
for the liability asserted.

No. 74-1042
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("Nay's Mail Ruleil ).

The escrow accounts were not reflected on

the books of the company.

Upon his death, a substantial volume

of correspondence was discovered that related to the escrow
accounts.

The essence of respondents' claim for damages is that

if Ernst had properly discharged its duty as auditor, it would
have investigated the way in which mail was handled within the
firm and would have discovered Nay's mail rule.

Decisions of the Courts Below
The DC granted Ernst's motion for summary judgment,
but this was reversed by CA7

•
~n

•

a lang and rambling discourse

(reading more like a second rate law review comment than a court
opinion) that is somewhat less than illuminating.

CA7 held that

a proper case had been alleged under Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5.
It was conceded that no actual knowledge of fraud was
averred, and that scienter was not charged by respondents.

In

effect, CA7 inferred knowledge of fraud (assuming the allegations
to be true) on the theory that if Ernst had exercised due diligence (i.e., han not breached an alleged duty to inquire into

..-..__,
Nay's mail rule) it would have discovered and disclosed the fraud.
In short, under the rationale of CA7's opinion, proof of negligence
on Ernst's part in failing to discover Nay's mail rule would
subject Ernst to damage liability under the Securities Act.

No. 74-1042
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CA7 thereupon concluded that summary judgment was improper; that there were genuine issues of material fact to be
decided at trial; and the case was remanded for trial.*
Although the case at this time is in an "interlocutory"
status in view of the remand for trial, we granted cert for the
purpose of considering the applicable standard of liability in
a damage suit under Section lO{b) and Rule lOb-5.

There is a

conflict among the circuits, although the negligence standard
adopted by CA7 is the minority view.

The Question
The questions which, as I am presently advised, need
to be considered by this Court are best expressed in the amicus
brief on behalf of the American Institute ,of CPAs:
1. May liability for damages be imposed upon accountants pursuant to Section lO(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5
for negligent failure to comply with generally
accepted auditing standards in the absence
of pleading and proof of scienter?
2. May an auditor be liable in damages
for aiding and abetting his client's violation
of Section lO{b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5
in the absence of knowledge of the client's
violative conduct and solely on the basis of
negligent performance of audit functions?

*

Other issues are involved in this case, including equitable
estoppel and the applicable statute of limitations. As I
presently view the case, these issues need not be reached.

5.
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The issue posed by these related questions is important.

As we had occasion recently to note in Blue Chip

Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, private causes of action for damages
under Section lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 have evolved expansively by
judicial interpretation.

The decision of CA7, if affirmed by

us, would advance this process to new frontiers.

Damage lia-

bility could be imposed for negligence not only upon the contracting party (the brokerage firm in this case), but also upon
a "third party" accounting firm.

The Relevant Statutory and Rule Language
Section lO(b) of the Act of 1934 makes it un-lawful:
(b) To use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security registered
on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.

~ further

If the "plain meaning" rule is applied, we need go no
than the foregoing statutory language.

The proscribed

conduct, applicable "in connection with the purchase or sale of
any" security, is identified as "any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention" of rules and regulations
of the Commission.

This language has been held by most circuits

addressing the problem as requiring "scienter," usually defined

No. 74-1042
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as actual knowledge of or reckless disregard of fraudulent
conduct.
Rule lOb-5, adopted pursuant to Section 10 (b), amplifies the language of the statute.

~

It is unlawful under Sub-

section (1) of the Rule "to employ any device, scheme or artifice" to defraud; under Subsection (2) "to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact neeessary to make the statements" not misleading; and under Subsection (3) to engage "in any act, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any
person" -- in each of these situations in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Subsection (2) does not expressly contain the words
"defraud," "fraud" or "deceit;" nor does it refer to any "manipulative or deceptive device."

-

But the Rule must be construed in

light of, and consistently with, Section lO(b).

Indeed, if the

r'

Rule were construed to create a liability based upon simple negligence, petitioner argues with logic that the Rule would be invalid as imposing a standard significantly more exacting than
that required by the statute itself.

Legislative and Regulatory History
The briefs of petitioner and amicus make a rather

fJ

3~

7.
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persuasive case to the effect that such legislative history as
exists also supports the requirement of scienter.
~-

See p. 39 et

of petitioner's brief; and p. 13 et seq. of the amicus

brief of the American Institute of CPAs.

Decisions of Courts of Appeals
The briefs assert that decisions in CA2, CAS, CA6, and
CAlO construe lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 as requiring scienter (i •.e.,
a degree of culpability beyond negligence).

I have examined only

a couple of CA2 decisions, and these do support generally this
position:

~,

~,

Judge Friendly's concurring opinion in SEC

v. Texas Gulf SulfJ r, 401 F.2d 833, which has since been followed
in that circuit; and Shemtob v. Sherson, Hammill and Co., 448 F.2d
442, 445.
Apparently CA9 (White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724)

is generally

in accord with CA7.
Petitioner's brief cites Professor Loss and other
secondary authorities in support of its position.

Policy Considerations
In Blue Chip Stamps, we gave weight to "policy considerations."

I am inclined to agree that such considerations are

especially relevant where we are asked to extend by judicial

No. 74-1042
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interpretation civil liability for damages under a statute which,
by its terms, imposes no such liability.

As in Blue Chip Stamps,

a negligence standard applicable to auditors would invite litigation based on a simple averment of absence of due care, not
merely in the recording of the facts as reflected by the company's
books but in failing properly to discover mismanagement or fraud.
Third party suits of this kind, brought years after the occurrence .

--

of the alleged negli ence and viewed with "hind-sight" vision,
would impose a high risk of liability on accountqnts.

Comment
But quite apart from other considerations, I find no
basis in the statute -- or indeed in the Rule -- for the negligence
standard applied by CA7.

After all, the respondents elected to

sue in the federal court and jurisdiction is asserted under Section lO(b).

This has been viewed from the outset as a "fraud"

statute.
Although my present disposition is evident . from this
memorandum, this is a case with potentially wide ramifications.
I will try to keep a reasonably open mind pending further study
and discussion, and the oral argument.

December 1, 1975
To: Justic e Powell
From: Greg Palm
No .

74-1042

Ernst & Ernst v .

Hoehfelde~

After studying thi s cas e f a i rly care ful l y
this pas t s umme r I discovered that my own conclusions r egar ding
t he advi sa ili ty of a doptin g a negligence standard for rule
lOb-5 liabi li ty were simi lar t o your own(as expre ss ed in your
"aid-to -memory" memorandum)--ieo

the langua ge of t he Etlatute

and legislative his tory (admi ttedly almost none), i f anythi ng,

----

point away f r om the conc lusion that

any~f

-----------------------------------

ne&ligence standa rd

was in tended;l1:the structure mf the Sec urities Ac ts- - ie. then= are

~

·-

-------------------------

places where a type of negligenc e standar d has expre s sly been created ,
such as the duty of e xperts in the case of r egi s trat ion s tatement s (
defense of due

di ligenc e )--~uppor ts

than mere negl igence was intended;

the conclusion tha t something more
policy arguments

identified i n petitioner's brief--many of which are derived from
Blue Chip Stamps- - and noted by you in your memorandum also support
------------..>

the view that s ome type of quasi-scienter standard is appropriate.
/

The "weight" of judicial authority--ie. Judge Friendly in Texas
Gulf, Judge Adams ••• • --also support s t his position.
In light of t his agreement I

decided at t hat time that

it would not be very f r uitf ul to write a memorandum unless and until
I thought of some important factors that would argue against the
conclusion reached in your own prelimina ry memorandum.
have t hought of none.

As yet I

Thus, although I intend to review the briefs

tomorrow so that t hey will be fresh in mind should you want to
di s cuss the
no

case prior to voting on frid a y, I intend to give you

memorandum i n this

cas ~ .
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OFFICE OF H 1

r· ~E:··;'<

SUPRE1'i/IF. COU.il, U.S.

December 4, 1 975

Honorable Michael Rodak , Jr.
C.l''f_·\.

Supreme Court of the United States
Washington, D.C.
20543
Re:

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder
______(!.! 0 ~ 7 4 :.!Q.~~j_ __________

Dear M:L. Rodak:
During the argument yesterday in the above case, Mr.
Justice Brennan asked government counsel ~~at was the
position of the Secu:ci-t:i.es and Exchange Commission on whe·ther
an implied right of action exists under Section 17(a ) .
Counsel
responded that the Conunission h ad taken no position on Uwt
question.
Counsel assumed that the question referred to
Section 1 7( a ) of the Sec u rities Exchange Act of 1 934, which
requires that brokers and dealers maintain certain records
pertaining t o t.heir financial cond.i..t.ion and sub::Cl.it. reports to
the Commission.
Because of a prior colloquy between Mr. J ustice Blackmun
and one of the counsel for responde n ts, government counsel is
concerned that Mr. Justice Brennan might have been referring
to Section 1 7 (a ) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933, which
is an an·tifraud provision.
~[' he Commission has taken the pos:L~:ion
thut an implied right of action exists for violation of the
latter provision.
Would you

ple~se

distribute copj. e s of this le tte r to the

Coru:-t.
Since rely,

Hobt::;rt H. Bork
Solicitor General

.,. .. ~ )"\ _.
- .,t:-: ~Y _::
.

'

·''

- 2 cc:

Kenneth J. Bialkin, Esq.
Louis A. Craco, Esq.
1 Chase Manhattan Plaza
New York, N.Y.
10005
Francis D. Morrissey, Esq.
130 East Randolph Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60601
Willard L. King, E sq.
King, Robin, Gale & Pillinger
135 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603
Willard J. Lassers, Esq.
Elson, Lassers and Wolff
11 south LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603
Donald L. Vetter, Esq.
135 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, Illinois 60603
Leon M. Despres, Esq.
77 West Washington Street
Chicago, Illinois
60602
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

Greg Palm

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

DATE:

February 4, 1976

'7 </- /0 'fl...-

Ernst & Ernst
You were
case to write.

qui~

right in saying that this is not an easy

I have no difficulty with the correctness of

our basic analysis, but nevertheless find it a difficult and
delicate task to put an opinion together that satisfies.

[?]

In view of

14

~~~he number of changes made, and to facilitate your further

.,UI
c.~

'#)

I return herewith your draft of 1/16/76.

editing, Sally has prepared a partially "cleaned up" copy
reflecting my editing.

I give this to you, together with your

original draft from which you will be able to see exactly
what I have done.
I have adhered to the basic structure of your draft.
Nor was I able to reduce the length appreciably, and possibly
not at all.
As I have devoted all the time now available to me on
this case (with others backed up awaiting my attention), I
would appreciate your resuming the editing and revising
process.

In undertaking this, in addition to the changes

I have made and my marginal suggestions, I have the following
thoughts:

"t.

1.

2.

The contrast you have drawn throughout the opinion

is between "knowing or intentional misconduct", on the one
hand, and negligence or "negligent misfeasance", on the other.
What is the derivation of this terminology?

The briefs and

arguments, for the most part, spoke simply in terms of
"scienter" and "negligence".
used language that I

Judge Adams in Korn (at p. 287)

like= ~

\.,

. tr.

\.'

'f.'

~J:

"An intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud. "
Adams, p. 285, also referred to Judge Friendly's formulation as including "recklessness" that amounts to fraud.

What

would you think of our using the term "scienter" and defining
it early in the opinion, using the Adams/Friendly terminology?
Also, is there a reason for use of the term "misfeasance"
in conjunction with "negligence"?

In connection with choice

of terminology, lO(b) uses "deceptive device or contrivance" '
and Rule lOb-5, in two of its subsections uses the term
'

"fraud".
2.

iii'

,,~,

I notice that Adams opinion in

the Rule, includes its caption:

~,

in quoting

"Employment of Manipulative

and Deceptive Devices" •. In the briefs, however, I recall
no reference to this caption.

If, indeed, the published

rule includes the caption, we should make some reference to
it in III-D where we address the meaning of subsection (2).

'

!

'.

.'

3.
3.

I am under the impression thatthere is a good bit of

repetition in our references to the sections of the two Acts
providing for "express" liability.

We rely on these sections

in several different places in the opinion.

This is probably

desirable, but you might keep this in mind in the editing
process.

r'?

~

'B~

,lrl

,.. t"~~

p~"~j~

~

4. We do not discuss the absence of "privity" in the
common law sense between Ernst & Ernst and respondents. I

view this as an important fact, and indeed one that could be
controlling with me.

We took the case, however, to resolve

the conflict as to scienter, and I do not think a majority of
the Court would be willing to dispose of it on the absence of
privity.

We should address this question in a footnote.

I

would welcome your thought as to what should be said.
5.

You have indicated to me the reason for not including

a discussion of "policy considerations".

I was impressed,

however, with Judge Friendly's discussion of· such considerations
in his concurring opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur.

He was there

foausing on the effect of a mere negligence rule on management
of corporations in determining what information to disclose
to stockholders.

I agree with Judge Friendly that a serious

,;

policy consideration is present in that context.

I wonder,

also, whether a similar - or perhaps even more serious policy consideration is not present in a . case like this one , •
where liability is sought to be imposed upon an accountant
1,;;

1'

4.
in the absence of privity, and also tn the absence of any
reliance by the plaintiffs on what the accountant did.

You ,

might try your hand at a footnote summarizing generally the
relevant policy considerations, noting that we need not
elaborate on these in view of the language and history of
10 (b). "

' ,,

,,

~.~

[··· f\

wif·
"' lt

'•

·~,

!:!

fi

~~-·

l~
~

~

'
'·

..,

lfp/ss

2/18.1 6

MEMORANDUM
TO:

Greg Palm

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

February 18, 1976

'11/- !CJ!.f"'-·

Ernst & Ernst
We must do something with footnote 20.

Apart from its

unacceptable length (as a single note), it overdignifies
some rather far-fetched argument (really "grasping at straws")
advanced in this case.
As to reliance on Cochran's reference to "negligence",
I

would dispose of that quite summarily by saying that taken,

in context, it was a general observation made in a discussion
of § 8 that was amended prior to passage to require willful
participation as a prerequisite to liability.

I

would conclude

a brief paragraph (a sentence or two) with your statement that
"the comment, ·n context, sheds no light whatever on the meaning
of

§

lO(b)".
The remainder of note 20, in its present form, considers

arguments advanced by industry representatives in hearings
before the Committees.

Rather than identify specific arguments,

I would say merely that the Commission also seeks support for
its position by relying on arguments made by industry
representatives at the legislative hearings.

A second

sentence should be added consolidating the last two sentences
presently in the note, namely, to the effect that testimony

2.

during the course of Committee hearings, particularly by
opponents to the legislation, is entitled to relatively little
weight even when specifically relevant.
cases).

(Citing your three

In this general connection, you might see if there

is anything helpful in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Corp.,

341 U.S. 384, at 395.
L.F.P., Jr.
ss

.

.

lfp/ss

2/19/76

-

MEMORANDUM

TO:

Mr. Greg Palm

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

February 19, 1976

DATE:

No. 74-1042

Ernst &·E rnst

I return herewith the latest draft, reflecting some
editing and the addition of a number of riders .

Also, I

deliver a couple of memos on specific points.
Between the two of us, a draft has gone through so much
piecemeal editing that it is difficult to judge whether it is
in satisfactory form.

Indeed, if we had not been short of

secretarial help, I would have had the entire draft and notes
recopied before undertaking my veview.

I had considerable

trouble tying the footnotes to the text and even keeping the
pages straight.

In terms of substance, I continue to have

some difficulty with the extent to which we rely on the language
of lO(b) and the transition from Part II to Part III.

I think

the language of lO(b) comes very close to being so clear and
unambiguous, in light of other provisions of the Acts, as
to require no consideration of legislative history.

I prefer,

nevertheless, to leave Part III in our opinion, but I do not
wish to imply - in our transition to Part III a any lack of
confidence in Part II as actually controlling.
Thank you for your note 29 with respect to "policy
considerations". _I may try to revise and condense this, or
I may abandon the idea entirely.

'

J

2.

As to procedure from now on, I suggest the following:
1.

Review my editing and changes, and discuss with

me any questions of substance or major language changes that
you think appropriate.
2.

I do not think the draft is in satisfactory form to

give to the printer.

Therefore, I suggest that you give the

notes to Gail and the text to Sally, each to copy such pages
as may be necessary to give the printer something that is clean
andd clear enough to minimize printing time and error.

I

doubt that any printer could figure out where to go from the
present state of things.
3.
my

Except as to points that you specifically bring to

attention, I will not again review the draft until it is

in printed form as a Chambers Draft.

I believe the best way

to progress this opinion is to get it in print.

Then you,

your editor (Carl, I believe) and I can go to work on it wth
with the view to making it as coherently and carefully written
as possible.
4.

I intended saying above that, in reviewing this again,

I hope you will omit or condense any footnote that does not
contribute something necessary or worthwhile to the opinion.
Some of the notes seem to me to be quite marginally relevant.

5.

As you may know, each of us is called on now at

Friday Conferences to state the status of circulated opinions.
I certainly want to circulate Ernst & Ernst prior to the

'

•

l

3.
Court Conference on Friday, March 5,.

This means that I will

have to have a Chambers printed draft no later than the weekend
of March 28·29.
L.F.P., Jr.
ss

lfp/ss

2/19/- ·

MEMORANDUM

DATE:

TO:

Gre;g Palm

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

February 19, 1976

:,

t

)

No. 74-1042

~ ~-}

!,, ,.

Ernst & Ernst

I am not content with Part III, at least on the basis
of my understanding of the situation.
The petitioner for certiorari did not present § 17(a)
as an issue, and no cross petition presented it.

As I

dictate this, I have had no opportunity to review the bill
of complaint.
'i··>,~:

'

My recollection, however, is that it is

.j

predicated solely on 10 (B) and lOb-S •.,~
My recollection is that, at the oral argument, Mr. King

spoke of amending the complaint to aver a cause of action
under 17(a).

(It is possible that my recollection- which is

not sharp - is related to a proposed amendment for some other
purpose).
This litigation has been going on for many years.

If

there is any way to avoid it, I do not wish to saddle the lower
federal courts with another year or two of pointless litigation.

I think there is no merit whatever to the 17(a), but

persistent plaintiffs may find it profitable nevertheless to
continue the litigation.
\,

~'

'·

'·

-

2.

If indeed the complaint does not allege such a cause of
action, and in the absence of any effort prior to this Court
to amend the complaint, I would dispose of this i i.ssue simply
and briefly in a footnote to the effect that respondents
belatedly, after the petition for certiorari had been filed
and granted attempted to raise an issue not specified in their
complaint.

Accordingly, the issue is not before us.

I would

simply reverse the case and if they want to initiate a new
proceedings let them go to it below but without any assist
from us.
L.F.P., Jr.
ss

..

lfp/ss

2/20/76

Possible Footnote (Ernst

~

Ernst)

We might add something along the following lines at an
appropriate place in the opinion. It should come up
near the beginning or at the end.

We took this case to resolve the long-standing
conflict as tofue standard of liability under§ lO(b).
As we find its language and history disoositive of the
issue, there is no occasion to consider whether policy
considerations - that may have influenced the lawmakers are relevant to the ascertainment of congressional intent.
We do note that the standard of liability urged by
respondents would significantly broaden the class of
plaintiffs who may seek to impose liability upon
accountants and other experts who perform services or
express opinions with resoect to matters under the two
Acts.

Last Term, in Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 747-748,

the Court pertinently observed:
(here copy the quote from Blue Chip that Greg_has in his first draft of this note)
This case, on its facts, may illustrate an extreme example
of the reach of the standard urged by respondents.

They

2.
sought to impose substantial personal liability for
damages for alleged negligent conduct upon which respondents
concede·"lthat they did not rely.

Acceptance of their view

would indeed extend the "hazards" of rendering expert
advice under the Acts to new frontiers, raising serious
policy ouestions not yet addressed by Congress.

.iu:vt"ttttt <!Joud of t!rt ~tb .itatttl

Jfagfringtmt. ~. <!}.

2llgtJl.~

CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

March 10, 1976

No. 74-1042 - Ernst & Ernst
Dear Lewis,
I am glad to join your opinion
for the Court in this case.
Sincerely yours,

(?:;,
1'

/

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

f

/

.Snprtm.t Of.mri ttl t!tt 'Jnittb ,jbtttg
._,aslfittgbnt. ~. ~· 2ll.;i~~
C HAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

March 11, 1976

Re:

No. 74-1042 - Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Sincerely,

t

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

/

~u;vt"tmt

Q}oud of t!rt ~tb ~taftg
Jfaglrittgton. ~. (!}. 2llgtJl.~

CHA'tBERS OF

JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE

March 15, 1976

Re:

No. 74-1042 - Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your very good opinion
in this case.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to Conference

.;§u:p-rtntt <!ftrttd trf tqt ~.cb ~hrlta
'Ba1llyin:gitrn, lfl. <!f. 2 ll,? J.I,~
CHAMBERS O F

c

.J U S TI CE WM . .J . BRE N NA N , .JR .

March 25, 1976

RE: No. 74-1042

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, et al.

Dear Harry:
Please join me in your dissenting opinion in the
above.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Blackmun
cc: The Conference

/

,ju.prtntt <!}ourl 1tf tfrt 'Jlltri:t:tb ,jtatts

Jfas!ringLm. ~. <4.

2ll~){.~

CHAMBERS OF

THE CHIEF JUSTICE

March 2 6, 1976

Re:

Dear

74-1042 - Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder

Lewis:
Please join me in your circulation of March 11.
Regards,

·~~
Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

lfp/ss

1

?'29/76

-

'1- ld</v-

E:rn.st

&

Ernst

Respondents in this case were customers of a small
brokerage
Nay.

fir~largely

owned by its president, Leston B.

Respondents were induced by Nay to invest in a

fraudulent securities scheme.

The firm went bankrupt and

Nay committed suicide.
Petitioners in this case, Ernst & Ernst, had audited
the firm's books for many years.

They did not discover

the fraud because Nay was careful to maintain no records.

~·

rul~that

His technique included a

authorized to open all mail addressed

he alone was

to his attention.

After the bankruptcy, respondents sued the accounting

firm;lalleging that it was negligent in failing to have
discovered Nay's rule/ with respect to opening mail.

The

theory was/ that if discovered~ that rule ~oul~ have aroused
the suspicion of

theau~ fir; /and ehat upon investiga-

tion j the fraud would have been revealed.

Th~ suit was brought under

§

lO(b) and Rule lOb-5

of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

The Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, reversing the District
Court, held that respondents had stated a valid cause of
action for damages, even though only negligence had been
alleged.

~ ~~ a~~~ 'I~

..,~ ~ ~"·~·t.f

4

€_.

s~. IIJ(,~.J ~

E..'

2.
Section lO(b) speaks of man~pulative land deceptive
device,;or contrivances.
congressional intent'

These words reflect a
to proscribe a type of conduct

quite different from negligence.

Indeed, the language

Congress chose in other sections of the Securities Acts,

~~rected

to negligent conduct, stands in sharp

contrast to the language of § lO(b).
The legislative history of the 1934 Act, as well as
the overall pattern of express civil liabilities created
by the Acts, also supports the view that § lO(b) is not
directed at merely negligent conduct.
~s

case
defraud

For reasons more fully set forth in the opinion for
the Court, we

~&·L,.~
~kAthe

Court of Appeals erred in reading

a negligence standard into § lO(b) and Rule lOb-5.
Accordingly, we reverse its judgment.

Mr. Justice Blackmun has filed a dissenting opinion
in which Mr. Justice Brennan joins.

Mr. Justice Stevens

took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

April 6, 1976

Cases Held for No. 74-1042

ERNST & ERNST v. HOCHFELDER

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE:
There are three cases being held for ERNST & ERNST,
two of which are related and will be discussed together:
No. 74-1366, Schaefer v. First National Bank of Lincolnwood,
and No. 74-1407 Roam&n & Renshaw v. Schiefer.
The petitions in these cases arise from a complex
stock fraud. A number of persons, including an employee of
the petitioner brokerage firm in No. 74-1407 [hereinafter
Rodman & Renshaw] conspired to drive up the price of the
stock of a certain corporation in order to facilitate a
merger. Petitioners in No. 74-1366 [hereinafter Schaefer]
were purchasers of the shares during the period in which
their market price was artifically inflated. They brought
this civil action under § 1 of the Sherman Act and various
sections of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934.
CA 7 held that Schaefer had a cause of action
under § lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 despite the express remedy for
price manipulation in 1 9 of the 1934 Act and that the
applicable state statute of lLmitations for civil actions
under § lO(b) was equitably tolled because Rodman & Renshaw
had facilitated the fraud of their employee th~oufh
negligence. The court further held that Schaefer s
Sherman Act claLm was incompatible with the damage remedies
under the Securities Acta.

2.

Rodman & Renshaw assert that an ~plied cause
of action under 1 lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 should not be
permitted where the facts alleged constitute a legitimate
cla~ under S 9(a)(2) of the 1934 Act since this will
permit plaintiffs to circumvent the statute of l~itations
provided under 1 9(e). They also challenge the equitable
toll of the statute of l~itations, and contend that if
there is a 1 lO(b) cla~, 1 9(e), rather than state law,
provides the relevant period of l~itations.
The question whether an ~plied cause of action
is appropriate under 1 lO(b) for stock price manipulation
in view of the express cause of action under 1 9(a)(2),
is certainly not frivolous.
The procedural restrictions
provided by S 9(e) would indeed be circumvented by
permitting actions under § lO(b).
Section 9(a)(2)
covers manipulative conduct on national securities
exchanges for the "purpose of inducing the purchase or
sale of such security by others." The applicability of
1 lO(b) is not l~ited to national exchanges and it
contains no special notice requirement other than general
scienter. Thus, this is a case in which the ~plied cause
of action under § lO(b) would totally .nullify the restrictions
on the express action under 1 9(a)(2). Compare Ernst &
Ernst, slip op. 22-24 & n. 31 with SEC v. National Securities,
Inc., 393 u.s. 453, 468 (1969).
-

-

Rodman & Renshaw cite no cases in direct conflict
with CA 7's holding. Moreover, the attractiveness of this
case as a vehicle for resolving this issue is d~inished
by the fact that this is an appeal from pre-trial motions
for summary judgment and the district court expressly noted
that there was a disputed issue of fact whether the § 9(e)
statute of l~itations had in fact run in this case.
Depending upon how the "purpose" clause of S 9(a)(2) is
construed, the action here thus might be sustainable under
that section.
The basis for CA 7's resolution of the tolling
issue is. not entirely clear. In reaching its conclusion

3.

the court relied principally on its decision in Ernst &
Ernst which held that negligent facilitation of fraUd may
justify tolling. But it also note.d that in the original
complaint Schaefer had alleged direct participation by
Rodman & Renshaw in the fraud. The issue whether the
statute of l~itations under § 9 should be applied in
§ lO(b) actions apparently was not raised below. Rodman
& Renshaw do not raise the issue of the appropriateness "
of premising a § lO(b) action on allegations of negligent
facilitation of fraud. In any event, this case would not
necessarily be controlled by Ernst & Ernst, as the
perpetrator of the fraud here was a ROdman & Renshaw
employee. ,
l'.. ;,

Ernst & Ernst has no direct bearing on the
appropriate resolution of the issues raised in the Rodman
& Renshaw petition, none of which in my view merit review
at this t~e. Accordingly, I will vote to deny the
petition in No • . 74-1407.
,,

****
,
As to the implied repeal of the Sherman Act as
urged by Schaefer, CA 7's holding that the existence of
the damage remedies under the Securities Acts rendered
"superfluous" private remedies under the antitrust laws
is questionable. As the Solicitor General points out in
his amicus brief, however, the circumstances of this case
are rather unique. Neither Schaefer nor the S.G. is
aware of any prior cases in which manipulations of
securities, as distinguished from commodities, have been
challenged as violative of both the antitrust and securities
laws. I agree with the S.G. that the case does not merit
review by this Court an~accordingly, will vote to deny
the petition in No. 74-1366. , ,
;
:;·

';···
i:;

I

I

...
4.
No. 75-1065

John Nuveen & Co., Inc. v. Sanders

This case concerns the application of § lO(b)
and Rule lOb-5 to dealers in commercial paper. CA 7 held
that commercial paper with a maturity of 90 days constituted
"securities" within the meaning of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, despite the definition of "security" in
1 3(a~(l0) of that Act which expressly states that the
term 'shall not include • • • any note, draft, bill of
exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at
the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months • • • • "
The court further held that the petitioner, a dealer in
commercial paper, was liable for civil damages under
1 lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 to purchasers of such paper for
failure to make an adequate investigation of the financial
strength of the issuer corporation. Although CA 7 purported
not to rely on a "mere negligence" standard, it is evident
from the opinion that r.etiti~ner was held liable without
any proof of "scienter', as that term is used. in Ernst &
Ernst.
Petitioner's liability was premised on the fact
thit it had failed to make a "reasonable investigation"
of the issuer, CA 7 noting that petitioner had "acted in
the mistaken, but honest belief that financial statements
prepared by certified public accountants correctly represented
the condition of the issuer • • • • " Pet. App. 1.
Petitioner challenges each of these holdings.
Although the issue of the scope of the term "security"
under the 1934 Act is important, in view of the liability
standard under § lO(b) and Rule lOb-5 adopted by CA 7,
I will vote to grant, vacate, and remand in light of
Ernst & Ernst.

L.F .P., Jr.
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No. 74-1042
ERNST & ERNST

v.
HOCHFELDER

1.

Res ps seek rehearing in this case decided on Mar. 30, 1976, on the

"sole issue" that this Court was wrong in stating that resps had only proceeded on
a theory of negligence.

Thus, resps contend, summary judgment was inappropriate.

Resps contend that negligence was not mentioned in the complaint.

-

The only mention

of negligence was in answer to an interrogatory in which they said they were not
charging petr with intentional fraud but with inexcusable negligence.

Resps then

- 2 -

c

contend that this case charges petr with deliberate failure to perform a duty.
This, resps contend, is fraud, not negligence.
2.

Resps appear to be trying to say that the answer to the interroga tory

should be ignored.

However, the Court noted it in footnote 5 and Part III.

dissent in Ernst & Ernst does not discuss this issue ,
Kovacic

5/4/76
DK

The

No. 74-1042
Ernst & Ernst, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the ~ ~
United States Court of Ap- 0:4 ~~~
v.
peals for the Seventh Cir- - I
.
Olga Hochfelder et al.
&!Y1I-' ~~
cuit.
[March -,

1976]

MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the
Court.
The issue in this case is whether an action for civil
damages may lie under § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), 48 Stat. 891, 15
U. S. C. § 78j (b), and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5, in the absence
of an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud on the
part of the defendant.
I

~

~~~
C-a---r.-<- j:<SJ .J.o
..;:.;- ..n .
c:L- I -

J

1 _J_

~•

/L_~

~Pj

~~

Petitioner, Ernst & Ernst, is an accounting firm. From
1946 through 1967 it was retained by First Securities
Company of Chicago (First Securities), a small broker- ~~
age firm and member of the Midwest Stock Exchange 4_~
and the National Association of Securities Dealers, to
perform periodic audits of the firm's books and records. C!-~~
In connection with these audits Ernst & Ernst prepared j;HL~
for filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission
~,_:_
(the Commission) the annual report for First Securities,
as required by§ 17 (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S. C. § 788 ~~~r(a) .1 It also prepared for First Securities responses
' Section 17 (a) requires that securities brokers or d ealer~
" make ... and preserve ... such accounts ... books, and other

ot~~'
~~~
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to the financial questionnaires of the Midwest Stock
Exchange.
Respondents were customers of First Securities who
invested in a fraudulent securities scheme perpetrated
by Leston B. Nay, president of the firm and owner of
92 % of its stock., Nay induced the respondents to invest funds in "escrow" accounts that he represented
would yield a high rate of return. Respondents did so
from 1942 through 1966. with the majority of the transactions occuring in the 1950's.
transactions were not in the customary form of dealings between First Securities and its customers. Typically, the
respondents sold legitimate securities through First Securities to obtain funds to invest in 1!fte escrow a~coun .
,.....-;
~~1ey then drew their personal checks payable to Nay
')~ ~c::.g:~
or t e an or his account.
o sue 1 ~ accounts
_...were reflected on the books a.nd records of First Securities, and none was shown on its periodic accounting to
respondents. Nor were they included in First Securities'
filings with the Commission or the Exchange. In fact,
there were no escrow accounts as Nay converted rerecords, and make ~ uch re port ~, n~; th e Commission by its rul es nnd
regula tions may prescribe a R neccsRnry or appropriat e in the public
interest or for the protection of investors. " During the period relevant here, CommiRRion Rule 17a-.5 , 17 CFR § 240.17a-5 , required
thnt the reports of fin ancial condition in clude a certifir.ate Rtnting
" clen rl y the opinion of the nccountnnt with respect to the fin aneinl
stat ement covered by the certificate and the a ccounting principle~
and practices reflected therein. " Sec SEC R elease No. 3338 (Nov .
28, 1948 ), X-17A-5 (h) . The rule required ErnRt & Ernst to sta te
in its certificat e, inter alia, " whether the audit was made in nccordnnce with generally accept ed :1\lditing standards applicabl e in
the circumst:mres" and proYidrd that nothing should " be ronsl rurd
to imply authority for the omi H~ ion of any proredme whic·h independent aceountants would ordinarily employ in the course of an
audit for the purpose of expresRing the opinions" required by therule.
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spondents' funds to his own use immediately upon
receipt.
This fra.ud came to light in 1968 when Nay committed
suicide, leaving a note describing First Securities as
bankrupt and the escrow investments as "spurious."
Respondents subsequently filed this action 2 for damages against Ernst & Ernst" in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under
§ 10 (b) of the 1934 Act. The complaint charged that
Nay's escrow scheme violated § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5
of the Comrnission, 4 and that Ernst & Ernst had "aided
~ _and _abettc~ Nay'~ ,violat~ons by it~ ."fa.ilure" to con~
duct
proper aud1~ of F1rst Secur1t10s. As revealed
.:-- ~ through discovery, respondent's cause of action rested
0
on a theory of negligent misfeasance. The premise was
that Ernst & Ernst had failed to utilize "appropriate
auditing procedures" in its audits of First Securities,
thereby failing to discover internal practices of the firm
2
Two separate, but substantinlly ident ira!, complaints initially
were filed by different groups of respondents. Subsequently the respondents jointly filed a First Amended Complaint. The two cases
were treated by the District Court as if they were consolidated
and were consolidated formally on appeal.
3
The first cotmt of the complaint was directed againHt the Mid-west Stock Exchange, char~ing that through its act and omissions it
had aided and abetted Na.y's fraud. Summary jud~mcnt in favor
of the Exchange wns affirmed on nppral. Ilochfelder v. Midwest
Stacie Exchange, 503 F. 2d 364 (CA7), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 875
(1974).
4
Immediately after Nay's suicide the Commission commenced recrivership proceedings ~ First Securities. n those procee mg~
all of the respondents except two nssert cd claims based on the
fraudulent escrow accounts. These claims ultimately were tt'H'....,..,.__
in SEC v. First Securities Co., 463 F. 2d 981, 986 (CA7 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U. S. 880 (1973), where tlw court held that Nay's conduct Yiolated § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5, and thnt First Securities
was li[tb]e for Nay's fraud ns an aider nnd abettor. The question
of Ernst & Ernst's liability was not considet'ed in that case.
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said to prevent an effective audit. The practice principally relied on was Nay's rule that only he could open
mail addressed to him at First Securities or addressed
to First Securities to his attention, even if it arrived in
his absence. Respondents contended that if Ernst &
Ernst had conducted a proper audit, it would have discovered this "mail rule." The exisknce of the rule then
would have been disclosed in reports to the Midwest
Stock Exchange and to the Commission. and this would
have led to an investigation of Nay that would have
revealed the fraudulent scheme. Respondents specifically discla.imed the existence of fraud or intentional
misconduct on the part of Ernst & Ernst. 5
After extensive discovery the District Comt granted
Ernst & Ernst's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. The court re,i<'cted Ernst & Ernst's
contention tha.t a cause of action for aiding and abetting
a securities fraud could not be maintained under§ 10 (b)
or Rule lOb-5 merely on allegations of negligence. It
concluded. however, that there was no genuine issue of
material fact with respect to whether Ernst & Ernst had
conducted its a.udits in arcoJ'dallcc with genemlly accopkd auditing standards."
In their responsr to interrogatorirs in thr District Court reconceded that " [ w] e do not aecuse Ernst & Ernst of
dclibrrate, intentional frnud,"' mNely with "inexcusable negligrnce."'
App. 81.
"The Distric·t Court also hrld that rc;;;pondcnts' action was b:trred
by the doctrine of cquit.ablr cstopprl and 1be applicable stntc statute of limitations of thrrc yc:ll''· Sre n. 27, infra. As cu~tomrrR of
First Securitie::; some of the rc:-;pondent R were sent confirmation form~
ns required under § 17 (a) nnd Rule 17a-5 rrquesting that. they
verify the accuracy of the statements and notify Ernst & Ernst aR to
any exceptions. Although the confirmation forms c-ontained 110
reference to the escrow accounts, Ernst & Ernst were not notified
of this fact. The last audit of First Securities by Ernst & Emst
5

~ponclentR
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed
and remanded. 503 F. 2d 1110 (1974).. That court
held that one who breaches a duty of inquiry and disclosure owed another can be liable in damages for aiding
and abetting a third party's violation of Rule 10-b upon
demonstrating that but for the breach the fraud would
have been discovered or prevented. Id., at 1104.7 The
court reasoned that Ernst & Ernst had a common-law
and statutory duty of inquiry as to the a.dequacy of First
Securities' internal control system because it had contracted to audit First Securities and to prepare for filing
with the Commission the annual report of its financial
was completed in December 1967 and the first complaint in this
action was not filed until February 1971.
7
In support of this holding, the Conrt of Appeals cited its decision
in llochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, 503 F. 2d 364 (CA7
1974), where it stated that a cln im for aiding and a betting a :;ecurities fraud solely by inaction could be maintained under Rule IOb-5.
In such case the plnintiff must show "that the party eharged with
aiding and abetting had knowledge of or, but for the breach of a
duty of inquiry, should have had knowledge of the fraud, and that
possrssing such knowledge the party failed to act due 1o an improper motive or breach of a duty of disclosme." /d., at 374. The
(•ourt explained in this case that. t.hese "elements ronstitute a flexible
standard of liability which should be amplified according to the
pecularities of each case." 50;3 F. 2d, at 1104. In view of our
holding thnt an intent to deceive, manipulnt<', or defraud is required
for civil liability under § 10 (b) and Rule IOb-5, we need not
consider whether civil liability for aiding and abetting is appropriate
under the ~>ection and the Rule, nor the elements necessary to cstnbli ~ h such a cnu~e of artion . Ser, e. (! .• B1'enn on v. ~Midwestern
United Life Insuran ce Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (ND Ind. 1966), 286
F. Supp. 702 (ND Ind . 1968), nff'cl. 417 F. 2d 147 (CA7 1969) ,
rert.. denied, 307 U. S. 989 (1970) (defendant held liable for giving
active and knowing as<>istanre to a third pnrty rngnged in violations
of the securities laws). Se<> grn('nill~r Rudrr, Multiple D<'fcndants
in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy,
In Pari Delicto, IndPmni.ficntion and Contribution, 120 U. Pa. L .
Rev. 59'7, 620-645 (1972).
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condition required under § 17 of the 1934 Act a.ncl Rule·
17a-5. 17 CFR § 240. 17a-5.s Thr f ourt further rcasonrd that respondents wcrP beneficiaries of the statutory duty to inquirP,n and tiH' related dL:ty to disclose
any material irregularities that wrr{' cliscovrrecl. l d.,
at 110.5-1111. The court eoncluclrd that there were
genuine issues of fact as to whether Ernst & Ernst's
failure to discover and comment upon Nay's mail rule 10
constituted a breach of its duties of inquiry a.nd disclosure, id., at 1111. a.ncl whether inquiry and disclosure
Seen. 1, Rupra.
The court concludrd that. thr duty of inquiry imposPd on Ernst
& Ernst under § 17 (a.) was "grounded on a concern for the protection of investorR such a~ rrr.-;pondent;,;] ," without rearhing the
qurstion whether the statute imposed a "direct duty" to thr respondents. 503 F. 2d, at 1105. The court rrcognizcd that Ernst &
ErnRt owed no common-law duty of inquiry to re::;pondents :niHing
from its contract with First Sccuritie:; since Ernst & Ern~t did not
specifically foresee that re~pondent. · limited class might suffer from
a nrgligrnt audit, compare Glanze1' v. Shepa1'd, 233 N. Y. 2:~6, 135
N. E. 275 (1922), with Ultmmar<>s Co1'p. v. Touche. 255 N.Y. 170,
174 N. E. 441 (1931), sec, e.{!., R.I. 1/ospital Trust Nat'l Bank v.
Swa1'tz, 455 F. 2d 847, 851 (CA4 1972). Indeed, respondent:; conceded that they did not rely on thr financial statement~'! and reports
prepared by Ernst & Ernst or on its certificate of opinion. 503 F.
2d, at 1107.
10 In their briefs rcspondrnts allude to sc,·eral other alleged failin!!S by ErnRt & Ernst in it~ audit of First Securitie;;, principally itH
failure to inf)uire into the collrctibility of rertnin loans by Fir::;t Sccuritir"~ to Nay and and its failme to follow up on a 1965 memorandum that characterized Fin;t Seenrities' overall system of internal
control as weak because of the centralization of functions in the
ra~hirr. The Court of Appeals mentioned none of these alleged
drficicncics in its opinion in thi~ case, although it did discuss some
of them in its opinion in Jlnchfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchml{!e,
503 F. 2d, at 370-371, holding that. they were insufficient to put the
Exchange 011 notice that further inquiry into First Securitie·' financial affairs was required.
R

9
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would ha.ve led to the discovery or prevention of Na.y's
fraud. I d., a.t 1115.11
We granted certiorari to resolve the question whether
a private cause of action for damages will lie under
§ 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 in the absence of a.ny allegation of scienter-an intent to deceive, manipula.te. or
defraud.12 421 U. S. 009 (1975). We conclude that it
will not and therefore we rcvcrsc. ~
1

11
The Court of Appeals al~o reYer::>ed the District Court'::> holding
with respect to Ernst & Ernst's equitable estoppel and statute of
limitations defenses. See n. 6, supra. In view of our dispo::>ition
of the ease we need not address the issues raised by these defen~es.
12
Although the verbal formubtions of the standard to be applied
have varied, several courts of appeals in substance have held 1hat
negligence alone is sufficient for civil liability under § 10 (b) and
Rule 10b-5. Sec, e. g., White v. Abrams, 495 F. 2d 724 (CA9 1974)
(fiexible duty standard); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F. 2d 718, 735 (CAS
1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 951 (1968) (negligent misfeasnnrc
sufficient for liability); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F. 2d 634 (CA7
1963) (knowledge not required). Other courts of appeals have
held that some type of "scienter"-i. e., in tent to defraud, reckless
disregard for the truth, or knowing use of some practice 1o defraud-is necessary in such an action. Sec, e. g., Clegg v. Conk, 507
F. 2d 1351, 1361-1362 (CAlO 1974), cert. denied, 422 U. S. 1007
(1975) (something more than ordinary negligence"); Lanza v. Drexel
& Co., 479 F. 2d 1277, 1306 (CA2 1973) ("willful or recklC'SS disregard" of the truth). But few of the derisions announcing 1hat Rome
form of negligence suffices for civil liability w1der § 10 (b) and Rule
10b-5 have involved only negligent conduct. Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 489 F. 2d 579, 606 (CA5 1974), cert. denied, 419 U. S.
879 (1974); Kahn v. American Metal Clima.1:, Inc., 458 F. 2d 255,
286 (CA3 1972) (Adams, J., concurring); Burklo, Scienter and Rule
10b-5, 67 Nw. U. L. Rev. 562, 568-570 (1972).
In this opi11ion the term "scienter" refer::> to a mental state embracing an intent to decrive, manipulate, or defraud. In ccrtai11
arra.:; of the law reckless disregard of 1he truth is considered equivalent to knowledge for purposes of imposing liability for some aet.
We need not here address the question whether, in some circumfFootnote 13 is on ]J. 8]
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Federal regulation of transactions in securities emerged
as part of the aftermath of the market crash in 1929.
The Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) , 48 Stat. 74, as
amended 15 U. S. C. § 77a et seq., was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors against fraud and, through
the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote
ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing. See H. R.
Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1-5 (1933). The
1934 Act was intended principalJy to protect investors
against manipulation of stock prices through regulation
of transactions upon securities exchanges and in overthe-counter markets, and to impose regular reporting
requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national securities exchanges. See S. Rep. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., 1- 5 (Hl34). Although the Acts contain numerous carefully drawn express civil remedies
and criminal penalties, Congress recognized that efficient
regulation of securities trading could not be accomplished under a rigid statutory program. As part of the
1934 Act Congress created the Commission, providing it

74-1042-0PINION

ERNST & ERNST v . HOCHFELDER

with an arsenal of flexible enforcement powers. See,
e. g., 1933 Act §§ 8, 19, 20, 48 Stat. 79, 85, 86, as
amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 77h, 77s, 77t; 1934 Act §§ 9,
19, 21, 48 Stat. 889, 898, 899, as amended, 15 U. S. C.
§§ 78i, 78s, 78u.
Section 10 of the 1934 Act makes it "unlawful for
any person
(b) rt] 0 use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors." 15
U. S. C. § 78j.. In 1942, acting pursuant to the power
eonferred by § 10 (b) , the Commission promulgated
Rule 10b-5, which provides:
0

0

0

"Employment of manipulative and deceptive
devices
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
" ( 1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud,
"(2) to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessa.r y
in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
"(3) to engage in any act. practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security."
Although § 10 (b) does not by its terms create an
express civil remedy for its violation , and there is no
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indication that Congress,'" or the Commission \ovhen
adopting Rule 10b-5."' contemplated such a remedy,
the existence of a private cause of action for violations
of the Rule is no-vv well established. Bl'Ue Chip Stamps
v. Manor Dr'Ug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 730 (1975);
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128,
150-154 (1972); S'Uperintcndent of Insurance v. Bankers
Life and Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n. 9 (1971). During the 30-year period sine<' a private cause of action
was first implied under ~ 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5,'r. a
substantial body of case law and conm1entary has developed as to its elements. Courts and commentators
long ha,ve differed as to whether scienter is a necessary
element of such a cause of action, or whether negligent
conduct alone is sufficient. 17 In addressing this question, we turn first to the language of § 10 (b) , for the
"starting point in every ease involving construction of a
statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps,
supra, at 756 (PowELL, J., concurring). E. g., FTC v.
Bunte Brothers, 312 U. S. 349, 350 (1941).
See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 5-6 (1934);
Note, Implied Liability Under tho Securities Exchange Act, 61 Harv .
L. Rev. 859, 861 (1948).
1
" See. e. g., Birnbmtrn v. NewpMt Steel Corp., 193 F. 2d 461, 463
(CA2) , cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956 (1952); 3 Loss, Securities Regulation 1469 n. 87 (2d ed. 1961).
11:Kardon v. National Gypsmn Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (1946).
17
See cases cited in n. 12 , supra. Compare, e. g., Comment,
Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 69 Col. L. Rev. 1057, 1080-1081 (1969');
Note, Negligent Misrepescntations under Rule 10b-5, 32 Chi. L. Rev .
824, 835-836 (1965); Note, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 938, 947 (1969); Note,
Civil Liability Under Section lOB and Rule 10B-5: A Suggestion
for RephLcing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 Yale ·L. J. 658, 682-689
( 1965) , with, e. g., 3 Loss, supra, at 1766; 6 id., at 3883-3885 (Supp .
11

19(19).
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A

Section 10 (b) makes unlawful the usc or employment of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in contravention of Commission rules. The
words "manipulative or deceptive" used in conjunction
with "device or contrivance" strongly suggest that § 10
(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional
conduct. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.
2d 833, 868 (CA2 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert..
denied sub nom. Kline v. SEC, 394 U. S. 976 (1969);
Loss. Sumary Remarks, 30 Bus. Lawyer 163, 165 (1975).
See also Kahn v. American Metal Climax, 458 F. 2d 255,
280 (CA3 1972) (Adams, J., concuning).
In its amicus curiae brief, however, the Commission
contends that nothing in the language "any manipulative device or contrivance" limits its operation to knowing and intentional practiccs. 18 In support of its view,
the Commission cites the overall congressional purpose
The Commission ~ would not permit recovery upon
proof of negligence in all cases. In light of the limitations that
Congress has placed on the cxpre;;s civil remedies in the 1933 and
1934 Acts, sec pp. - - - , infra, the Commission would limit the
circumstances in which civil liability could be imposed for negligent
violation of Rule lOb-5 to situations in which (i) "the defendant
knew or reasonably could forsPe that the plaintiff would rely on
his conduct, (ii) the plaintiff did in fact so rely, and (iii) the
amount of the plaintiff's damages caused by the defendant's conduct
was definite and ascertainable." Brief of Amicus Curiae 23-33. The
Commission concludes that the present record does not establish
these conditions for civil liability since respondents in fact did not
rely on Ernst & Ernst's audits, the financial statements of First
Securities could not have been rca;;onably foreseen as likely to induce
rc~pondents to inve t in the escrow accounts, and the amount of
re:=;pondents' damages was unascertainable. !d., 33-36. Respondcnt.s accept the Commission's analysis of the operative language of
the statute and Rule, but reject these additional requirement<S for
recovery for negligent violations.
18

,-c::5
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in the 1933 and 1934 Acts to protect investors against
false and deceptive practices that may injure them.
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. 8., at
151; Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co., 404 U. 8 .. at 11-12; J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 433 (1971); SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 195 (1963). The
Commission then reasons that since the "effect" upon
investors of given conduct is the same whether the
conduct is negligent or intentional, Congress must have
intended to bar all such practices and not just those
done knowingly or intentionally. The logic of this
effect-oriented approach would impose liability for
wholly faultless conduct where such conduct results in
harm to investors, a result the Commission is unlikely
to support. But apart from where its logic might lead,
the Commission would add a gloss to the opera.tive
language of the statute quite different from its com~
monly accepted meaning. See, e. g., Addision v. ally
19
Hill Co., 32 U. S. 607, 617- 618 (1944).
The ~
d---m~ argument simply ignores the use of the words
"device" or "contrivance," terms that make unmistakable a congressional intent to proscribe a type of con-

If.

1
n "We should of course be faithful to the meaning of a statute.
But after all Congress expresses its meaning by words. If legislative policy is couehed in vague language, ea8ily susceptible of one
me:ming as well as another in the common speech of men, we should
not stifie a policy by a . . . grudging process of eonstrnctio.n. To
let words dmw on some pUI'J)Ose is one thing. To draw on some
unexpressed spir.i t outside the bounds of the normal meaning of
wordcl is quite another . . . . After all, legislation when not cxprr,sscd in technical terms is addressed to the common run of men
a nd is therefore understood according to the sense of the thing,
as the ordiuary man has a right to rely on ordinary words nddrc~Red
to him ." 322 U.S., at 617-618. Sec Frunkfnrlu, Some Reflections
on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Col. L. Rev. 527,536-587 (1947) .

'
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duct quite different from negligence.Z° Few concepts
in the law are more familiar than that of negligence.
One must assume that if Congress had intended to extend the reach of § 10 (b) to embrace negligent conduct
it would have said so in conventional, commonly accepted terms.
In addition to relying upon the Commission's argument with respect to the operative language of the statute, respondents contend that since we are dealing with
"remedial legisla.t ion," Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S.
332, 336 (1967), it must be construed "not technically
and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial
purposes." Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U. S., at 151. This argument assumes that "remedial
purposes" of the Act embrace as a minimum a negligence
standard of liability. But in seeking to accomplish its
broad remedial goals, Congress did not elect a single
or uniform standard of civil liability even as to express
civil remedies. In some circumstances and with respect
to certain classes of defendants, Congress did create express liability predicated upon a failure to exercise reasonable care, e. g., 1933 Act § 11 (b) (liability of persons
such as accountants or lawyers for misleading statements in portions of registrations statements for which
they are responsible). In other situations good faith is
an absolute defense, 1934 Act § 18, 15 U. S. C. § 78r
20

Webster's Int'l Dictionary (2d ed. 1934) defines "device":
"[t]hat which is devised, or formed by design; a contrivance; an
invention; project; scheme; often a schrme to deceive; a stratng('!ll;
~ n artific£ and "contrivance" in pertinent part as "[a] thing f'On- .
,~rived or used in contriving; a scheme, plan, or artifice." In turn,
"contrive" in pertinent part is defined as "To devise; to plan; to
plot ... [t]o fabricate ... de..;ign; invent ... to scheme . . . . "
The Commission al~o ignores the use of the terms "[t]o use or
employ," lnngunge that is supportive of the view that Congress
did not intend § 10 (b) to embrace negligent conduct .

\V

.
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(misleading statements in any document filed pursuant
to the Act), while in other circumstances Congress created express liability regardless of the defendant's fault,
1933 Act § 11 (issuer liability for misleading statements
in the registration statement).
It i.s thus evident that Congress imposed express civil
liability in the 1933 and 1934 Acts on a pa.rticnlarized
basi.s. Ascertainment of congressional intent with respect to the standard of liability created by a particular
section ojt he Act must therefore rest primarily on the
language of that section. Where , as here, we deal with
a judicially implied liability, the statutory language certainly is no less important. In view of the language
of § 10 (b) which so clearly connotes intentional rillsconduct, and mindful that the language of a statute
controls when sufficiently clear in its context, United
States v. Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 648 (1961); Packard
Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485, 492 (1947),
further inquiry may be unnecessary. We turn now,
nevertheless, to the legislative history of the 1934 Act
to ascertain whether there is support for the meaning .a ttributed to § 10 (b) by the Commission and
respondents.
B
Although the extensive legislative history of the 1934
Act is bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress'
intent, at history supportJ our cone us1on that § 10 (b)
was addressed to practices that involve some element
of scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for
negligent conduct alone.
The original version of what would develop into the
1934 Act was contained in identical bills introduced by
Senator Fletcher and Representative Rayburn. S. 2693,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1034). H. R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d
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SC"ss. (1934). Section 9 (c) of the bills, from which present § 10 (b) evolved, proscribed as unlawful the usc of
"any dcvic~ or contrivance which, or any device or contrivance in a way or mn,nner w·hich the Commission may
by its rules and rcguglations find detrimental to the public interest or to the proper protection of investors." The
othC"r subsections of proposed § 9 listed specific practices
that Congress empowered the Commission to regulate
through its rulemaking power. Sec §§ 9 (a) ("short
sale") , (b) ("stop-loss order"). Soon after the hearings
on the House bill were held, a substitute bill was introduced which abbreviated and modified § 9 (c)'s operative
language to read "any manipulative device or contrivance." S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (c) (1934); H. R.
7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (c) ( 1934). Still a third bill,
retaining the Commission's power to regulate the specific
practices enumerated in the prior bills, and omitting all
reference to the Commission's authority to prescribe rules
concerning manipulative or deceptive devices in general,
was introduced and passed in the House. H. R. 9323,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1934). The final language of § 10
is a modified version of a Senate amendment to this last
House bill. See H. R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Scss.,
32-33 (1934).
Neither the intended scope of§ 10 (b) nor the reasons
for the changes in its operative language are explicitly
revealed in the legislative history of the 1934 Act, which
deals primarily with other aspects of the legislation.
There is no indication, however, that § 10 (b) w~ (
tended to proscribe conduct not involving scienter The
, cnatc Report discusses generally the vanous abuses that
precipitated the need for the legislation and the inade1
quacy of self-regulation by the stock exchanges.
The Report then analyzes the component provisions

J
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of the statute, but does not par:-;10. The only specific
reference to§ 10 iB this diseussi~the ~ing:
"In addition to the discretionary and elastic powers conferred on the administrative authority, effective regulation must include several clear statutory
provisions reinforced by penal and civil sanctions,
aimed at those manipulative and deceptive practices
which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful
function. These sanctions are found in sections 9, 1()
and 16." S. Rep. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934).

/

1n the portion of the general analysis section of the
Report entitled "Manipulative Practices," however, there
is a discussion of specific practices that were considered
so inimical to the public interest as to be expressly prohibited, such as "wash" sales and "matched" orders 21
and of other practices sue 1 as stabilizatiOn of security
)rices and grants of options, t 1at m1g t in some cases
serve legitimate purposes. These latter practices were

lc~t :o ~~~:~~~:;!:~Com~ission. Significantly, w~
thmk, .
. .. , t 1ere was no m ICa
tion that any type of criminal or civil liability was to
attach in the absence of scienter. For example, in dis~
cussing the potential abuses resulting from the use of
options, the Report indicated that self-regulation by a
Wash sales are transactions involving no change in beneficial
ownership. Matched orders nrc ordN~ for the pnrchasej sale of a
security that are Pntercd with the knowlrdge that orders of substantinlly the snme .~ize. at suhRtnntinlly the same time nne! pri<"e,
have been or will be entered by the same or different persons for
the saJcjpurchase of such sernrity. Section 9 (n) (1) of the 1984
Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78 (a) (1), proscribes wash sales and matrhed
orders when cffcctuntcd "l}]or the purpose of crentinp: a fal.~c or·
misleading appearanre of active trading in any scruril)' registered
on a national scrmitics exehnnge or ... the market for any surh
security." Sec In re J. A. Latimer & Co., 38 S. E. C. 700 (1058);
In 1·e Thornton & Co., 28 S. E. C. 208 (1D48) .
21

.
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securities ·change had proved inadequate because members might mploy "lWltlllember.s; ~ by its rules,
to execute transactions. /d., 9. In commenting on the
express civil liabilities provided in the 1934 Act, the Report explains:

6

" ... the bill provides that any person who unlawfully manipulates the price of a security, or who
induces transactions in a security by means of false
or misleading statements, or who makes a false or
misleading statement in the report of a corporation,
shall be liable in damages to those who have bought
or sold the security at prices affected by such violation or statement. In such case the burden is on the
plaintiff to show the violation or the fact that the
statement was false or misleading, and that he relied
thereon to his damage. The defendant may escape
liability by showing that the statement was made in
good faith." /d., at 12-13 (emphasis supplied).
The Senate Report thus reveals a congressional intent to
prevent "manipulative and deceptive practices ... which
fulfill no useful function" and to create a private action
for damagE'S stemming from "illicit practices," where the
defendant has not acted in good faith. There is no indication that Congress intended anyone to be made an
insurer against potentially misleading conduct or misstatement unless he acted otherwise than in good faith.
-------...:-----r·tw extensive hearmgs that preceded) passage of the
1934 Act similarly touched only briefly on § 10, and most
of the discussion was devoted to the enumerated devices
now proscribed in § 10 (a). The most relevant exposition of the provision that was to become § 10 (b) was by
Thomas G. Corcoran, a spokesman for the drafters. Corcoran indicated:
"Subsection (c) [ § 9 (c) of H. R. 7852-later § 10>

I,

/
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(b)] says, 'Thou shalt not devise any other cunning
devices.' ...
"Of course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to
prevent manipulative devices. I do not think there
is any objection to that kind of clause. The Commission should have tho authority to deal with new
manipulative devices."
Hearings on H. R. 7852 and R. R. 8720 before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong.,
2d Scss., 115 ( 1934). This brief explanation of § 10 (b)
by the spokesman for its drafters is significant. The
secti~ was described rip;htly as a "catch-all" dausc to
enable the Commission "to deal with new manipulative
[or cunning] devices." It is difficult to believe that any
lawyer, legislative draftsman, or legislator would use
these words if the intent was to create liability for merely
negligent acts or omissions. Usc of the word "manipulative" is especially significant. It is virtually a term of
art when used in connection with securities markets. It
connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially
affecting the price of securitics. 22 Neither the legislative
history nor the briefs supporting respondents identify
any usage or authority for construing manipulative or
cunning conduct to include negligence. 2 a
See Webstt>r's Int'l Dietionnry (2d ed. 1934): "mnnipulate":
" ... to manage or trr::tt. nrtfully or fraudulently; a.<> to manipulnte
accounts . . . . 4. Exchanges. To force (price~) up or down, as
hy matched orders, wash sale,;, fictitious reports ... ; to ri~."
2 " In support on£ its poPition the Commission citPs a statement
by Corcoran in the Senate hearings that "in modern society there
Hre mnny things you have to m<lke crimes which arc Rhrcr matters
of negligence" and "intent is not ncecssary for rvery crimt>." Hearings on Stock Exchange Prartircs before the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Scss., 6509-0510 (1934). The
!'Otnment., taken in context, sheds no light on the meaning of § 10 (b).
22

7
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c
The 1933 and 1934 Acts constitute interrelated components of the federal regulatory scheme governing transactions in securities. Sec Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at
727-730. As the Court indicated in SEC v. National Seruritics, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), "the interdependence
of the various sections of the securities laws is certainly
a relevant factor in any interpretation of the language
Congress has chosen." Recognizing this, respondent and
The question had been raised whether criminal violations could arise
under § 8 of S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., which beeame § 9 of the
1934 Act, in the absence of specific intent to influence security
prices for personal gain. Corcoran's remarks, however·, were not
addrm<scd to the scope of § 8, but were general obsr,rvations concerning activity society might proscribe under criminal law. Ferdinand Pecora, cotmsel to the committee, described the draft language
ns "[e]xcluding from its scope an act that is not done with any
ultcr.ior motives or purposes, as set forth in the act." ld., 6510.
Moreover, prior to the passage of the 1934 Act, § 8 was amcndrd to
require willful participation ns a prerequiRite to civil liability for
violations. Compare § 9 (e) of the 1934 Act with § 8 (c) of S. 2693.
The Commission further reliec; on objections to a draft vrr::;ion
of § 10 (b)-§ 9 (c) of S. 2693 and H. R. 7852, see pp. - - - ,
supm-raised by representatives of the securities industry in the
House and Senate hearings. They warned that the lnnguage was
so vague that the Commission might outlaw anything. E. g.,"Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supm, at 6988; Hearing:> on
H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, Hou~e Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 115 (1934), 258. Rema.rks of this
kind made in the course of legi1;lativc debate or hearing~ other than
by persons responsible for the preparation or the drafting of a
bill, are entitled to little weight. See, e. g., United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 276-277 (1947); United States v.
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110, 125 (1942). This is especially so with regard to the ·tatements of legislative opponents who
"[i]n their zeal to defeat a bill ... understandably tend to over,.;tatc its reach." NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 65 (1954).
Sec Schwegmann Bros . v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394395 (1951).
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the Commission contrast § 10 (b) to other sections of tha
Acts to support their contention that civil liability may
be imposed upon proof of negligent conduct. We think
they misconceive the significance of the other provisions. --......-of the Act,...iR- wb.ieh- we--fitt-4. e"Vi.GefH:lQ.. su~ ffl-- a;
p
~
rQQUit:QRTefrl-trhl'ft-an eletMlli gf gc~utQJ;-he---f)fflVed.
~
The Commission argues that Congress has been explicit
in requiring willful conduct when that was the standard
of fault intended, citing § 9 of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C.
§ 78, which generally proscribes manipulation of securities prices. Sections 9 (a) (1) and (2), for example, respectively prohibit manipulation of security prices "[f]or
the purpose of creating a false or misleading appearance
of actual trading in any security ... or ... with respect
to the market for any such security," and "for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by
others." See also § 9 (a)(4). Section 9 (e) then imposes upon "[a]ny person who willfully participates in
any act or transaction in violation of" other provisions
of § 9 liability to anyone who purchased or sold a security at a price affected by the manipulative activities.
From this the Commission concludes that since § 10 (b)
is not by its terms explicitly restricted to willful, knowing, or purposeful conduct, it should not be construed in
all cases to require more than negligent action or inaction
as a precondition for civil liability.
The structure of the Acts docs not support the Commission's argument. In each instance that Congress
created express civil liability . iu both ~g-tt§' It cfearly
specified whether recovery was to be premised on knowing or intentional conduct, negligence, or entirely innocent mistake. Sec 1933 Act, §§ 11, 12, 15, 15 U. S. C.
§§ 77k, 77l. 77o; 1934 Act §§ 9, 16. 18, 20. id., §§ 78i,
78p 78r, 78t. For example, § 11 of the 1933 Act unambiguously creates a private action for damages when a

<' '\
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registration statement includes untrue statements of material facts or fails to state material facts necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading. The issuer
of the securities is held absolutely liable for any damages,
within the limits specified by § 11 (e), resulting from such
misstatement or omission. But experts such as accountants who have prepared portions of the registration statement are accorded a "due diligence" defense. In effect,
this is a negligence standard. An expert may avoid civil
liability with respect to the portions of the registration
statement for which he is responsible by showing that
"after reasonable investigation" he had "reasonable
ground [s] to believe" that the statements for which he
was responsible were true and there was no omission of a
material fact.~ ~ 11 (b)(3)(B)(i). See, e. g., Escott v.
Barchris Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697-703 (SDNY 1968).
The express recognition of a cause of action premised on
negligent behavior in ~ 11 stands in sharp contrast to
the language of § 10 (b), and significantly undercuts the
Commission's argument.
Equally significant, while specifying negligence as a
standard of fault in somP circumstances under the 1933
Act, sec §§ 11, 12 (2), 15. 15 U. S. C. §§ 77k, 77l , 77o,"''
4

24
Other indiYidunls who sign the registration statement, directors
of the isl:luer, nnd the underwriter of the securities similarly nrc
accorded n complete defen.<;c ngninst. ('i1·il linbility bnsed on the excrri;,;e of rrnsonnble investig.1tion nml a rrasonuble brlicf thnt the
rrgistmt ion Rtatement wns not misleading. §§11 (b)(3)(A), (C),
(D); (r). Ree. e. g., Feit v. L easco Data Processing Equipment
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 575-5R3 (EDNY 1971) (underwriters, hut
not officer-director,;, estnblished their due diligence defense). See
gcnernlly R. J enn ings & II. l\Inrsh, Securities Regulation 1018-1027
(3d ed. 1972), nnd ~ourc·e.~ ritrd t hrrrin: Folk, Civil LinbilitieiS under
the Fcdernl Sreuritie;:; AetH: The 13archris Cnse, 55 Va. L. Rev . 199
(1969).
"" Rrrtion 12 (2) erentes potential ci1·il liability for a seller of
securities in favor of the purchaser for misleading statements or
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Congress indicated no role for such a standard Ill the
1004 Act. Each of the express liability provisions of the
Hl34 Act, except those directed to specific classes of inrlividuals such as directors. officers, or lOo/o beneficial holders of securities, sec § 16 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 78p,~" contains
a state of mind requirement for civil liability requiring
something more than negligence. Section 9 proscribes
the manipulation of securities on national securities exchanges and creates potential civil liability for any person who "willfully participates" in such conduct. § 9
(e). Section 18 creates potential civil liability for misleading statements filed with the Commission, but provides the defendant with the defense that "he acted in
good faith and had no knowledge that such statement
was false or misleading." 15 U. S. C. § 78r. And § 20,
15 U. S. C. § 78t, which imposes liability upon "controlling persons" for violations of the Act by persons whom
they control, exculpates a defendant who "acted in good
faith and did not ... induce the act ... constituting the
omissions in connection with the 1 ran~action. The sellrr i~ exculpated if he pro1·e;; th:lf hr did not know, or i11 the exerci~e of
reasonable care, could not hnvr known of the untruth or omi~:<ion.
Section 15 of the HJ33 Art, as amended by § 208 of the 1934 Art,
makes persons who "control" nny person liable under § 11 or § 12
liable jointly and severally to the same extent as the eontrollcd pcrHon, unless he "had no knowledge of or reasonable ground..; to bl'licve in the existenre of facts hy reasons of whirh thr liability of
t.ho controlled person is alleged to exist." 15 U.S. C.§ 77o. Sec Act
of June 6, 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, c. 404, § 208,48 Stat. 908.
2 r, Section 16 (b) provides that a corporation may recapture for
itself the profits realized on a Jlurrhnse and sale, or ~ale and purrhasr. of its securities within six months by a direc-tor, o1Iirer, or
benrficial owner of more than 10% of any elm;~ of the corpor~1 tion's
N]uity securitie::>. Sec Foremost-M cK.esson, Inc. v. Provident Sec1trities Co.,- U.S.- (1976); Kem County Land Co. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp., 411 U. S. 582 (1973); Reliance ]J}lectric Co. v.
Emerson Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418 (1972).
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violation .... " In Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at 736, we
noted the anomaly of imputing to Congress an intention
"to expand ... a judicially implied cause of action beyond the bounds it delineated for comparable express
causes of action" in the provisions of these Acts. The
result urged here by respondents would be no less
anomalous.
Finally, the express civil remedies in the 1933 Act allowing recovery for negligent conduct are subject to
significant procedural restrictions not applicable umler
~ 10 (b). Section 11 (e) of the 1933 Act, for example,
authorizes the court to require a plaintiff bringing a suit
under § 11, § 12 (2), or § 15 thereof to post a bond for
costs, including attorneys' fees. Section 13 specifies a
statute of limitations of one year from the violation, or
three years from the offer or sale, applicable to actions
brought under § 11, § 12 (2), or § 15. It also is significant that simultaneously with the adoption of the 1934
Act, Congress tightened the restrictions on § 11 and § 12
actions by amendment of the 1933 Act. Prior thereto,
§ 11 contained no provision for payment of costs. 48
Stat. 891. See Act of June 6, 1934, Pub. L. No. 291,
c. 404, § 206 (e), 48 Stat. 907. The amendments also
substantially shortened the statute of limitations provided by § 13 of the 1933 Act. Compare 1933 Act § 13,
48 Stat. 84, with 15 U.S. C. § 77m. See 1934 Act, § 207,
48 Stat. 908. 27 Absent substantial evidence in the legislative history to the contrary-and there is none-we are
unwilling to assume that the judicially created private
27
Since no statute of limitations is provided for civil actions
under § 10 (b), as in other case~ of judirially implied remrclics, the
law of limitations of the forum state i8 followed. Sec Jlolwbera v.
Annbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 395 (1946), and cases citrd therein. Although it is not always certain which state st~ttute of limitation~
should be followed, such statui e:s of limit atiolls mmally arc longer
than the period provided undrr § 13. 3 Loss, supra, nL 1778-1774.
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damage remedy under § 10 (b) can be extended, consistently with the intent of Congress, to actions premised
on negligent wrongdoing. Except for suits against issuers of securities, which are held absolutely liable for
damages resulting from misleading registration statements, such an assumption would nullify the effectiveness
of the carefully drawn restrictions on express private
damages actions that Congress proyided in the 1933 Act
and the 1934 Amendments. 28 See, e. g., Fischman v.
Raytheon Manufacturing Co., 188 F. 2d 283 (CA2 1951);
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d, at 867-868
(Friendly, J .. concurring); Rose11berg v. Globe Aircraft
Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124 (SD Pa. 1948); 3 Loss, supra,
at 1787-1788; Jennings & Marsh, Securities Regulation
(3d ed. 1972).
D
We have addressed. to this point, primarily the langua.ge a.nd history of ~ 10 (b). The Commission contends, however, that subsections (2) and (3) of Rule
10lr-5 are cast in language which-if standing alonecould encompass both intentional and negligent behavior.
These subsections respectively provide that it is unlawful "[t]o make any untrue statement of a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made in
Congress regarded these reRt.rirtiom on private damage uctions
as significant. In introducing Title IT of 1he 1934 Act, Senutor
Fletcher indicnted that the amendment to § 11 (e) of the 1933 Art,
providing for potential payment of rosts, including attorney,, ' fees
"is the most important famendment] of all." 78 Cong. Roc. 8669.
One of its purposes wns to doter actions brought solely for their
potential settlement vn!uo. See Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at 740741. This deterrent is lacking in the § 10 (b) context, iu which a
dist rict comt's power to nward nttorne~:s ' fees is sharply rirrumscribcd. See Alycska Pi]Jeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,
421 U. S. 240 (1975) ("hnd fnith" requircmrnt); F . D. Rich Co. v.
Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974).
28
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light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading ... " or "to engage in any act, practice,
or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person .... " Viewed in
isolation the language of subsection (2), and arguably
that of subsection (3), could be read as proscribing any
type of material misstatement or omission, or course of
conduct, that has the effect of defrauding investors,
whether negligently caused or otherwise.
We note first that such a reading cannot be harmonized with the administrative history of the Rule, a
history making clear that when adopted the Commission
intended it to apply only to activities that involved
scienter. 20 More important, Rule lOb-5 was adopted
~H Appnrently the Rule was a hastil~r drafted response to a situation involving clenr evidence of intentionn l misconduct. The Commission's Regional Administrator in Boston had reported to the
Director of the Trading and Exchange Division that the preRident
of a rorpor:1tion wns telling the other shnrcholders that the corporation was doing poorly and purchasing their shares at the resultant
depressed prices, when in fnct the business wns doing exceptionnlly
well. The Rule was drafted and approved on the dny this rrport
was received. Sec Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. Law. 793, 922 (1967) (remarks of Milton
Freeman, one of Rule's co-drnfters): Bltte Chip Stamps v. Manm·
Drug Stores, 421 U. S., at 767 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). Although adopted pursunnt to § 10 (b), the langnage of the Rule a ppears to have been derived in. significn nt pnrt from § 17 of the 1933
Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78q, e. (J., ibid.; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co.,
401 F. 2d, at 867 (Friend!~' .•T., concurring). There is no indirntion in the administmtive history of the Rule that any of the subsections was intended to proscribe condurt not involving scienter.
Indeed tho Commission's Release issued contemporaneously with the
Rule cxplnined:
"The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced the
adoption of a rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection
with the purrhase of securities. The previously existing rules
against fraud in the purchase of securities applied only to brokers

•

.
,
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pursuant to authority granted the Commission under
§ 10 (b). The rulcmaki ng power granted to a.n administrative agency charged with the administra.tion of a
ferl.eral statute is not the power to make law. Rather,
it is "the power to adopt r<'gulatiolls to carry into effect
the will of Congress as expressed by the statute." Dixon
v. United States, 381 U. S. 68. 74 (1965), quoting Manhattan General Equip1ncrlt Co. v. Commissioner, 297
U. S. 129, 134 (1936). Thus, despite the broad view
of the Rule adva.nced by the Commission in this case,.
its scope cannot exceed the power granted the Commission by Congress under § 10 (b). For the reasons
stated above, we think the Commission's original interpreta.t ion of Rule 10b-5 was compelled by tho Jang~1age
and history of § 10 (b) and related sections of the Acts.
See. e. g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. , 478 F. 2d
1281 , 1299 (CA2 1973); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.
2d 1277, 1305 (CA2 1973); SEC v. Texas G1llj Sulphur
Co., supra, at 868; 3 Loss Securities Regula.tion 1766
(2d .eel. 1961); 6 id., at 3883~3885 (Supp. 1960). ~
~ l'here a statute speaks so specifically in terms of
manipUlation and deception, and of implementing devices or contrivances-the commonly understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing-and where its hisand dealers. The new mlc close;; a loophole in the protections
ngninst fraud administered b.v the Commission by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying srcurities if thry engage in fr::~ud
in their purchase." SEC Release No. 3230 (M11y 21, 1942) .
Th:1t same year, in its Amnml Report, the Commission again stated
that the purpose of the rule was to pro teet investors against "fraud":
"During the fiscal year the Commission adopted Rule X-10B-5
ilR an additional protection to investors. The new rule prohibits
frnnd by any pcr~on in connection with the purchnse of securities,
while the previonsly existing rules against frn,ud in the purchnse of
securities applied only to brokers and dealers." 8 SEC Ann. Rep.
10 (1942).

..

~
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tory reflects no more expansive intent, we are quite
unwilling to extend the scope of the statute to negligent conduct. 30
III
Recognizing that as a precondition to the imposition
of civil liability § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5 might be held

e

10
'
As we find the language and history of § 10 (b) dispositive of
the appropriate standard of liability, there is no occasion to examine
r.hc additional considerations of "policy," set forth by the parties,
that may have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of the
statute. We do note that the standnrd urged by respondents would
si~nificantly bronden the clnss of plaintiffs who may seek to impose
lin bility upon accountants and other experts who perform serYices or
express opinions with respect to matters under the Acts. Last Term,
in Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U. S., at 747-748, the Court 'p ertinently
observed:
"While much of the development of the law of deceit has been the
elimination of artificial barriers to recover on just claims, we arc not
the first court to express concern that the inexorable broadening of
the rlass of plaintiffs who may sue in this area of the law will ultimately result in more harm than good. In Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441, Chief Judge Cardozo observed with respect to 'a, liability in an indeterminate amonnt for
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate cause':
" 'The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so
extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the
implication of the duty that expose::> to these consequences.' Id., at
179-180, 174 N. E., at 444."
Thi~ case, on its facts, illustrates the extreme reach of the stancl:ud
nrged by respondents. As investors in transactions initiated by
Nay, not First Securities, they were not foreseeable users of the
financial statements prep::trcd by Ernst & Ernst. Respondents conceded that they did not rely on either these financial statements or
Ernst & Ernst's certificate of opiuion. See n. 9. The class of
pPrsons eligible to benefit from such a standard, though small in. this
cnsc, could be numbered in the thousands. Acceptance of respondCi""~ view would extend\thc "hazards" of rendering expert ad,·ice
undert he Aet8Uo: 4cw Tro51t1@ raisir1g serious policy questions not
yet addressed by Congress.

cb
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to require proof of more than negligent misfeasance by
Ernst & Ernst, respondents further contend that whatever standard is adopted, the case should be remanded
for trial. Throughout the lengthy history of this case
respondents have proceeded on a theory of liability
premised on .negligence, specifically disclaiming that
Ernst & Ernst had engaged in fraud or intentional misconduct.31 In these circumstances, we think it inappropriate to remand the action for further proceedings.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.
MR. JusTICE STEVENS

took no part in the consideration

or decision of this case.

31

See 503 F. 2d, at 1104, 1119; n. 5, supra.
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The issue in this case Js whether an a.ction for civil
damages may lie under § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), 48 Stat. 891, 15
U. S. C. § 78j (b), and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5, in the absence
of an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud on the
part of the defendant.
I

Petitioner, Ernst & Ernst, is an accounting firm. From
1946 through 1967 it was retained by First Securities
Company of Chicago (First Securities), a small brokerage firm and member of the Midwest Stock Exchange
and the National Association of Securities Dealers, to
perform periodic audits of the firm's books and records.
In connection with these audits Ernst & Ernst prepared
for filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the Commission) the annual report for First Securities,
as required by§ 17 (a.) of t.he 1934 Act, 15 U.S. C. § 788
(a). 1 It also prepared for First Securities responses
1
Section 17 (a) requires that securities brokers or dealers
"make . . . and preserve ... such accounts . . . books, and other

.. .,
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to the financial questionnaires of the Midwest Stock
Exchange.
Respondents were customers of First Securities who
invested in a fraudulent securities scheme perpetrated
by Leston B. Nay, president of the firm and owner of
92o/o of its stock., Nay induced the respondents to invest funds in "escrow" accounts that he represented
would yield a high rate of return. Respondents did so
from 1942 through 1966, with the majority of the transactions occuring in the 1950's. ThP escrow fund transactions were not in the customary form of dealings between First Securities and its customers. Typically, the
respondents sold legitimak securities through First Securities to obtain funds to invest in the escrow accounts.
They then drew their personal checks payable to Nay
or the bank for his account. No such escrow accounts
were reflected on the books a~1d records of First Securities, and none was shown on its periodic accounting to
respondents. Nor were they included in First Securities'
filings with the Commission or the Exchange. In fact,
there were no escrow accounts as Nay converted rererords, and make such reports, a;;: Lhe Commission by its mles nnd
regulations may prescribr 1\R neressary or appropriate in the p11blic
interest or for the protection of investors." During the period relevant Iiere, Commission Rnle 17a-5, 17 CFR § 240.17a-5, required
that the reports of financial condition include a certificate stnting
"clearly the opinion of the accountant with respect to the financial
statement covered by the certiftcate and the accounting principles
and practices rrflectcd therein." See SEC Release No. 3338 (Nov.
28, 1948), X-17A-5 (h). The rule required Ernst & Ernst to state
in its certificate, inter alia, "whether the audit wns mnde in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards applicable in
the circumstance.>" an·d provided that nothing should "he construed
to imply authority for the omis:>ion of any procedure which independent accountants would ordinarily employ in the cour~e of an
audit for the purpose of expressing the opinions" required by the
rule.
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spondents' funds to his own use immediately upon
receipt.
This fraud came to light in 1968 when Nay committed
suicide, leaving a note describing First Seourities as
bankrupt and the escrow investments as "spurious."
Respondents subsequently filed this action 2 for damages against Ernst & Ernst 3 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under
§ 10 (b) of the 1934 Act. The complaint charged that
Nay's escrow scheme violated § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5
of the Commission/ and that Ernst & Ernst had "aided
and abetted" Nay's violations by its "failure" to conduct a proper audit of First Securities. As revealed
through discovery, respondent's cause of action rested
on a theory of negligent misfeasance. The premise was
that Ernst & Ernst had failed to utilize "appropriate
auditing procedures" in its audits of First Securities,
thereby failing to discover internal practices of the firm
2 Two separate, but substantially identical, complaints initially
were filed by different groups of respondents. Subsequently the respondents jointly filed a First Amended Complaint. The two cases
were treated by the District Court as if they were consolidated
and were consolidated formally on n.ppeal.
3
The first count of the complaint was directed against the Midwest Stock Exchange, charging that through its act and omissions it
had aided and abetted Nay's fraud. Summary judgment in favor
of the Exch::wge was affirmed on a.ppeal. Hochfelder v. Midwest
Stoclc Exchange, 503 F. 2d 364 (CA7), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 875
(1974).
4
Immediately after Nay's suicide the Commission commenced receivership proceedings as to First Securities. In those proceedings
all of the respondents except two asserted claims based on the
fraudulent escrow accounts. These claims ultimately were upheld
in SEC v. First Securities Co., 463 F. 2d 981, 986 (CA7 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U. S. 880 (1973), where the court held that Nay's conduct violated § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5, and that First Securities
was liable for Nay's fraud as an aider and abettor. The question
of Ernst & Ernst's liability was not considered in that case .

•
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said to prevent an effective audit. The practice principally relied on was Nay's rule tha.t only he could open
mail addressed to him at First Securities or addressed
to First Securities to his attention, even if it arrived in
his absence. Respondents contended that if Ernst &
Ernst had conducted a proper audit, it would have discovered this "mail rule." The existence of the rule then
would have been disclosed in reports to the Midwest
Stock Excha.nge and to the Commission, a.nd this would
have led to an investigation of Nay that would have
revealed the fraudulent scheme. Respondents specifically disclaimed the existence of fra.ud or intentional
misconduct on the part of Ernst & Ernst. 5
After extensive discovery the District Comt granted
Ernst & Ernst's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. The court rejected Ernst & Ernst's
contention that a, cause of action for a.iding and abetting
a securities fraud could not be maintained under § 10 (b)
or Rule lOb-5 merely on allegations of negligence. It
concluded, however, that there was no genuine issue of
material fact with respect to whether Ernst & Ernst ha.d
conducted its audits in accordance with genera.lly accepted auditing standards. 6
In their response to interrogatories in the District Court respondents conceded that " [w] c do not accuse Ernst & Ernst of
deliberate, intentional fraud," merely with "inexcusable negligence."
App. 81.
n The District Court also held that. respondents' action was barred
by the doctrine of equitable estoppel and the applicable state statute of limitations of three years. Sec n. 27, infra. As customers of
Fir~t Securities some of the respondents were sent confirmrt,tion forms
as required under § 17 (a ) and Rule 17a-5 requesting that they
verify the accuracy of the sta tements and notify Ernst & Emst as to
any exceptions. Although the confirmation forms con1ained no
reference to tho escrow accounts, Ernst & Ernst were not notified
of this fact. The last audit of First Securities by Ernst & Ernst
5
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed
and remanded. 503 F. 2d 1110 (1974). That court
held that one who breaches a duty of inquiry and disclosure owed another can be liable in damages for ajding
and abetting a third party's violation of Rule 10-b upon
demonstrating that but for the breach the fraud would
have been discovered or prevented. !d., at 1104. 7 The
court reasoned that Ernst & Ernst had a common-law
and statutory duty of inquiry as to the adequacy of First
Securities' internal control system because it had contracted to audit First Securities and to prepare for filing
with the Commission the annual report of its financial
was completed in December 1967 and the first complaint in this
action was not filed until Februa.ry 1971.
7
In support of this holding, the Court of Appeals cited its decision
in Ilochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, 503 F. 2d 364 (CA7
1974), where it stated that a claim for aiding and abetting a securities fraud solely by innction could be maintained under Rule 10b--5.
In such cnse the plaintiff must show "that the party charged with
niding and abetting had knowledge of or, but for the breach of a
duty of inquiry, should have had knowledge of the fraud, and that
possessing such knowledge the party failed to act due to an improper motive or breach of a duty of disclosure." /d., at 374. The
court explained in this case thnt these "elements constitute a flexible
standard of liability which should be amplified according to the
pecularities of each case." 503 F. 2d, at 1104. In view of our
holding that an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud is required
for civil liability under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5, we need not
consider whether civil liability for aiding nnd abetting is appropriate
under the section and the Rule, nor the elements necessary to cstabliRh such a cause of action. Sec, e. g., Brennan v. ltfidwestern
United Life Insurance Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (ND Ind. 1966), 286
F. Supp. 702 (ND Ind. 1968), nff'd. 417 F. 2d 147 (CA7 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U. S. 989 (1970) (defendant held liable for giving
active and knowing assistance to a third pnrt.y engaged in violatio11s
of tho securities laws) .. SP.e gencmlly Huder, Mnlt,ip]e Defendants
in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy,
In Pnri Delicto, IndE'mnification and Contribution, 120 U. Pa. L ..
Rev. 597, 620-645 ( 1972) .
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condition required under § 17 of the 1934 Act and Rule
17a-5, 17 CFR § 240. 17a-5. 8 The Court further reasoned that respondents were beneficiaries of the statutory duty to inquire. 0 and the related dnty to disclose
any material irregularities that were discovered. I d.,
at 1105-1111. The court concluded that there were
genuine issues of fact as to whether Ernst &' Ernst's
failure to discover and comment upon Nay's mail rule 10
constituted a breach of its duties of inquiry and disclosure, id., at 1111, and whether inquiry and disclosure
Seen. 1, 8upra.
The court concluded thnt the duty of inquiry imposed on Ernst
& Ernst under § 17 (a) was "grounded on a concern for the protection of investors surh fl~ [respoudents] ," without reaching the
quest.ion whether the statute imposed a "dirert duty" to the respondents. 503 F. 2d, at 1105. The court recognized that Ernst &
Ernst owed no common-hw duty of inquiry to responde11ts arising
from its contract with First Securities since Ernst & Ernst did not
specifically foresee that respondents limited class might suffer from
a negligent audit, compare Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135
N. E. 275 (1922), with Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170,
174 N. E. 441 (1931), see, e. g., R.I. Ilospital Trust Nat'l Baulc v.
Swartz, 455 F. 2d 847, 851 (CA4 1972). Indeed, respoudents conceded that they did not rely on the finanrial statements and reports
prepared by Ernst & Ernst or on its certificate of opinion. 503 F.
2d, at 1107.
10 In their briefs respondents allude to several other alleged failings by Ernst & Ernst in its audit of First Securities, principally its
failure to in(]uire into the collectibility of certain loans by First Secmities to Nay and and its failure to follow up on a 1965 memorandum that characterized Fir~t Securitie;,;' overall system of internal
control as weak because of the centralization of functions in the
cashier. The Court of Appeals mentioned none of these alleged
deficiencies in its opinion in this case, although it did discuss r.;ome
ol' them in its opinion in Ilochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange,
503 F. 2d, at 370-371, holding that they were insufficient to put the
Exchange on notice that further inquiry into First Securities' financinl affairs was required.
8

9
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would have led to the discovery or prevention of Nay's
fraud. I d., at 1115.11
We granted certiorari to r0solve the question whether
a private cause of action for damages will lie under
§ 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5 in the absence of any allegation of scienter-an intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud.u 421 U. S. 900 (1975). We conclude that it
will not and therefore v\'C rcverse.' 3
11
The Court of Appeals al~o reversrd the District Courl'~:> holding
with respect to Ernst & Ernst's equitable estoppel and statute of
limitations defenses. See n. 6, supra. In view of our disposition
of the case we need not address the issues raised by these defenses.
12 Although the verbal formulations of the standard to be applied
have varied, several courts of appeals in substance have held that
negligence alone is sufficient for civil liability under § 10 (b) and
Rule 10b-5. Sec, e. g., White v. Abrams, 495 F. 2d 724 (CA9 1974)
(flexible duty standard); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F. 2d 718, 735 (CAS
1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 951 (1968) (negligent miAfeal:)ance
sufficient for liability); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F. 2d 634 (CA7
1963) (knowledge not required). Other courts of appeals have
held that some type of "scienter"-i. e., intent to defraud, reckless
disregard for the truth, or knowing use of some practice to defraud-is necessary in such an action. See, e. g., Clegg v. Conk, 507
F. 2d 1351, 1361-1362 (CA10 1974), cort. denied, 422 U. S. 1007
(1975) (something more than ordinary negligence"); Lanza v. Drexel
& Co., 479 F. 2d 1277, 1306 (CA2 1973) ("willful or reckless di~:>re
gard" of the truth). But few of the decision~:) announcing 1hat some
form of negligence suffices for civil liability under § 10 (b) and Rule
10b-5 have involved only negligent conduct. Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 489 F. 2d 579, 606 (CAS 1974), cert. denied, 419 U. S.
879 (1974); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F. 2d 2.55,
286 (CA3 1972) (Adams, J., concurring); Bucklo, Scienter and Rule
10b-5, 67 Nw. U. L. Rev. 562, 568-570 (1972).
In this opinion the term "scienter" refers to a mental state embmcing an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In certain
arms of the law reckless disregard of lhe truth is considered equivalent to knowledge for purposes of imposing liability for some act.
We need not here address the que~:>tiou whether, in some cireum[Footnote 13 is on p. 8]
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Federal regulation of transactions in securities emerged
as part of the aftermath of the market crash in 1929.
The Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), 48 Stat. 74, as
amended 15 U.S. C. ~ 77a et seq., was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors against fraud and, through
the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote
ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing. See H. R.
Rep .. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1-5 (1933). The
1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors
against manipulation of stock prices through regulation
of transactions upon securities exchanges and in overthe-counter markets, and to impose regular reporting
requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national securities exchanges. See S. Rep. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5 (1934). Although the Acts contain numerous carefully drawn express civil remedies
and criminal penaltiC's, Congress recognized that efficient
regulation of securitiPs trading could not be a.ccomplished under a rigid statutory program. As part of the
1934 Act Congress created the Commission, providing it
stances, reckless behavior is sufllcient for civil liability under§ 10 (b}
and Rule 10b-5.
·.
tn Respondents contend thn.t, Ernst & Brost owed them a direct
duty under § 17 (a) and Rule 17a-.'5 of the 1934 Act to conduct a
proper audit of First Securitir.~ :.llld that they may premi~e a private
cause of action agninst Ernst. & Ernst for violation of that duty.
Respondents original cause of action, however, was premised solely
on alleged aiding and abetting violation of § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5.
During the lengthy history of this litigation they appnren1ly made
no motion to amend their original complaint to include a damnge
action undpr § 17 (a) and Rule 17n-5. We do not think thnt respondents should be permitted to rai;;e this new cau~e of action for
the first time in this Court.
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with an arsenal of flexible enforcement powers.

See,

e. g., 1933 Act §§ 8, 19, 20, 48 Stat. 79, 85, 86, as
amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 77h, 77s, 77t; 1934 Act §§ 9,
19, 21, 48 Stat. 889, 898, 899, as amended, 15 U. S. C.
§§ 78i, 78s, 78u.
Section 10 of the 1934 Act makes it "unlawful for
any person . . . (b) [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . a.ny
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors." 15
U. S. C. § 78j. In 1942, acting pursuant to the power
conferred by § 10 (b), the Commission promulgated
Rule 10b-5, which provides:
"Employment of manipulative and deceptive
devices
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or
of any fa.cility of any na.tional securities excha.nge,
"(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud,
"(2) to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fad necessa.ry
in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
"(3) to engage in any act. practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person , in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security."
Althou~h §

10 (b) does not by its terms create an
express civil remedy for its violation, and there is no
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indication that Congress,H or the Commission when
adopting Rule 10b-5,'" contemplated such a remedy,
the existence of a private cause of action for violations
of the Rule is now wrll established. Blu.e Chip Stampg
v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. fi. 723, 730 ( 1975);
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S. 128,
150-154 (1972); Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankerg
Life and Cagualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n. 9 (1971). During the 30-year period since a private cause of action
was first implied undrr § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5/ 6 a
substantial body of case law and commentary has developed as to its elements. Courts and commentators
long have differed as to whether scienter is a necessary
element of such a cause of action, or whether negligent
conduct alone is sufficient.' 7 In addressing this question, we turn first to the language of § 10 (b). for the
"starting point in every case involving construction of a
statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps,
supra, at 756 (PowELL, J., concurring). E. g., FTC v.
Bunte Brothers, 312 U. S. 349. 350 (1941).
See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 5-6 (1934);
Note, Implied Liabilit~r Under t.he Securities Exchange Act, 61 Harv.
L. Rev. 859, 861 (1948).
1 " Sec, e. g., Birnbnum v. Ne·wport Steel Corp., 193 F. 2d 461, 463
(CA2), cert. denied, 343 U. S. 956 ( 1952); 3 Loss, Securities Regulation 1469 n. 87 (2d ed. 1961).
16 Kardon v. National Gyrmtm Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (1946).
' 7 See cases cited in n. 12, s'Upra.
Compare, e. g., Comment,
Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 69 Col. L. Rev. 1057, 1080-1081 (1969);
Note, Negligent Misrepesentations under Rule 10b-5, 32 Chi. L. Rev.
824, 835-836 (1965); Note, 82 Hnrv. L. Rev. 938,947 (1969); Note,
Civil Liability Under Section lOB aud Rule 10B-5: A Suggestion
for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 Yale L. J. 658, 682-689
(1965), with, e. g., 3 Loss, supra, at 1766; 6 id., at 3883-3885 (Supp.
1969).
14
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A

Section 10 (b) makes unlawful the use or employment of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in contravention of Commission rules. The
words "m~nipulative or deceptive" used in conjunction
with "device or contrivance" strongly suggest tha.t § 10
(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional
conduct. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.
2d 833, 868 (CA2 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert.
denied sub nom. Kline v. SEC, 394 U. S. 976 (1969);
Loss, Sumary Remarks, 30 Bus. Lawyer 163, 165 (1975.).
See also Kohn v. American Metal Climax, 458 F. 2d 255,.
280 (CA3 1972) (Adams, J., concurring).
In its amicus curiae brief, however, the Commission
contends that nothing in the language "any manipulative device or contrivance" limits its operation to knowing and intentional practices. 18 In support of its view,
the Commission cites the overall congressional purpose
18 The Commission, however, would not permit recovery upon
proof of negligence in all ca es. In light of the limitations that
Congress has placed on the express civil remedies in the 1933 and
1934 Acts, see pp. - - - , infra, the Commission would limit the
circumstances in which civil liability could be imposed for negligent
violation of Rule 10b-5 to situntions in which (i) "the defendant
knew or reasonably could forsee 1lmt the plaintiff would rely on
his conduct, (ii) the plaintiff did in fact so rely, aud (iii) the
amount of the plaintiff's damage~ caused by ihe defendant's conduct
was definite and ascertainable." Brief of Amicus Curiae 23-33. The
Commission concludes that the present record does not establish
these conditions for civil liability since respondents in fact did not
rely on Ernst & Ernst's audits, the financial statements of First
Securities could not have been reasonably fore:;een as likely to induce
re.'lpondents to invest in the escrow accounts, and the amount of
respondents' damages was unascertainable. !d., 33-36. Respondents accept the Commission's analysis of the operative language of
the statute and Rule, but reject these nddii ional requirement;; for
recovery for negligent ,·iolations.
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in the 1933 and 1934 Acts to protect investors against

false and deceptive practices that may injure them.
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S., at
151; Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co., 404 U. S .. at 11-12; J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 433 (1971); SEC v. Capital Gains
Research B~treau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 195 (1963). The
Commission then reasons that since the "effect" upon
investors of given conduct is the same whether the
conduct is negligent or intentional, Congress must have
intended to bar all such practices and not just those
done knowingly or intentionally. The logic of this
effect-oriented approach would impose liability for
wholly faultless conduct where such conduct results in
harm to investors, a result the Commission is unlikely
to support. But apart from where its logic might lead,
the Commission would add a gloss to the operative
language of the statute quite different from its commonly accepted meaning. See, e. g., Addision v. Hally
Hill Co., 32 U. S. 607, 617-618 (1944). 1 The Commission's argument simply ignores the use of the words
"device" or "contrivance," terms that make unmistakable a congressional intent to proscrihe a type of con1)

' u "We should of course be faithful to the meaning of a statute.
But after all Congress expresses its meanin~ by words. If Jcgislatil·e policy is eonched in vague langua~c, ea~ily s u~ceptible of one
meaning as 'wll as another in the rommou ~perch of men, we should
not. st ifle a policy by a ... ~rudging process of construction. To
let words draw on some purpose is one thing. To dr;1w on some
unexpressed spirit out~ide the bounds of the normal mP. aning of
word~ is quite another . . . . After all, lrgislation when not expressed in technical terms is addre~sed to tho common run of men
and i' therefore understood according to the srnse of the thing,
as the ordinary man has a right to rel.v on ordinary words addrc.".·ed
to him ." 322 U. S., at 617-618. Sec Frankfurter, Some Reflcrtions
on the Reading of StatutcR, 47 Col. L. Rev. 527,536-537 (1947) .
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duct quite different from negligence.2° Few concepts
in the law are more familiar than that of negligence.
One must assume that if Congress had intended to extend the reach of § 10 (b) to embrace negligent conduct
it would have said so in conventional, commonly accepted terms.
In addition to relying upon the Commission's argument with respect to the operative language of the stair
ute, respondents contend that since we are dealing with
"remedial legislation," Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S.
332, 336 (1967), it must be construed "not technically
and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial
purposes." Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406
U. S., at 151. This argument assumes that "remedial
purposes" of the Act embrace as a minimum a negligence
standard of liability. But in seeking to accomplish its
broad remedial goals, Congress did not elect a single
or uniform standard of civil liability even as to express
civil remedies. In some circumstances and with respect
to certain classes of defencla.nts, Congress did create express liability predicated upon a failure to exercise reasonable ca.re, e. g., 1933 Act § 11 (b) (liability of persons
such as accountants or lawyers for misleading statements in portions of registrations statements for which
they are responsible). In other situations good faith is
an absolute defense, 1934 Act ~ 18, 15 U. S. C. ~ 78r
20
Webster's Int'l Dictionary (2d ed. 1934) defines "device":
"[t]hat which is devised, or formed by design; a contrivance; an
invention; project; .scheme; often a scheme to deceive; n stratagem;
an artifice" and "contrivance" in pertinent part as "[a] thing contrived or used in contriving; a scheme, plan, or artifice." In turn,
"contrive" in pertinent part is defined as "To devise; to plan; to
plot . . . [t] o fabricate ... design ; invent ... to scheme . . . . "
The Commission also ignores the use of the terms "[t]o use or
employ," language that i ~ snpporti\'(1 of the view that Congress
did not intend § 10 (b) to embrace negligent conduct.
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(misleading statements in any document filed pursuant
to the Act), whik in other circumstances Congress createrl express liability regardless of the defendant's fault,
1933 Act § 11 (issuer liability for misleading sta.t cments
in the registration statement).
It is thus evident that Congress imposed express civil
liability in the 1933 and 1934 Acts on a partic11larized
basis. Ascertainment of congressional in tent with respect to the standard of liability created by a particular
section oft he Act must therefore rest primarily on the
language of that section. Where, as here, we deal with
a judicially implied liability, the statutory language certainly is no less important. In view of the language
of § 10 (b) which so clearly connotes intentional misconduct, and mindful that the language of a statute
controls when sufficiently clear in its context, United
States v. Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 648 (1961); Packard
Motor Car Co. v. NLRB , 330 U. S. 485, 492 (1947),
further inquiry ma.y be unnecessary. We turn now,
nevertheless, to the legislative history of the 1934 Act
to ascertain whether there is support for the meaning .a ttributed to § 10 (b) by the Commission and
respondents.
B
Although the extensive legislative history of the 1934
Act is bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress'
intent, that history supports our conclusion that § 10 (b)
was addressed to practices that involve some element
of scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for
negligent conduct alone.
The original version of what would develop into the
1934 Act was contained in identical bills introduced by
Senator Fletcher and Representative Rayburn. S. 2693,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934). H. R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d

.'
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Sess. (1934). Section 0 (c) of the bills, from which present § 10 (b) evolved, proscribed as unlawful the usc of
"any device or contrivance which, or any device or contrivance in a way or manner which the Commission may
by its rules and reguglations find detrimental to the public interest or to the proper protection of investors." The
other subsections of proposed § 9 listed specific practices
that Congress empowered the Commission to regulate
through its rulemaking power. See §§ 9 (a) ("short
sale"), (b) ("stop-loss order"). Soon after the hearings
on the House bill were held, a substitute bill was introduced which abbreviated and modified § 9 (c)'s operative
language to read "any manipulative device or contrivance." S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (c) (1934); H. R.
7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (c) (1934). Still a third bill,
retaining the Commission's power to regulate the specific
practices enumerated in the prior bills, and omitting all
refrrence to the Commission's authority to prescribe rules
concerning manipulative or deceptive devices in general,
was introduced and passed in the House. H. R. 9323,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. ( 1934). The final language of § 10
is a modified version of a Senate amendment to this last
House bill. See H. R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.,
32-33 ( 1934).
Neither the intended scope of § 10 (b) nor the reasons
for the changes in its operative language are explicitly
revealed in the legislative history of the 1934 Act, which
deals primarily with other aspects of the legislation.
There is no indication, however, that § 10 (b) was intended to proscribe conduct not involving scienter. The
Senate Report discusses generally the various abuses that
precipitated the need for the legislation and the inadequacy of self-regulation by the stock exchanges.
The Report then analyzes the component provisions.
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of the statute, but does not pare § 10. The only specific
reference to § 10 in this discussion is the following:
"In addition to the discretionary and elastic powers conferred on the administrative authority, effective regulation must include several clear statutory
provisions reinforced by penal and civil sanctions,
aimed at those manii)ulative and deceptive pra.ctices
which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful
function. These sanctions are found in sections 9, 10
and 16." S. Rep. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934).
In the portion of the general analysis section of the
Report entitled "Manipulative Practices," however, there
is a discussion of specific practices that were considered
so inimical to the public interest as to be expressly prohibited, such as "wash" sales and "matched" orders/ 1
and of other practices, such as stabilization of security
prices and grants of options, that might in some cases
serve legitimate purposes. These latter practices were
left to regulation by the Commission. Significantly, we
think, in discussing these practices, there was no indication that any type of criminal or civil liability was to
attach in the absence of scienter. For example, in discussing the potential abuses resulting from the use of
options, the Report indicated that self-regulation by a
~ t Wash sales are transaction s involving no change in brneficial
ownership . Mat ched orders nrc orders for the purchascjsa]e of a
securit y that are entered with the knowledge that orders of ~ub
stant ially the same size, at sub,;t:mti:tlly the sa me time and price,
have been or will be entered by t he same or different p er~ on s for
the sale/purchase of surh ~r curit y . Section 9 (a ) (1) of the 1934
Act , 15 U . S. C. § 78 (a ) (1) , pro:>cribes wnsh sales and matched
orders when effcctu:1ted " [f] or the purpose of c reatin~ a fal se or
misleading appea rance of act ive trading in any .securit _,, rq~;i s t e red
on a national securities exchange or . . . t he m:uket for any such
~ec urity. " Sec In re J . A . Latim e1' & Co., 38 S. E. C. 790 (1958) ;
In re Thornton <~ Co., 28 S. E. C. 208 (1948) .

'

.
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securities exchange had proved inadequate because members might employ nonmembers, not bound by its rules,
to execute transactions. /d., 9. In commenting on the
express civil liabilities provided in the 1934 Act, the Report explains:
" ... the bill provides that any person who unlawfully manipulntes the price of a security, or who
induces transactions in a security by means of false
or misleading statements, or who makes a false or
misleading statement in the report of a corporation,
shall be liable in damages to those who have bought
or sold the security at prices affected by such violation or statement. In such case the burden is on the
plaintiff to show the violation or the fact that the
statement \vas false or misleading, and that he relied
thereon to his damage. The defendant may escape
liability by showing that the statement wa.s made in
good faith." !d., at 12-13 (emphasis supplied).
The Sena.te Report thus reveals a congressional intent to
prevent "manipulative and deceptive practices ... which
fulfill no useful function" and to create a private action
for damages stemming from "illicit practices," where the
defendant has not acted in good faith. There is no indication that Congress intended anyone to be made an
insurer against potentially misleading conduct or misstatement unless he acted otherwise than in good faith.
The extensive hearings that preceded passage of the
1934 Act similarly touched only briefly on § 10, and most
of the discussion was devoted to the enumerated devices
now proscribed in § 10 (a). The most relevant exposition of the provision that was to become § 10 (b) was by
Thomas G. Corcoran, a spokesman for the drafters. Corcoran indicated:
"Subsection (c) [ § 9 (c) of H. R. 7852-later § 10
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(b) l says, 'Thou shalt not devise any other cunning
devices.' ...
"Of course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to
prevent manipulative devices. I do not think there
is any objection to that kind of clause. The Commission should have the authority to deal with new
manipulative devices."
Hearings on H. R. 7852 and R. R. 8720 before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess., 115 ( 1934). This brief explanation of § 10 (b)
by the spokesman for its drafters is significant. The
section was described rightly as a "catch-all" clause to
enable the Commission "to deal with new manipulative
[or cunning] devices." It is difficult to believe that any
lawyer, legislative draftsman, or legislator would use
these words if the intent was to create liability for merely
negligent acts or omissions. Use of the word "manipulative" is especially significant. It is virtually a term of
art when used in connection with securities markets. It
connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially
affecting the price of securitics. 22 Neither the legislative
history nor the briefs supporting respondents identify
any usage or authority for construing manipulative or
cunning conduct to include negligence. 2 :1
22 Sec Webster's Int'l DieLionnry (2d ed. 1934): "manipulate":
" ... to ma.nagc or t.re::tt artfully or fraudulently; as to manipulate
arcounts . . . . 4. Exchanges. To force (prices) up or clown, as
by matched orders, wash sales, fictitions reports ... ; to rig."
23 In support of its po~ition the Commission cites n, statement
by Corcoran in the Senate heari11gs that "in modern Aorict)' there
are many things yon have to make crimes which arc sheer matters
of negligence" and "int.cnL is not necessary for every crime." Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the Senate Commiltee on
Banking and Currency, 73cl Cong., 2cl Sess., 6509-6510 (1934). The
comment, taken in context, sheds no light on the meani11g of § 10 (b).
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c
The 1933 and 1934 Acts constitute interrelated components of the federal regulatory scheme governing transactions in securities. See Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at
727-730. As the Court indicated in SEC v. National Securit·ies, Inc., 393 U. S. 453 (1969), "the interdependence
of the various sections of the se~rities laws is certainly
a relevant factor in any interpretation of the language·
Congress has chosen." Recognizing this, respondent and
The question had been raised whether criminal violations could arise
under § 8 of S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., which became § 9 of the
1934 Act, in the absence of specific intent to influence security
prircs for personal gain. Corroran's remarks, however, were not
addressed to the scope of § 8, but were general observations concerning activity society might prosrribe under criminal law . Ferdinand Pecora, counsel to the committee, described the draft language
as "[e]xcluding from its scope an act th~tt is not done with any
ulterior motives or purposes, as set forth in the act." ld ., 6510.
Moreover, prior to the passage of the 1934 Act, § 8 was amended to
require willful participation as a prerequisite to civil liability for
violations. Compare § 9(e) of the 1934 Act with § 8 (c) of S. 2693.
The Commission further reJip_s on objections to a draft version
of § 10 (b)-§ 9 (c) of S. 2693 and II. R. 7852, see pp. - - -,
supra-ra ised by representatives of the securities indu try in the
House and Senate hearings. They warned that the language was
so vague that the Commission might outlaw anything. E. g., Hcmings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6988; Hearings on
H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720, House Cmmn. ou Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 115 (1934), 258. Remn.rks of this
kind made in the course of legi~btivc debate or hearings other than
by persons responsible for the preparation or the drafting of a
bill, are entitled to little weight. See, e. g., United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 27&-277 (1947); United States v.
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110, 125 (1942). This is especially so with regard to the statements of legislative opponents who
"[i]n their zeal to defeat a bill .. . understandably tend to ovC'rstate its reach." NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U.S. 58,66 (1964).
See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394-395 (1951).
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the Commission contrast § 10 (b) to other sections of the
Acts to support their contention that civil liability may
be imposed upon proof of negligent conduct. We think
they misconceive the significance of the other provisions
of the Act, in which we find evidence supportive of a
requirement that an element of scienter be proved.
The Commission argues that Congress has been explicit
in requiring willful conduct when that was the standard
of fault intended, citing § 9 of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C.
§ 78, which generally proscribes manipulation of securities prices. Sections 9 (a) (1) and (2), for example, respectively prohibit manipulation of security prices "[f] or
the purpose of creating a false or misleading appearance
of actual trading in any security ... or ... with respect
to the market for any such security," and "for the purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by
others." See also § 9 (a)(4). Section 9 (e) then imposes upon "[a]ny person who willfully participates in
any act or transaction in violation of" other provisions
of § 9 liability to anyone who purchased or sold a security at a price affected by the manipulative activities.
From this the Commission concludes that since § 10 (b)
is not by its terms explicitly restricted to willful, knowing, or purposeful conduct, it should not be construed in
all cases to require more than negligent action or inaction
as a precondition for civil liability.
The structure of the Acts does not support the Commission's argument. In each instance that Congress
created express civil liability in both Acts it clearly
specified whether recovery was to be premised on knowing or intentional conduct, negligence, or entirely innocent mistake. See HJ33 Act, ~§ 11, 12, 15, 15 U. S. C.
§§ 77k, 77l, 77o: 1934 Act §§ 9, 16. 18, 20. id., §§ 78i,
78p 78r, 78t. For example, § 11 of the 1933 Act unambiguously creates a private action for damages when a
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registration statement includes untrue statements of material facts or fails to state material facts necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading. The issuer
of the securities is held absolutely liable for any damages,
within the limits specified by § 11 (e), resulting from such
misstatement or omission. But experts such as accountants who have prepared portions of the registration statement are accorded a "due diligence" defense. In effect,
this is a negligence standard. An expert may avoid civil
liability with respect to the portions of the registration
statement for which he is responsible by showing that
"after reasonable investigation" he had "reasonable
ground[s] to believe" that the statements for which he
was responsible were true and there was no omission of a
material fact. 24 § 11 (b) (3) (B) (i). See, e. g., Escott v.
Barchris Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697-703 (SDNY 1968).
The express recognition of a cause of action premised on
negligent behavior in § 11 stands in sharp contrast to
the language of § 10 (b), and significantly undercuts the
Commission's argument.
Equally significant, while specifying negligence as a
standard of fault in some circumstances under. the 1933
Act, see §§ 11, 12 (2), 15, 15 U. S. C. §§ 77k, 77l, 77o, 2 "
Other individuals who s i~n the regiRtra tion statement , directors
of tho issuer, and the underwriter of the securities similarly are
accorded a complete defense ngain~t rivillinbility based on the exerci~e of re:~sonuble investigation ami a rPasonnble belief that the
re~ri strat ion statement was not misleading. §§ 11 (b) (3) (A) , (C),
(D); (c). See, e. (1., Peit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544. 575-583 (EDNY 1971) (underwriters, but.
not officer-directors, established their due diligence defense) . See
generally R. J ennings & H . Marsh, Securities Regulation 1018-1027
(:3d ed. 1972), and Rourres citrd thrrein; Folk, Civil Liabilities under
the Federal Securities Acts: The Barchris Case, 55 Va. L. Rev. 199
(1969).
25
Sertion 12 (2) rrentec; potPntii:ll civil liability for a seller of
securities in favor of the purchaser for misleading statements or
24

'.
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Congress indicated no role for such a standard . in the
1034 Act. Each of the express liability provisions of the
1934 Act, except those directed to specific classes of individuals such as directors, officers, or 10 7o beneficial holders of securities, sec § 16 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 78p," 6 contains
a state of mind requirement for civil liability requiring
something more than neg] igencc. Section 9 proscribes
the manipulation of securitif's on national sec uri ties exchanges and creates potential civil liability for any person who "willfully participates" in such conduct. § 9
(e). Section 18 creates potential civil liability for misleading statements filed with the Commission, but provides the defendant with the defense that "he acted in
good faith and had no knowledge that such statement
was false or misleading." 15 U. S. C. § 78r. And § 20,
15 U. S. C. § 78t, which imposes liability upon "controlling persons" for violations of the Act by persons whom
they control, exculpates a defendant who "acted in good
faith and did not ... induce the act ... constituting the
omissions in connection wi1 h 1he tranHaction. The seller is exeulpaled if he proves that he did not know, or in the exercise of
reasonable care, could not have known of the uni ruth or omiHsion.
Section 15 of the 1933 Act. , ns amended by § 208 of the 19:34 Act,
makes perRons who "control" any person liable under § 11 or § 12
liable jointly and severally to the same extent as the rontrolled per~on, unless he "had no knowledp.:c of or reasonable gronnds to believe in the existence of facts by reasons of which the liability of
tho controlled person is alleged to exist." 15 U.S. C.§ 77o. Sec Act
of .Tune 6, 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, c. 404, § 208, 48 Stat. 908.
20 Section 16 (b) provides that a corporation may recapture for
itself the profits realized on a purchase and sale, or sa le and purchase, of its securities within six months by a director, officer, or
benc.ficial owner of more than 10% of any class of the rorporntion's
equity securities. Sec Foremost-111cKesson, Inc. v. Provident SrcuriU. S. (1976) ; Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental
ties Co., Petroleum Corp., 411 U. S. i'iR2 (1973); Reliance Electric Co. v.
Emenwn Electric Co., 404 U. S. 418 ( 1972).
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violation .... " In Blue Ch1:p Starnps, supra, at 736, we
noted the anomaly of imputing to Congress an intention
"to expand ... a judicially implied cause of action beyond the bounds it delineated for comparable express
causes of action" in the provisions of these Acts. The
result urged here by respondents would be no less
anomalous.
Finally, the express civil remedies in the 1933 Act allowing recovery for negligent conduct are subject to
significant procedural restrictions . not applicable under
~ 10 (b). Section 11 (e) of the 1933 Act, for example,
authorizes the court to require a plaintiff bringing a suit
under § 11, § 12 (2), or § 15 thereof to post a bond for
costs, including attorneys' fees. Section 13 specifies a
statute of limitations of one year from the violation, or
three years from the offer or sale, applicable to actions
brought under § 11, § 12 (2), or § 15. It also is significant that simultaneously with the adoption of the 1934
Act, Congress tightened the restrictions on § 11 and § 12
actions by amendment of the 1933 Act. Prior thereto,
§ 11 contained no provision for payment of costs. 48
Stat. 891. See Act of June 6, 1934, Pub. L. No . .291,
c. 404, § 206 (e), 48 Stat. 907. The amendments also
substantially shortened the statute of limitations provided by § 13 of the 1933 Act. Compare 1933 Act § 13,
48 Stat. 84, with 15 U. S. C. § 77m. See 1934 Act, § 207,
48 Stat. 908. 27 Absent substantial evidence in the legislative history to the contrary-and there is none-we are
unwilling to assume that the judicially created private
27 Since no statute of lirnitai ions is provided for civil actions
under § 10 (b), as in other cases of judicially implied remedies, the
law of limitations of the forum state is followed. See HoLmb erg v.
Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 395 (1946), and case::; cited therei.n. A lthough it is not always certain which state statute of limitation::;
should be followed, such sl atute::; of limitation" mmally arc longer
than the period provided under § 13. 3 Loss, supra, at 1773-1774.
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damage remedy under § 10 (b) can be extended, consistently with the intent of Congress, to actions premised
on negligent wrongdoing. Except for suits against issuers of securities, which are held absolutely liable for
damages resulting from misleading registration statements, such an assumption would nullify the effectiveness
of the carefully drawn restrictions on express private
damages actions that Congress provided in the 1933 Act
and the 1934 Amendments. 28 See, e. g., Fischman v.
Raytheon Manufacturing Co., 188 F. 2d 283 (CA2 1951);
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d, at 867-868
(Friendly, J., concurring); Rose11berg v. Globe Aircraft
Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124 (SD Pa. 1948); 3 Loss, supra,
at 1787-1788; Jennings & Marsh, Securities Regulation
(3d ed. 1972).
D
We have addressed, to this point, primarily the language and history of ~ 10 (b). The Commission contends, however, that subsections (2) and (3) of Rule
101>-5 are cast in language which-if standing alonecould encompass both intentional and negligent bd1avior.
These subsections respectively provide that it is unlawful "[tlo make any untrue statement of a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made in
Con~rcss regarded thc;.;c rest rie1ions on private damage actions
ns significant. In introclnring Title IT of the 1934 Act, Senator
Fletcher inclic:1tcd that the :lmPndment to § 11 (c) of the 1933 Act,
prm·ic!ing for potcnti:1l pnymcnt of costs, including nttorneyR' fee:;
"is the most import:1nt [:1mendmcnt] of all." 78 Cong. RPc . 8669.
One of its purposes wn s to deter actions brou~J:ht solely for their
potential settlement vnht<'. tke Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at 740-741. This deterrent is lacking in the § 10 (b) contr.xt, in which a
dist rirt eourt'R powpr to awnrd attorneys' fcc.~ i ~ Rharply rircumF;cribPc! . Se<' Alycska Pi7Jeline Service Co. v. fVildemess Society,
421 U. S. 240 (197.'5) ("h:1d f:1ith" r<'f)ltircmPnt); F. D. Rich Co. v_
Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 12!) (1974).
28
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light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading ... " or "to engage in any act, practice,
or course of business which operates or would operate
as a fraud or deceit upon any person .... " Viewed in
isolation the language of subsection (2), and arguably
that of subsection (3), could be read as proscribing any
type of material misstatement or omission, or course of
conduct, tha.t has the effect of defrauding investors,
whether negligently caused or otherwise.
We note first that such a reading cannot be harmonized with the administrative history of the Rule, a
history making clear that when adopted the Commission
intended it to apply only to activities that involved
scienter. 29 More important, Rule lOb-5 was adopted
9
" Appnrrntlv the Rule was a hastily drafted response to a situation invoh·ing rlear evidence of intentional misconduct. The Commission's Regional Administrator in Roston had reported to the
Director of the Trading and Exchange Division that the president
of a corporation was telLing the other shareholders that the corporation was doing poorly and purchasing their shares at the rrsultant
depressed prires, when in fnct the busine.ss wns doing exceptionally
well. The Rule was drafted and approved on the day this rrport
was received. Sre Conferenre on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. Law. 79:3, 922 (1967) (remarks of Milton
Freeman, one of Rule's co-drnfters); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U. S., at 767 (BLACKMUN, J ., dissenting). Although ndopted pm·Ruant to § 10 (b), the language of the Rnlc appcnrs to have been derived in signifirnnt part from § 17 of the 1933
Art, 15 U. S. C. § 78q, e. g., ibid.; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co.,
401 F. 2rl, at 8fi7 (Friendly, J., concnrring). There is no indiration in the administrntive history of the Rule that any of the subsections was intended t.o proseribc conduct not involving srienter.
Indeed the Commi~sion's HeleaRe iRsued contemporaneously with the
Rnle explained:
"The Securitie.s nnd Exchange Commission today announced the
ndoption of n rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection
with the purrhase of securities. The previously existing rules
agr~inst fraud in thr purchase of sccurit,ics applied only to brokers
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pursuant to authority granted the Commission under
~ 10 (b). The rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency chargrcl with the administration of a
federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather,
it is "the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect
the will of Congress as expressed by the statute." Dixon
v. United States, 381 U. S. 68. 74 (1965) , q11oting Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Cornm1:ssioner, 297
U. S. 129, 134 (1936). Thus, despite the broad view
of the Rule advanced by the Commission in this case,
its scope cannot exceed the power granted the Commission by Congress under ~ 10 (b). For the reasons
stated above, we think the Commission's origina.l interpretation of Rule lOb-5 was compelJed by the language
and history of § 10 (b) and related sections of the Acts.
Sec. e. g., Gerstle v. Garnble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F. 2d
1281. 1299 (CA2 1973): Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.
2d 1277, 1305 (CA2 1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., sur.rra, at 868; 3 Loss Securities Regulation 1766
(2d eel. 19EH); 6 id., at 3883- 3885 (Supp. 1969). In
short, where a statute speaks so specifically in terms of
manipulation and deception , and of implementing devices or contrivances- the commonly understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing-and where its hisand dealers. The new rule cloHcs a loophole in the protections
ngainst fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting indiYidun,ls or companies from buying securities if they engage in fraud
in their purchase." SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942) .
Thn,t same year, in its Annual Report, the Commission again stated
that, the purpose of the rule wa8 to protect investors against "fraud":
"During the fiscal year the Commission adopted Rule X-IOB-5
as an additional protection to investors. The now rule prohibits
fraud by any person in connection with the purchase of securities,
while the previou~J:v existing rules against fraud in the purchase of
securities applied only to brokers and dealers." 8 SEC Ann. Rep .
10 (1942).
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tory reflects no more expansive intent, we are quite
umvilling to extend the scope of the statute to negligent conduct. 80
III
Hccognizing that a.'3 a precondition to the imposition
of civil liability § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5 might be held
~ 0 As we find the l:mguage :-tnd history of § 10 (b) dispositive of
the approprintc stnndnrcl of liability, there is no occasion to examine
the additionnl considerations of "policy," set forth by the parties,
that may have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of the
statute. We do note that the standard urged by respondents would
~ignificantly broaden the class of plaintiffs who may seek to impose
liability upon accountants and other experts who perform services or
express opinions with respect to matters under the Acts. Last Term,
in Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U. S., at 747-748, the Court pertinently
observed:
"While much of the development of the law of deceit has been the
elimination of artificial barriers to recover on just claims, we arc not
the first court to express concern that the inexorable broadening of
the class of plaintiffs who may sut> in this area of the law will ultimately result in more harm than good. In Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441, Chief Judge Cardozo observed with respect to 'a liability in an indeterminate amount for
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate rause':
" 'The hazards of a businei's conducted on these terms arc so
extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the
implication of the duty thnt rxposcs to these consequences.' /d., at
179-180, 174 N. E., at 444."
This case, on its facts, illustrntcs the extreme reach of the standard
nrged by respondents. As investor.,; in transactions initiated by
Nay, not First Securities, they were not foreseeable users of the
financial statements prepared by Ernst & Ernst. Res11ondents conceded that they did not rely on either these financial statements or
Ernst & Ernst's certificate of opinion. See n. 9. The class of
prrsons eligible to benefit from sueh a stnndard, though small in thi~
case, could be numbered in the thousands. Acceptance of re.~pond
ents' view would extend thr "hazards" of rendering expert ad1·ire
under the Acts to new frontiNs, raising serious policy questions not
yet addressed by Congress.
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to require proof of more than negligent misfeasance by
Ernst & Ernst, respondents further contend that whatever standard is adopted, the case should be remanded
for trial. Throughout the lengthy history of this case
respondents have proceeded on a theory of liability
premised on .negligence, specifically disclaiming tha.t
Ernst & Ernst had engaged in fraud or intentional misconduct.31 In these circumstances, we think it inappropriate to remand the action for further proceedings.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed ..

MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration
or decision of this case.

31

Sec 503 F . 2d, at 1104, 1119; n . 5, supra.
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The issue in this case is whether an action for civil
damages may lie under § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S. C.
§ 78j (b), and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule
lOb--5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5, in the absence of an allegation of intent to deceive, manipula.te, or defraud on the
part of the defendant.
I

Petitioner, Ernst & Ernst, is an accounting firm. From
1946 through 1967 it was retained by First Securities
Company of Chicago (First Securities), a small brokerage firm and member of the Midwest Stock Exchange
and of the National Association of Securities Dealers, to
perform periodic audits of the firm's books and records.
In connection with these audits Ernst & Ernst prepared
for filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the Commission) the annual reports required of First
Securities under§ 17 (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S. C.§ 78q
(a). 1 It also prepared for First Securities responses
t Section
17 (a) requires that securities brokers or dcalen;
"make ... and preserve ... sueh accounts ... books, and other
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to the financial questionnaires of the Midwest Stock
Exchange (the Exchange).
Respondent-s were customers of First Securities who
invested in a fraudulent securities scheme perpetrated
by Leston B. Nay, president of the firm and owner of
927o of ita stock. Nay inrluced the respondents to invest funds in "escrow" accounts that he represented
would yield a high rate of return. Respondents did so
from 1942 through 1966, with the majority of the transactions occurring in the 1950's. In fact, there were no
escrow accounts as Nay converted respondents' funds to
his own use immediately upon receipt. These transactions were not in the customary form of dealings between First Securities and its customers. The respondents drew their personal checks payable to Nay or
the bank for his account. No such escrow a.ccounts
were reflected on the books and records of First Securities, and none was shown on its periodic accounting to
respondents in connection with their other investments.
Nor were they included in First Securities' filings with
the Commission or the Exchangr.
records, and make sur.h reports, as the Commi~sion by its rulr~~ :md
regulations may prescribr as nrr.CR~ary or appropriate in the public
interm;t or for thr protection of investor;;." During the prriod relevant Iiere, Commission Rule 17a-5, 17 CFR § 240.17a-5, required
tlmt Fir;:t Seruritie~ filr an annual rrport of its finanri:tl condition
thnt included a cPrtificatr ~t:1i ing "r·lrarl:v the opinion of the arrountant. with respert to thr finanrinl siatemrni rm·rrr·d by the ccrtificn1r
and the arcountin~ prinriplrs nnd prariirrs rdlcctrd thrrcin." See
SEC Relense No. 3:{:iR (Nm·. 28, 1948), X-17A-5 (h). The rule requirrd Ern~t & Fr11~1 to Htair in its rrrtifiratc, inter alia. "whether
thr audit was m;•de in areorcbnre with grncrally accrpted nuditing
standards applirablc in the circumRt.'Lneef'" nnd prm·ided that nothing in the rulo f'hould "bP ronf'trued to imp!~· authority for the
omis8ion of any procedure which independent n.crountnntR would
ordinarily employ in thr rour~e of an audit for tho purpose of
exprcf'sing the opinions rrqnirrd" by the rulr.
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This fraud came to light in 1968 when Nay committed
suicide, leaving a note that described First Securities as
bankrupt and the escrow accounts as "spurious." Respondents subsequently filed this action 2 for damages
against Ernst & Ernst a in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under
§ 10 (b) of the 1934 Act. The complaint charged that
Nay's escrow scheme violated ~ 10 (b) and Commission
Rule 10b-5/ and that Ernst & Ernst had "aided and
abetted" Nay's violations by its "failure" to conduct
proper audits of First Securities. As revealed through
discovery, respondent's cause of action rested on a
theory of negligent misfeasance. The premise was that
Ernst & Ernst had failed to utilize "appropriate auditing procedures" in its audits of First Securities, thereby
failing to discover internal practices of the firm said
to prevent an effective audit. The practice principally relied on was Nay's rule that only he could open
2
Two separate, but substantially identical, complaints initially
were filed by different membrrs of the pre~ent group of respondents.
Subsequently the respondrnts jointly filed a Fir~t Amended Compln.int. The two cases were treated by the District Court ns if they
were consolida,t.ed and were comolidated formally on appeal.
3
The first count of the complaint wns directed against the
Exch:mge, charging that throu~th itR acts and omis.~ions it had
aided and abett.ed Nay's fraud. Summary judgment in favor
of the Exchange wn.s a:ffirmed on appeal. Hochfelder v. Midwest
Stock Exchange, 503 F. 2d 364 (CA7) , cert. denied, 419 U. S. 87&
(1974).
1
Immediately after Nay's suicide the Commission commenced receivership proceedings a~ta.in st Firet Securities. In tho,~e proceedings
all of the respondents except two aRsertcd clai:mR based on the·
fraudulent escrow arronnts. These claims ultimately wcro allowed
in SEC v. First Securities Co., 463 F. 2d 981, 986 (CA7 1972), crrt.
denied , 409 U. S. 880 (1973). where the court held that Nay's conduet violated § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5, and that First Securities
wns lia.ble for Nay's frand ns an aider and abettor. The question
of Emst & Ernst's liability was not considered in that case.
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mail addressed to him at First Securiti0s or addressed
to First Securities to his attenti0n, even if it arrived in
his absence. Respondents contended that if Ernst &
Ernst had conducted a proper andit, it would have discovered this "mail rule." The existence of the rule then
would have been disclosed in reports to the Exchange
and to the Commission by Ernst & Ernst's res0rvation
that the mail rule prevcnt,ed an effective audit. This
would have led to an investigation of Nay that would
have revealed the fraudulent scheme. Respondents specifically disclaimed the existence of fraud or intentional
misconduct on the part of Ernst & Ernst."
After extensivf' discov<'ry the District Covrt granted
Ernst & Ernst's motion for summary judgment and dis. missed the action. The court rejected Ernst & Ernst's
contention that a cause of action for aiding and abetting
a securities fraud could not be maintained under § 10 (b)
and Rule lOb-5 merely on aJlegations of negligence. It
concluded, however. that there wa.s no genuine issue of
material fact with respect to whether Ernst & Ernst had
conducted its audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards."
5
In their response to interrogatories in the District Court respondents conceclecl that they did "not. accuse Ern~t & Emst of
deliberate, intentional fraud," merely with "inexcusable negligence ."
App. 81.
6 The District Court al~o held respondent's action \\'as ba.rred by
the doctrine of equitable e~toppel and the n,pplicable Illinois sta.tutr of limitations of three years. Seen. 27, infra. As customers of
First Securities respondents were sent confinnation forms as required under § 17 (a) and Rule 17a.- 5 requesting that they verify
the n.ccuracy of the statrmrnts and notify Ernst & Ernst as to
any exceptions. Although the confirm:ttion forms contained no
reference to t,he escrow a.crounts, Ernst & Ernst was not notified
of this fact. The last audit of First Securities by Ernst & Ernst
was completed in Derembrr 1967 and the first complaint in this
action wa.s not filed until February 1971.
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The Court of Appeals for tho Seventh Circuit reversed
and remanded, holding that one who breaches a duty
of inquiry and disclosure owed another is liable in damages for aiding and abetting a third party's violation of
Rule 10b-5 if the fraud would have been discovered or·
prevented but for the breach. 503 F. 2d 1100 (1974). 7
The court reasoned that Ernst & Ernst had a common-law
and statutory duty of inquiry into the adequacy of First
Securities' internal control system because it had contracted to audit First Securities and to prepare for filing
with the Commission the annual report of its financial
condition required under § 17 of the 1934 Act and Rule
17a- 5, 17 CFR § 240.17a- 5.8 The Court further rea7
In support of thi~ holding, the Court of Appeals cited its decision
in Ilochfeldcr v. Midwest Stork Rxchanae, supra, where it detailed
the clements necessary to establish a claim under Rule 10])-5 based
on a. defendant's aiding and abetting a securities fraud solely by
inaction. Sec n. 3 supra. In sueh a case the plaintiff mnst show
"that the party ch:uged with aiding and abetting had knowledge of
or, but. for the brca.ch of a duty of inquiry, should have had knowledge of tho fraud, and that possessing such knowledge the party
failed to act due to an improper motive or brPach of a. duty of ·
disclosure." !d., at 374. The court explained in the instant ('ase
that these "elements constitute a flexible standa.rd of liability which
should be amplified according to tho peculiarities of each case." 503
F. 2d, at 1104. In view of our holding that an intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud is required for civil liability under § 10 (b)
:md Rule lOb-5, we ne€d not consider whether civil liability for
aiding and abetting is appropriate under the section and the rule,
nor the elements necessa ry to Pstablish such a cause of ac.tion. See,
e. g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Snpp. 673
(1966), 286 F. Supp. 702 (ND Ind. 1968), aff'd, 417 F . 2d 147 (CA7
1969) , cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970) (defendant held liable for
giving active and knowing assistance to a third party enga.ged in
violations of the securities Jaws). Sec generally Rud(;'r, Multiple
De fondants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Ind('mnification and Contribution, 120 ,
U. Pa. L. R ev. 597, 620-645 (1972).
8 See n. 1, ~upra.
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soned that respondents were beneficiaries of the statutory duty to inquire 9 and the related duty to disclose
any material irregularities that were discovered. Id.,
at 1105-1111. The court concluded that there were
genuine issues of fact as to whether Ernst & Ernst's
failure to discover and comment upon Nay's mail rule 10
constituted a breach of its duties of inquiry and disclosure, id., at 1111, and whether inquiry and disclosure
would have led to the discovery or prevention of Nay's
fraud. ld., at 1115.u
9

The court concluded that the duty of inquiry imposed on

Em~t

& Ernst under § 17'(a) was "grounded on a concern for the pro-

tection of investors such as [respondents]," without reaching the
question whether t he statute imposed a "direct duty" to the respondents. 503 F. 2d, at 1105. The court held that Ernst &
Ernst owed no common-law duty of inquiry to respondents arising
from its contract with First Securities since Ernst & Ernst did not
specifically foresee that respondents' limited class might suffer from
a nrgligent audit, compare Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135
N. E. 275 (1922), with Ultramare.~ Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170,
174 N. E. 441 (1931) ; see, e. g., R.I. Hospital Trust Nat'l Bank v.
Swartz, 455 F. 2d 847, 851 (CA4 1972) . Moreover, r<'spondcnts
conceded that they did not rely on the financial statements and
reports prepared by Ernst & Ern~t or on its certificate of opinion.
503 F. 2d, at 1107.
10 In their briefs respondents allude to several other alleged failings by Ernst & Ernst in its audit of First Securities, principnlly its
failure to inquire into the collcctibility of cerktin loans by First Securities to Nay and and its failure to follow up on a 1965 memorandum that characterized First Securities' overall system of internal
control as wenk because of the centralization of functions in the
cashier. The Court of Apprals mentioned none of these nllc!!ed
deficiencies in its opinion in this rase, although it did discuss the
loans to Nay and certain other related maHers in its opinion in
Hochfelder v. Midwe8t Stock Exchange, 503 F. 2d, at 370-371, holding that the existence of thcl'le facts was insufficient to put the
Exchange on notice that further inquiry into First Securities' financia 1 affairs was required .
11
The Court of Appeals also reversed the District Court's holding
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We granted certiorari to resolve the question whether
a private cause of action for damages will lie under
§ 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 in the absence of any allegation of scienter-an intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud. 1 ~ 421 U. S. 909 (1975). We conclude that it
will not and therefore we reverse. 13
with respect to equitable estoppel :m.d the statute of limit.'1tions.
See n. 6, supra. In view of our disposition of the case we need not
address these is:;;ues.
12 Although the verbal formulations of the standa.rd to be applied
have varied, several courts of appeals have held in substance that
negligence alone is sufficient for civil liability under § 10 (b) and
Rule lOb-5. See, e. g., White v. Abrams, 495 F. 2d 724, 730 (CA9
1974) ("flexible duty" standard); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F. 2d 718,
735 (CA8 Hl67), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (negligence sufiicient); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F. 2d 634 (CA7 1963) (knowledge not required). Other courts of appeals have held that some
type of scienter-i. e., intent to defraud, reckleBs disregard for the
truth, or knowing use of some practice to defraud-is necessary in
such an act,ion. See, e. g., Clegg v. Conk, 507 F. 2d 1351, 13611362 (CAlO 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975) (an element
of "scienter or conscious fault"); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F. 2d
1277, 1306 (CA2 1973) ("willful or reckless disregard" of the
truth). But few of the doci~ions 1mnounr.ing that, some form of
negligence sufiices for civil liability under § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5
actually have involved only negligent conduct. Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 489 F. 2d 5i9, 606 (CA5), cert. denied, 419 U. S.
879 (1974); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F. 2d 255,
286 (CA3 1972) (Adams, J., concurring); Bucklo, Scienter and Rule
lOb-5, 67 Nw. U. L. Rev. 562, 568-570 (1972).
In this opinion the term "scienter" refers to a mental state embraeing an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In certain
areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act.
We need not address here the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behaYior is sufi'icicnt for civil liability under § 10 (b)
and Rule lOb-5.
tk Respondent~ further contend thn t Ernst & Ernst owed them a
direct duty under § 17 (a) and Rule 17a.-5 of the 1934 Act to conduct a proper audit of First Securities and that they may premise a
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Federal regulation of transactions in s0curities emerged
as part of the aftermath of the market crash in 1929.
The Securities Act of 1933 (1903 Act). 48 Stat. 74. as
amended 15 U. S. C. ~ 77a et seq., was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material information concerning pnhlic offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors against fraud and. through
the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote
ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing. See H. R.
Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong. , 1st Sess., 1- 5 (1933). The
1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors
against manipulation of stock prices through regulation
of transactions upon securities exchanges and in overthe-counter markets. a.nd to impose regular reporting
requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national securities exchanges. See S. Rep. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5 (1934). Although the Acts contain numerous carefully drawn express civil remedies
and criminal penalties, Congress recognized that efficient
regulation of securities trading could not be accomplished under a rigid statutory program. As part of the
1934 Act Congress created the Commission, which is provided with an arsenal of flexible enforcement powers. See,
e. g., 1933 Act ~§ 8, 19. 20. 48 Stat. 79, 85, 86. as
amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 77h, 77s, 77t; 1934 Act §§ 9,
19, 21, 48 Stat. 889. 898, 899, as amended, 15 U. S. C.
§§ 78i, 78s, 78u.
private cause of action a.gainst Ernst & Ernst for viola.tion of that
duty. Respondents cause of action, however, was premised solely
on the alleged violation of § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. During the
lengthy history of this lit.ig[l.tion they h~tve not amellded their
original complaint to aver a cause of action under § 17 (a) and
Rule 17a-5. We therefore do not consider that a claim of liability
under § 17 (a) is properly before us even assuming respondents
could assert such a claim independently of § 10 (b).
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Section 10 of the 1934 Act makes it "unlawful for
any person . . . (b) [ t l o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors." 15·
U. S. C. § 78j. In 1942, acting pursuant to the power
conferred by § 10 (b), the Commission promulga.ted·
Rule lOb-5, which now provides:
"Employment of manipulative and deceptive
devices.
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or·
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails. or·
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
"(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud,
"(2) To make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
"(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security."
Although § 10 (b) does not by its terms create an
express civil remedy for its violation, and there is no
indication that Congress, 14 or the Commission when
See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 5-6 (1934);
Note, Implied Littbility Under the Securities Exchange Act, 61 Harv ..
L. Rev. 858, 860 (1948).
14
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adopting Rule lOb-5, 15 contemplated such a remedy,
the existence of a private cause of action for violations
of the statute and the rule is now well established. Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stor.es, 421 U. S. 723, 730
(1975); Affiliated Ute C£tizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 150-154 (1972); Superintendent of Insurance v.
Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U. S. 6, 13 n. 9
(1971). During the 30-ye,ar period since a private cause
of action was first implied under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5,16
a substantial body of case law and commentary has developed as to its elements. Courts and commentators
long have differed with regard to whether scienter is a
necessa.ry element of such a cause of action, or whether
negligent conduct alone is sufficient. 17 In addressing this
question, we turn first to the language of §10(b), for
"[t]he starting point in every case involving construction
of a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps,
supra, at 756 (PowELL, J .. concurring); e. g., FTC v.
Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312 U. S. 349, 350 (1941).
A
Section 10 (b) makes unlawful the use or employment of "any manipula.tive or deceptive device or con15 SEC Securities Exchange Relea.~c No. 3230 (1942); Birnbaum
v. Newport Steel Corp., 19:3 F. 2d 461, 463 (CA2), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952).
16
Kard,on v. Nation<1l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (ED Pa.
1946).
17 See cases cited in n. 12, supra.
Compare, e. g., Comment,
Scienter and Rule lOh-5, 69 Col. L. Rev. 1057, 1080--1081 (1969);
Note, Negligent Misrepcscntatio11:3 under Rule lOb--5, 32 Chi. L. Rev.
824. 839-844 (1965); Not,e, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 9~8, 947 (1969); Note,
Civil Liability Under Section lOB and R11le lOB-5: A Suggestion
for Replacing the Doctrine of Privity, 74 Yale L. J. 658, 682-689
(1965), with, e. g .. 3 L. Lo~s, Securitiefl Regulation 1766 (2d ed.
1961); 6 id., a.t 3883-3885 (Supp. 1969).
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trivance" in contravention of Commission rules. The
words "manipulative or deceptive" used in conjunction
with "device or contrivance" strongly suggest that § 10
(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional
misconduct. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.
2d 833, 868 (CA2 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert.
denied sub nom. Kline v. SEC, 394 U. S. 976 (1969);
Loss, Sumary Remarks, 30 Bus. Lawyer 163, 165 (1975).
See also Kahn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F. 2d
255, 280 (CA3 1972) (Adams, J., concurring).
In its amicus curiae brief, however, the Commission
contends that nothing in the language "manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance" limits its operation to
knowing or intentional pra.ctices. 18 In support of its view,
the Commission cites the overall congressional purpose
in the 1933 and 1934 Acts to protect investors against
false and deceptive practices that might injure them. See
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U. S., at
The Commis8ion would not permit recovery upon proof of
in all caser;. In order to harmonize civil liability nndcr
§ 10 (b) with the express rivil remedies contained in the 1933 and
1934 Acts, the Commission would limit the circumstances in which
civil liability could be imposed for negligent viola.t ion of Rule
lOb--5 to situations in which (i) the defendant knew or reasonably
could forsee that the plaintiti would rely on his conduct, (ii) the
plaintiff did in fact so rely, and (iii) the amount of the plaintiff's
damages caused by the defendant's conduct was definite and ascertainable. Brief of Amicus Curiae 23-33. The Commission concludes that the present record does not establish these conditions
since it could not reasonably have been forsecn that the finanrial
sta.t ements of First Securities would induce respondents to invest
in the escrow accounts, respondents in fact did not. rely on Ernst &
Ernst's audits, and the amount of respondents' damages was un-ascertainable. Id., 33-36. Re~pondents accept the Commission's
basic analysis of the operative language of the st-atute and rule,.
but reject these additional requirements for recovery for negligent
violations.
18

ne~ligence
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151; Super-£ntendent of Insurance v. Bm1ke1·s Life &
Casualty Co., 404 U. S .. at 11-12; .T. I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 432-433 (1064). See also SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 195
(1963). The Commission then reasons that since the
"effect" upon investors of given conduct is the same regardless of whether the conduct is negligent or intentional,
Congress must have inknded to bar all snch practices and
not just those done knowingly or intrntionally. The logic
of this effect-oriented approach would impose liability for
wholly faultless conduct \vhcre such conduct results in
harm to investors, a result tlw Commission would br unlikely to support. But apart from where its logic might
lead. the Commission would add a gloss to the operative
language of the statutR quite different frorn its commonly accepted meaning.
See, e. g., Addison v. Holly
H1:ll Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617-618 (1944).w
Tho argument simply ignores the usc of the words "manipulative" "device" or "contrivance," terms that make unmistakable a congressional intent to proscribe a type of
conduct quite different from negligence. 20 Use of the
10
"To let general words draw on somr purpose is one thing. To
draw on some unexpressed Rpirit outside the bounds of the normal
moaning of words is qnite another . . . . After all, lcgisla,tion when
not expressed in technical terms is addressed to the common run of
men and is theref~re under~tood arcording to the srnse of thr thing,
ns the ordinary man has a right to rely on ordinary words addressed
to him." 322 U. S .. at 617-618. See Frankfurter, Some Rcflertions
on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Col. L. Rev. 527, 536-537 (1947).
20
WebstPr's Int'l Dictionary (2d ed. 1934) defines "device" as
"rtJhat which is devised, or formed by de~ign; a contrivance; an
invention; project; srheme; often a scheme to deceive; a stratap;rm;
an artifice," and "contrivanre" in portinrnt part as "r a] thing contri\·rd or used in rontriving; a srhcme, plan, or artifice." In 1urn,
"contrive" in pertinent part is dcfinocl as t] 0 devise; to plan; to
plot ... [tlo fabrirate ... dc~ign; im·ent ... to scheme . . . . "
The Commission also ignore~ the use of the terms "[t]o u~e or

"r
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word "manipula.t ive" is especially significant. It is and
was virtually a term of art when used in connection with
securities markets. It connotes intentional or willful
conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities. 21
In addition to relying upon the Commission 's argument with respect to the operative la.nguage of the statute, respondents contend that since we are dealing with
"remedial legislation ," Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S.
332, 336 (1967), it must be construed "'not technically
and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial
purposes.'" Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United Sta,tes, 406
U. S., at 151 , quoting SEC v. Capital Ga1:ns Research
Bureau, supra, at 186. They argue that the "remedial
purposes" of the Acts demand a construction of § 10 (b)
that embraces negligence as a standard of liability. But.
in seeking to a.ccomplish its broad remedial goals, Congress did not adopt uniformally a negligence standard
even as to express civil remedies. In some circumstances
and with respect to certain classes of defendants. Congress did create express liability predica.t ed upon a failure
to exercise reasonable care. E. g., 1933 Act § 11 (b) (3)
(B), 48 Stat. 82 as amended 15 U. S. C. § 77k (b) (3) (B)
(liability of "experts," such as accountants, for misleading statements in portions of registration statements for
which they are responsible) .2 2 But in other situations
good faith is a.n absolute defense. 1934 Act § 18, 48 Stat.
897, as amended 15 U.S. C. § 78r (misleading statements
employ," language that is ~ upporti ve of the view t hat Congress
did not intend § 10 (b) to embrace negligent conduct .
21 Webster's
Int'l Dictionary, supra, defines "manipuhte" as
". . . to manage or treat ar tfully or fraudulently ; as to manipulate
accounts . . . . 4. Rxchanges. To force (prices) up or down , as
by matched orders, wash sales, fict itious rrport.s ... ; t o rig ."
22
See p . 21 & n . 26, infra.
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in any document filed pursuant to the 1934 Act). And
in still other circumstances Congress created express liability regardless of the defendant's fault, 1933 Act § 11
(a) (issuer liability for misleading statements in the registration statement).
It is thus evident that Congress fashioned standards of fault in the express civil remedies in the
1933 and 1934 Acts on a pa.rticula.rized basis.. Ascertainment of congressional intent with respect to the
standard of liability created by a particular section of
the Acts must therefore rest primarily on the language
of that section. Where, as here, we deal with a judicially implied liability, the statutory language certainly
is no less important. In view of the language of
§ 10 (b) which so clearly connotes intentional misconduct, and mindful that the language of a statute controls when sufficiently clear in its context, United States
v. Oregon, 366 U. S. 643,, 648 (1961); Packard Motor
Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485, 492 (1947), further
inquiry may be unnecessary. We turn now, nevertheless, to the legislative history of the 1934 Act to ascertain
whether there is support for the meaning a.ttributed to
§ 10 (b) by the Commission and respondents.
B

Although the extensive legislative history of the 1934
Act is bereft of any explicit explana.tion of Congress'
intent, we think the relevant portions of tha.t history
support our conclusion that § 10 (b) was addressed to
practices that involve some element of scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for negligent conduct
alone.
The original version of what would develop into the
1934 Act was contained in identical bills introduced by
Senator Fletcher and Representative Rayburn. S. 2693,

'·
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73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H. R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1934). Section 9 (c) of the bills, from which present § 10 (b) evolved, proscribed as unlawful the use of
"any device or contrivance which, or any device or contrivance in a way or manner which the Commission may
by its rules and regulations find detrimental to the public interest or to the proper protection of investors." The
other subsections of proposed § 9 listed specific practices
that Congress empowered the Commission to regulate
through its rulemaking power. See §§ 9 (a) (short
sale), (b) ("stop-loss order"). Soon after the hearings
on the House bill were held, a substitute bill was introduced in both Houses which abbreviated a.nd modified
§ 9 (c)'s opera.t ive language to read "any manipulative
device or contrivance." S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.,
§ 10 (b) (1934); H. R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (c)
(1934). Still a third bill, retaining the Commission's
power to regulate the specific practices enumerated in
the prior bills, and omitting all reference to the Commission's authority to prescribe rules concerning manipulative or deceptive devices in general, was introduced and
passed in the House. H. R.. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.,
§ 9 (1934). The final language of § 10 is a modified
version of a Senate amendment to this last House bill.
See H. R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 32-33
(1934) (Conference Report).
Neither the intended scope of § 10 (b) nor the reasons
for the changes in its operative language are revealed
explicitly in the legislative history of the 1934 Act, which
deals primarily with other aspects of the legisla.t ion.
There is no indication, however, that § 10 (b) was intended to proscribe conduct not involving scienter. The
extensive hearings that preceded passage of the 1934
Act touched only briefly on § 10, and most of the discussion was devoted to the enumerated devices that the

..
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Commission is empowered to proscribe under § 10 (a).
The most relevant exposition of the provision that was
to hecome § 10 (b) vYas by Thomas G. Corcoran, a
spokesman for the drafters. Corcoran indicated:
"Subsection (c) [§ 9 (c) of H. R. 7852-later § 10
(b)] says, 'Thou shalt not devise any other cunning
devices.' ...
"Of course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to
prevent manipulative devices. I do not think there
is any objection to that kind of clause. The Commission should have the authority to deal with new
manipulative devices.''
Hea.rings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720 before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess., 115 ( 1934). This brief explanation of § 10 (b)
by a spokesman for its dmftcrs is significa.nt. The
section was described rightly as a "catch-all" clause to
enable the Commission "to deal with new manipulative
[or cunning] devices." It is difficult to believe that any
lawyer, legislative draftsman, or legislator would use
these words if the intent was to create liability for merely
negligent acts or omissions. 23 Neither the legislative
history nor the briefs supporting respondents identify
any usage or authority for construing "ma.nipulative [or
cunning] devices" 24 to include negligence.
Roe n. 21, supra.
In support of its position the Commi~sion cites statcmc.nts
by Corcoran in the Senate hearings t b~tt "in modern society there
are many things you have to make crimes which arc sheer matters
of ne~rligcnce" and "intent is not necessary for every crime." Hearings on Stock Exchange Pmctices before the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6509-6510 (1934). The
comment, taken in context, sheds no light on the meaning of § 10 (b).
Corcoran's remarks were made during a discussion of whether criminal violations could arise under § 8 (a) (3) of S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d
2 1
'

24
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The legislative reports do not address the scope of
§ 10 (b) or its catch-all function directly. In considering specific manipulative practices left to Commission
regulation, however, the reports indicate that liability
would not attach absent scienter, supporting the conclusion that Congress intended no lesser standard under
§ 10 (b). The Senate Report of S. 3420 discusses generSess., which in material part was incorporated in § 9 of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S. C. § 78; in the absence of specific intent to influence security
prices for personal gain. The remarks, moreover, were not addre..qsed to the scope of § 8, but were general observations concerning activity society might proscribe under criminal law. Ferclinand Pecora., cmmsel to the committee and a draftman of S. 2693,
Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co.,- U.S.-,
n. 24 (1976), described the language as "[e]xcluding from its
scope an act that is not done with any ulterior motives or purposes, as set forth in the act." ld., at 6510. Further, prior to
the passage of the 1934 Act, proposed § 8 was amended to require
willful behavior as a prerequisite to civil liability fm vio~ations.
Compare§ 9 (e) of the 1934 Act with§ 8 (c) of S. 2693. See H. R.
Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 21 (1934).
The Commission also relies on objections to a draft. version
of § 10 (b)-§ 9 (c) of S. 2693 and H. R. 7852, see pp. 14-15,
supra-raised by representatives of the securities industry in the
House and Senate hearings. They warned that the language was
so vague that the Commission might outlaw anything. E. g., Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6988; Hearings on
H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720 before the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Con g., 2d Sess., 258 ( 1934). Rema.rks
of this kind made in the course of legislative debate or hearings other
than by persons responsible for the preparation or the drafting of a
bill, are entitled to little weight. See, e. g., United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 276-277 (1947); United States v.
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110, 125 (1942). This is especially so with regard to the statements of legislative opponents who
"[i]n their zeal to defeat a bill ... understandably tend to overstate its reach." NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964).
See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 394395 (1951).
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ally the various abuses that precipitated the need for the
legislation and the inadequacy of self-regulation by the
stock exchanges. The Report then analyzes the component provisions of the statute, but does not parse § 10.
The only specific reference to § 10 is the following:
"In addition to the discretionary and elastic powers conferred on the administrative authority, effective regulation must include several clear statutory
provisions reinforced by penal and civil sanctions,
aimed at those manipulative and deceptive practices
which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful
function. These sanctions are found in sections 9, 10
and 16." S. Rep. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess .. 6 (1934).
In the portion of the general analysis section of the
Report entitled "Manipulative Practices," however, there
is a discussion of specific practices that were considered
so inimical to the public interest as to require express
prohibition, such as "wash" sales and "matched" orders, 2 r.
and of other practices that might in some cases serve
legitimate purposes, such as stabilization of security
prices and grants of options. /d., at 7-9. These latter
practices were left to regulation by the Commission.
1934 Act§§ 9 (a)(6), (c), 48 Stat. 890, 15 U.S. C.§§ 78i
(a)(6), (c). Significantly, we think, in the discussion of
"WaRh" sales are trans:tctions involving no eh:mge in beneficial
ownership. "Matched" orders arc ordcrR for the purch:1se/sale of a
security that are entered with the knowledge that orders of substantially the same .size, at substantially the same time and price,
have been or will be entered by the same or different persons for
the salejpurchase of such security. Section 9 (a) (I) of the 1934
Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78i (a) (1), prosrribes wash sales and matched
orders when effectuated "[f]or the purpose of creating a false or
misleading appearance of active trading in any security registered
on a national securities exrhange, or , .. with respect to the market
for any ~;;uch security." See In re J. A. Latimer & Co., 38 S. E. C.
790 (1958); In re Thornton & Co., 28 S. E. 208 (1948).
25

.
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this latter category of specified manipulative practices,
there is no indication that any type of criminal or civil
liability is to attach in the absence of scienter. For example, in discussing the potential abuses resulting from
the use of options, the Report indicates that self-regulation by securities exchanges had proved inadequate because membe.rs might deliberately circumvent the rules of
the exchange by employing nonmembers to execute transactions. ld., at 9. Furthermore, in commenting on the
express civil liabilities provided in the 1934 Act, theReport explains:
" . . . if an investor has suffered loss by reason of
illicit practices, it is equitable that he should be
allowed to recover damages from the guilty party....
The bill provides that any person who unlawfully manipulates the price of a security, or who
induces transactions in a security by means of false
or misleading statements, or who makes a false or
misleading statement in the report of a corporation,
shall be liable in damages to those who have bought
or sold the security at prices affected by such violation or statement. In such case the burden is on the
plaintiff to show the violation or the fact that the
statement was false or misleading, and that he relied
thereon to his damage. The defendant may escape
liability by showing that the statement was made in
good faith." /d., at 12-13 (emphasis supplied).
With regard to the specified manipulative practioo;
considered in the Report, therefore, there is revealed an
overall congressional intent to prevent "manipulative
and deceptive practices ... which fulfill no useful func-tion" and to crea.t e private actions for damages stemming
from "illict practices," where the defendant has not acted
in good faith. The views expressed in the House Report
are consistent with this interpretation. H. Rep. No.
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1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11, 20-21 (1934) (H. R.
9323). There is no indication that Congress intended
anyone to be made liable for misleading conduct or misstatement unless he acted other than in good faith. The
catch-all provision of § 10 (b) should be interpreted no
more broadly.

c

The 1933 and 1934 Acts constitute interrelated components of the federal regulatory scheme governing transactions in securities. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S .. at
727-730. As the Court indicated in SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), "the interdependence
of the various sections of the securities laws is certainly
a relevant factor in any interpretation of the language
Congress has chosen .... " Recognizing this, respondents
and the Commission contrast § 10 (b) to other sections of
the Acts to support their contention that civil liability ma.y
be imposed upon proof of negligent conduct. We think
they misconceive the significance of the other provisions
of the Acts.
The Commission argues that Congress has been explicit
in requiring willful conduct when that was the standard
of fault intended, citing § 9 of the 1934 Act, 48 Stat. 889,
15 U. S, C. § 78i, which generally proscribes manipulation
of securities prices. Sections 9 (a)(1) and (a)(2). for
example, respectively prohibit manipulation of security
prices " [ f] or the purpose of creating a false or misleading
appearance of actual trading in any security ... or ...
with respect to the market for any such security," and
"for the purpose of including the purchase or sale of such
security by others." See also§ 9 (a)(4). Section 9 (e)
then imposes upon "[a]ny person who willfully participates in any act or transaction in violation of" other provisions of § 9 civil liability to anyone who purchased or
sold a security at a price affected by the manipulative
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activities. From this the Commission concludes that
since § 10 (b) is not by its terms explicitly restricted to.
willful, knowing, or purposeful conduct, it should not be
construed in all cases to require more than negl~gent
action or inaction as a precondition for civil liability.
The structure of the Acts does not support the Cornmission's argument. In each instance that Congress
created expFess civil liability in favor of defrauded purchasers or sellers of securities it clearly specified whether
recovery was to be premised on knowing or intentional
conduct, negligence, or entirely innocent mistake.. See
1933 Act, §§ 11 , 12, 15, 48 Stat. 82, 84, as amended 15
U. S. C. §§ 77k, 77l, 77o; 1934 Act §§ 9, 18, 20, 48 Stat.
889, 896, 897, 899, as amended 15 U. S. C. §§ 78i,
78r. 78t. For example, § 11 of the 1933 Act unambiguously creates a private action for damages when a
registration statement includes untrue statements of ma-·
terial facts or fails to state material facts necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading. Within the
limits specified by § 11 (e), the issuer of the securities is
held absolutely liable for any damages resulting from such
misstatement or omission. But experts such as accountants who have prepared portions of the registration statement are accorded a "due diligence" defense. In effect,
this is a negligence standard. An expert may avoid civil
liability with respect to the portions of the registration
statement for which he was responsible by showing that
"after reasonable investigation" he had "reasonable
ground[s] to believe" that the statements for which he
was responsible were true and there was no omission of a
material fact. ~ § 11 (b) (3)(B)(i) . See, e. g., Escott v.
6

2 6 Other individuals who sign the registration statement, directors
of the issuer, and the underwriter of the securities similarly arc
accorded a complete defense against civil liability based on the exercise of reasonable investigation and a reasonable belief that the

, ··
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Barchris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697- 703
(SDNY 1968). The express recognition of a cause of
action premised on negligent behavior in § 11 stands in
sharp contrast to the language of § 10 (b), and significantly undercuts the Commission's argument.
We also consider it significant that each of the express
civil remedies in the 1933 Act allowing recovery for negligent conduct, see ~§ 11, 12 (2), 15, 15 U.S. C. §§ 77k, 77l,
77o/ 7 are subject to significant procedural restrictions not
applicable under § 10 (b). 28 Section 11 (e) of the 1933
registration statement was not misleading. §§ 11 (b) (3) (A), (C),
(D), (c). See, e. g., Feit v. Leasco Data Proces&ing Equipment
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 575-583 (EDNY 1971) (underwriters, but
not officer-directors, established their due diligence defense). See
generally R. Jenning8 & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation 1018-1027
(3d ed. 1972), and sources cited therein; Folk, Civil Liabilities under
the Federal Securities ActR: The Barchris Case, 55 Va . L. Rev. 199
(1969).
21 Section 12 (2) crea.tcs potential civil liability for a seller of
securities in favor of the purchaser for misleading statements or
omissions in connection with the t.ranRaction. The seller is exculpated if he proves that he did not know, or in the exer~ise of
reasonable care, could not. have known of the untruth or omission.
Section 15 of the 1933 Act, a.~ amended by § 208 of Title II of the
1934 Act, makes persons who "r.ontrol" any person liable under § 11
or § 12 liable jointly nnd severa.lly to the same extent as the controlled
person, unless he "had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the fncts by reason of which the liability of
the controlled pcr~on is allcg;ed t.o exi~<t" 15 U.S. C.§ 77o . See Act
of .Tunc 6, 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, c. 404, Title II § 208, 48 Stat. 908.
28 Each of the provisions of tho 1934 Act that expressly crr_ate
civil liability, except tho~e directed to specific classes of individuals
such as directors, officers, or 10% benefirinl holders of sccnritics, see
§ 16 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 78p, Fm·emost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident
Securities Co., supra; Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 411 U. S. 582 (1973), contains n statr-of-mind something more than negligence. Section 9 creates potr.ntial civil liability for any person who "willfully participntcs" in the manpulation
of securities on a national exchange. § 9 (e). 15 U.S . C.§ 78i (e).

74-1042-0PINION
ERNST & ERNST v. HOCHFELDER

23

Act, for example, authorizes the court to require a plaintiff bringing a suit under§ 11, § 12 (2), or§ 15 thereof to
post a bond for costs, including attorneys' fees. Section
13 specifies a statute of limitations of one year from the
time the violation was or should have been discovered, in
no event to exceed three years from the time of offer or
sale, applicable to actions brought under § 11, § 12 (2),
or § 15. These restrictions, significantly, were imposed
by amendments to the 1933 Act passed as part of the
1934 Act. Prior to amendment § 11 (e) contained no
provision for payment of costs. 48 Stat. 83. Act of
May 27, 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, c. 38, Title I, § 11 (e).
See Act of June 6, 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, c. 404, Title II
§ 206 (e), 48 Stat. 908. The amendments substantially
shortened the statute of limitations provided by § 13.
Compare Pub. L. No. 22, supra, § 13, 48 Stat. 84, with 15
U. S. C. § 77m. See 1934 Act, § 207, 48 Stat. 908. See
n. 28 attached that the judicially created private
damage remedy under § 10 (b)-which has no comparable restrictions 29-cannot be extended, consistently with
Section 18 creates potential civil liability for misleading st11,tements
filed with the Commission, but provides the defendant with the
defense that "he acted in good faith and had no knowledge that
such statement was false or mislca.ding." 15 U. S. C. § 78r. And
§ 20 which imposes liability upon "controlling persons" for violations
of tho Act by those they control, exculpates a defendant who "ac·t ed
in good faith and did not ... induce the act ... constituting the
viohtion. . . ." 15 U. S. C. § 78t. Emphasizing the important
difference between the operative language a11d purpose of § 14 (a)
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S. C. § 14n (a), as contrasted with § 10 (b)
however, some courts have concluded that proof of scienter is
unnecessary in an action for damages by the slmreholder recipients·
of a materially misleading proxy statement against the issncr corpor:d.ion. See Gerstle v. Gamble-Slcogmo, Inc., 478 F. 2d 1281, 129!}
(CA2 1973); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., supra, at
289-290.
21
! Since no statute of limitations is provided for civil actions
under § 10 (b), the law of limitations of the forum state is followed
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the intent of Congress, to actions premised on negligent
wrongdoing. Such extension would allow causes of
action covered by § 11, § 12 (2), and § 15 to be brought
instead under § 10 (b) and thereby nullify the effectiveness of the carefully drawn procedural restrictions on
those express actions. See. e. g., Fischman v. Raytheon
Manufacturing Co., 188 F. 2d 783, 786-787 (CA2 1951);
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d, at 867- 868
(Friendly, J., concurring); Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft
Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124 (ED Pa. 1948); 3 L. Loss,
supra, at 1787-1788; R. Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities
Regulation 1070-1074 (3d ed. 1972). We would be unwilling to bring about this result absent substantial support in the legislative history, and there is none.'10
D

We have addressed, to this point, primarily the language a.nd history of § 10 (b). The Commission conas in other cases of judicially implied remedies. See Holmb erg v.
Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 395 ( 1946), and cases cited therein. Although it is not always ccrtnin which state statute of limitations
should be followed, such statutes of limitations usually nre longer
than the period provided under § 13. 3 L. Loss, supra, at 17731774. As to costs see n. 30 infra.
3 ° Congress regarded these restrictions on private damage ar-tions
ns significant. In introducinp: Title II of the 1934 Act, Senator
Fletcher indicated that the nmcnclment to § 11 (e) of the 1933 Act,
providing for potential payment of costs, induding attorneys' fees,
" is the most important [amendment] of all." 78 Cong. Rec. 8669.
One of its purposes was to deter actions brought solely for their
potential settlement value, See H. Rep. 1838, 73d Cong., Zd Sess.,
42 (1934) (Conference Report) ; Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at 740741. This deterrent is lacking in the § 10 (b) context, in which a
dist rict court's power to award [lttorneys' fees is sharply circumRc ribed. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wild erness Society,
421 U. S. 240 (1975) ("bad faith" requirement); F. D. Rich Co. v.
Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974).

,•
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tends, however, that subsections (2) anci (3) of RulelOb-5 are cast in language which-if standing alonecould encompass both intentional and negligent behavior._
These subsections respectively provide that it is unlawful "[t]o make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order·
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading ... "·
and "to engage in any act. practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person. . . ." Viewed in isolation the language of subsection (2), and arguably that of subsection (3), could be read as proscribing, respectively, any
type of material misstatement or omission, and a.ny
course of conduct, that has the effect of defrauding investors, whether the wrongdoing was intentional or not.
We note first that such a reading cannot be harmonized with the administrative history of the rule, a history making clear that when the Commission adopted
the rule it was intended to apply only to activities that
involved scienter. 31 More importantly, Rule lOb-5 was
31 Apparently the rule was a hastily drafted response to a situation clearly involving of intentional misconduct. The Commission's Hegional Administrator in Boston had reported to the
Director of the Trading and Exchange Division that the president
of a corporation was telling the other shareholders that the corporation was doing poorly and purchasing their shares at the rc~ultant
depressed prices, when in fact the business was doing exceptionally
well. The Hule was drafted and approved on the day this report
was received. See Conference on Codification of the Federal Seeuritics Laws, 22 Bus. Law. 793, 922 (1967) (remarks of Milton
Freeman, one of rule's co-drafters); Blue Chip Stamps, supra, a.t
767 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting). Although adopted pursua.nt to
§ 10 (b), the language of the rule ttppenrs to have been derived in
significant part from § 17 of· the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77q.
E. g., ibid.; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d, at 867
(Friendly, J., concurring). There is no indication in the adminis-

•.
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adopted pursuant to authority granted the Commission
under § 10 (b). The rulema.king power granted to an
administrative agency charged with the administration
of a federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather,
it is " 'the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect
the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.' " Di.rcon
v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965), quoting Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297
U. S. 129, 134 (1936). Thus, despite the broad view
of the Rule advanced by the Commission in this case,
its scope cannot exceed the power granted the Commission by Congress under § 10 (b). For the reasons
stated above, we think the Commission's original interpretation of Rule 10b-5 was compelled by the language
and history of § 10 (b) and related sections of the Acts.
See, e. g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Slcogmo, Inc., 478 F. 2d
1281, 1299 (CA2 1973); Lanza v. Drexel .& Co., 479 F.
2d 1277, 1304-1305 (CA2 1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf
trative history of the Rule that any of the subsections was intended
to proscribe conduct not involving scienter. Indeed the Commission's release issued contemporaneously with the rule explained:
"The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced the
adop1 ion of a rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection
with the purchase of securities. The previously existing rules
against fraud in the purchase of securities applied only to brokers
and dealers. The new rule closes a loophole in the protections
against fraud administered by the Commiflsion by prohibiting individuals or companies from buying sccuritieR if they engage in fr:1ud
in their purchase." SEC Jlelease No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
That f'ame year, in its Annunl Report, the Commission again statrd
that the purpose of the rule was to protect investors against "fmnd":
"During the fiscal year the Commission adopted Rule X-10B-f}
as an additional protection to inve:;tors. The new rule prohibits
fraud by any person in connection with the purchase of sceuritir.s,
while the preYiously exist.ing rules against fraud in the purchnse of
securities applied only to brokers and dmlers." 8 SEC Ann. Rep.
10 (1942).
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Sulphur Co., supra, at 868; 3 L. Loss, Securities Regula-

tion 1766 (2d ed. 1961) (concurring opinion); 6 id., at
3883-3885 (Supp. 1969) . When a sta.tute spea.ks so specifically in terms of manipulation and deception, and of
implementing devices and contrivances-the commonly
understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing-and
when its history reflects no more expansive intent, we
are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the statute to
negligent conduct. 32
32 As we find the language and history of § 10 (b) dispositive of
the appropriate standard of liability, there is no occasion to examine ·
t he additional considerations of "policy," set forth by the parties,
that may have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of the
statute. We do note that the standard urged by respondents would
significantly broaden the class of plaintiffs who may seek to impose
liability upon accountantg and other experts who perform services or
express opinions with respect to matters under the Acts. Last Term,
in Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at 747-748, the Court pertinently
observed:
"While much of the development of the law of deceit has been the
elimination of artificial barriers to recovery on just claims, we are not
the first court to express concern that the inexorable broadening of
the class of plaintiffs who mny sue in this area of the law will ultimately result in more harm than good. In Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931), Chief Judge Cardozo
observed with respect to 'a liability in an indeterminate Eunotmt for
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate cause':
" 'The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so
extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the
implica.tion of a dut.y that exposes to t,hese consequences.' Jd., at
179-180, 174 N. E., at 444."
This case, on its facts, illustrates the extreme reach of the standard
urged by respondents. As investors in transactions initiated by
Nay, not First Securities, they were not fore~eec'lble users of the
financial statementR prepared by Ernst & Ernst. Respondents conceded that they did not rely on either these financial statements or
Ernst & Ernst's certificates of opinion. See n. 9, supra. The class
of per~on.'S eligible to benefit from such a standard, though small in
this case, could be numbered in the thousMds in other cases. Acceptance of respondents' view would extend to new frontiers the·

'.
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III
Recognizing that § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5 might be held
to require proof of more than negligent misfeasance by
Ernst & Ernst as a precondition to the imposition of
civil liability respondents further contend that the ease
should be remanded for trial under whatever standard
is adopted. Throughout the lengthy history of this case
respondents have proceeded on a theory of liability
premised on negligence, specifically disclaiming that
Ernst & Ernst had engaged in fraud or intentional misconduct.~3
In these circumstances, we think it inappropriate to remand the action for further proceedings.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is
Reversed.

MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration
or decision of this case.

"hazards" of rendering expert advice under the Acts, raising serious
polioy questions not yet addressed by Congress.
""See 503 F. 2d, u,t 1104, 1119; n. 5, supra.
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The issue in this case is whether an action for civil
damages may lie under § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) , 48 Stat. 891 , 15 U. S. C.
§ 78j (b) , and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule
10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b- 5, in the absence of an allegation of intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud on the
part of the defendant.
I
Petitioner, Ernst & Ernst, is an accounting firm. From
1946 through 1967 it was retained by First Securities
Company of Chicago (First Securities) , a small brokerage firm and member of the Midwest Stock Exchange
and of the National Association of Securities Dealers, to
perform periodic audits of the firm 's books and records.
In connection with these audits Ernst & Ernst prepared
for filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the Commission) the annual reports required of First
Securities under § 17 (a ) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78q
(a) .1 It also prepared for First Securities responses
1 Section
17 (a) requires that secunties brokers or dealers
"make ... and preserve . . such accounts ... books, and other
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to the financial questionnaires of the Midwest Stock
Exchange (the Exchange) .
Respondents were customers of First Securities who
invested in a fraudulent securities scheme perpetrated
by Leston B. Nay, president of the firm and owner of
92% of its stock. Nay induced the respondents to invest funds in "escrow" accounts that he represented
would yield a high rate of return. Respondents did so
from 1942 through 1966, with the majority of the transactions occurring in the 1950's. In fact, there were no
escrow accounts as Nay converted respondents' funds to
his own use immediately upon receipt. These transactions were not in the customary form of dealings between First Securities and its customers. The respondents drew their personal checks payable to Nay or a designated bank for his account. No such escrow accounts
were reflected on the books and records of First Securities, and none was shown on its periodic accounting to
respondents in connection with their other investments.
Nor were they included in First Securities' filings with
the Commission or the Exchange.
records, and make such reports, as the Commission by its rules and
regulations may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors." During the period relevant here, Commission R11le 17a-5, 17 CFR § 240.17a-5, required
that First Securities file an annual report of its financial condition
that included a certificate stating "clearly the opinion of the accountant with respect to the financial statement covered by the certificate
and the accounting principles and practices reflected therein." See
SEC Release No. 3338 (Nov. 28, 1948) , X-17A-5 (h). The rule required Ernst & Ernst to state in its certificate, inter alia, "whether
the audit was made in accordance with generally accepted auditing
standards applicable in the circumstances" and provided that nothing in the mle should "be constmed to imply authority for the
omission of any procedure which independent accountants would
ordinarily employ in the course of an audit for the purpose of
.expressing the opinions required" by the rule.
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This fraud came to light in 1968 when Nay committed
suicide, leaving a note that described First Securities as
bankrupt and the escrow accounts as "spurious." Respondents subsequently filed this action 2 for damages
against Ernst & Ernst 3 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under
§ 10 (b) of the 1934 Act. The complaint charged that
Nay's escrow scheme violated § 10 (b) and Commission
Rule 10b-5;4 and that Ernst & Ernst had "aided and
abetted" N~ty's violations by its "failure" to conduct
proper audits of First Securitie~. As revealed through
discovery, respondents' cause of action rested on a
theory of negligent misfeasance. The premise was that
Ernst & Ernst had failed to utilize "appropriate auditing procedures" in its audits of First Securities, thereby
failing to discover internal practices of the firm said
to prevent an effective audit. The practice principally relied on was Nay's rule that only he could open
2 Two separate, but substantially identical, complaints initially
were filed by different members of the present group of respondents.
Subsequently the respondents jointly filed a First Amended Complaint. The two cases were treated by the District Court as if they
were consolida.ted and were consolidated formally on appeal.
8 The first
count of the complaint was directed against the
Exchange, charging that through its acts and omissions it had
aided and abetted Nay's fraud. Summary judgment in favor
of the Exchange was affirmed on appeal. Hochfelder v. Midwest
Stock Exchange, 503 F. 2d 364 (CA7), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 875
(1974) .
4 Immediately after Nay's suicide the Commission commenced receivership proceedings against First Securities. In those proceedings
all of the respondents except two asserted claims based on the
fraudulent escrow accounts. These claims ultimately were allowed
in SEC v. First Securities Co., 463 F. 2d 981, 986 (CA7 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1973) , where the court held that Nay's conduct violated § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5, and that First Securities
was liable for Nay's fraud as an aider and abettor. The question
of Ernst & Ernst's liability was not considered in that case.
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mail addressed to him at First Securities or addressed
to First Securities to his attention, even if it arrived in
his absence. Respondents contended that if Ernst &
Ernst had conducted a proper audit, it would have discovered this "mail rule." The existence of the rule then
would have been disclosed in reports to the Exchange
and to the Commission by Ernst & Ernst as an irregular
procedure that prevented an effective audit. This
.would have led to an investigation of Nay that would
have revealed the fraudulent scheme. Respondents specifically disclaimed the existence of fraud or intentional
misconduct on the part of Ernst & Ernst. 5
After extensive discovery the District Court granted
Ernst & Ernst's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. The court rejected Ernst & Ernst's
contention that a cause of action for aiding and abetting
a securities fraud could not be maintained under§ 10 (b)
and Rule lOb-5 merely on allegations of negligence. It
concluded, however, that there was no genuine issue of
material fact with respect to whether Ernst & Ernst had
conducted its audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards. 6
In their response to interrogatories in the District Court respondents conceded that they did "not accuse Ernst & Ernst of
deliberate, intentional fraud," merely with "mexcusable negligence."
App. 81.
6 The District Court also held respondent's action was barred by
the doctrine of equitable estoppel and the applicable Illinois statute of limitations of three years. See n. 29, infra. As customers of
First Securities respondents were sent confirmation forms as required under § 17 (a) and Rule 17a-5 requesting that they verify
the accuracy of the statements and notify Ernst & Ernst as to
any exceptions. Although the confirmation forms contained no
reference to the escrow accounts, Ernst & Ernst was not notified
of this fact. The last audit of First Securities by Ernst & Ernst
was completed in December 1967 and the first complaint in this
{l,ction was not filed until February 1971.
5
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed
and remanded, holding that one who breaches a duty
of inquiry and disclosure owed another is liable in damages for aiding and abetting a third party's violation of
Rule 10b-5 if the fraud would have been discovered or
prevented but for the breach. 503 F. 2d 1100 (1974). 7
The court reasoned that Ernst & Ernst had a common-law
and statutory duty of inquiry into the adequacy of First
Securities' internal control system because it had contracted to audit First Securities and to prepare for filing
with the Commission the annual report of its financial
condition required under § 17 of the 1934 Act and Rule
17a-5, 17 CFR § 240.17a-5.8 The Court further rea7 In support of this holding, the Court of Appeals cited its decision
in Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, supra, where it detailed
the elements necessary to establish a claim under Rule lOb-5 based
on a defendant's aiding and abetting a securities fraud solely by
inaction. See n. 3 supra, In such a case the plaintiff must show
"that the party charged with aiding and abetting had knowledge or
or, but for the breach of a duty of mquiry, should have had knowledge of the fraud, and that possessing such knowledge the party
failed to act due to an improper motive or breach of a duty of
disclosure." Id., at 374. The court explained in the instant case
that these "elements constitute a flexible standard of liability which
should be amplified according to the peculiarities of each case." 503
F. 2d, at 1104. In view of our holding that an intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud is required for civil liability under § 10 (b)
and Rule 10b-5, we need not consider whether civil liability for
aiding and abetting is appropriate under the section and the rule,
nor the elements necessary to establish such a cause of action. See,
e. g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673'
(1966), 286 F. Supp. 702 (ND Ind. 1968), aff'd, 417 F. 2d 147 (CA7
1969), ccrt. denied, 397 U. S. 989 (1970) (defendant held liable for
giving active and knowing assistance to a third party engaged in
violations of the securities laws). See generally Ruder, Multiple
Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases : Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Pan Delicto, Indemnification and Contribution, 12(J
U. Pa. L. Rev. 597, 620-645 (1972)..
s See n l, supra.
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soned that respondents were beneficiaries of the statutory duty to inquire 9 and the related duty to disclose
any material irregularities that were discovered. I d.,
at 1105-1111. The court concluded that there were
genuine issues of fact as to whether Ernst & Ernst's
failure to discover and comment upon Nay's mail rule 10
constituted a breach of its duties of inquiry and disclosure, id., at 1111, and whether inquiry and disclosure
would have led to the discovery or prevention of Nay's
fraud. !d., at 1115.11
The court concluded that the duty of inquiry imposed on Ernst
& Ernst under § 17 (a) was "grounded on a concern for the protection of investors such as [respondents]," without reaching the
question whether the statute imposed a "direct duty" to the respondents. 503 F. 2d, at 1105. The court held that Ernst &
Ernst owed no common-law duty of inquiry to respondents arising
from its contract with First Securities since Ernst & Ernst did not
specifically foresee that respondents' limited class might suffer from
a negligent audit, compare Glanzer v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135
N. E. 275 (1922), with Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170,
174 N. E. 441 (1931); see, e. g., R.I. Hospital Trust Nat'l Bank v.
Swartz, 455 F. 2d 847, 851 (CA4 1972). Moreover, respondents
conceded that they did not rely on the financial statements an<l
reports prepared by Ernst & Ernst or on its certificate of opinion.
503 F. 2d, at 1107.
10 In their briefs respondents allude to several other alleged failings by Ernst & Ernst m its audit of First Securities, principally its
failure to inquire into the collectibility of certain loans by First Securities to Nay and and its failure to follow up on a 1965 memorandum that characterized First Securities' overall system of internal
control as weak because of the centralization of functions in the
cashier. The Court of Appeals mentioned none of these alleged
deficiencies m its opinion in this case, although it did discuss the
loans to Nay a.nd certain other related matters in its opinion in
Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, supra, at 370-371, holding that the existence of these facts was insufficient to put the
Exchange on notiCe that further inquiry into First Securities' financial affairs was required
11 The Court of Appeals also reversed the District Court's holding
9
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We granted certiorari to resolve the question whether
a private cause of action for damages will lie under
§ 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 in the absence of any allegation of scienter-intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud. 12 421 U. S. 909 (1975). We conclude that it
will not and therefore we reverse.13
with respect to equitable estoppel and the statute of limitations.
See n. 6, supra. In view of our disposition of the case we need not
address these issues.
12 Although the verbal formulations of the standard to be applied
have varied, several courts of appeals have held in substance that
negligence alone is sufficient for civil liability under § 10 (b) and
Rule 10b-5. See, e. g., White v. Abrams, 495 F. 2d 724, 730 (CA9
1974) ("flexible duty" standard); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F. 2d 718,
735 (CA8 1967), cert. denied, 390 U. S. 951 (1968) (negligence sufficient); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F. 2d 634 (CA7 1963) (knowledge not required). Other courts of appeals have held that some
type of scienter~i. e., intent to defraud, reckless disregard for the
truth, or knowing use of some practice to defraud-is necessary in
such an action. See, e. g., Clegg v. Conk, 507 F. 2d 1351, 13611362 (CA10 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975) (an element
of "scienter or conscious fault"); Lanza v. D1·exel & Co., 479 F. 2d
1277, 1306 (CA2 1973) ("willful or reckless disregard" of the
truth). But few of the decisions announcing that some form of
negligence suffices for civil liability under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5
actually have involved· only negligent conduct. Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co., 489 F. 2d 579, 606 (CA5), cert. denied, 419 U. S.
879 (1974); Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F. 2d 255,
2.86 (CA3 1977) (Adams, J., concurring); Bucklo, Scienter and Rule ·
10b-5, 67 Nw. U. L. Rev. 562, 568-570 (1972) .
In this opinion the term "scienter" refers to a mental state em~
bracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In certain ·
areas of the law recklessness is cons1dercd to be a form of inten~ ,
tiona! conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act.
We need not. address here the question whether, in some circum~.
stances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under§ 10 (b)
and Rule 10b-5.
· 13 Respondents further contend that Ernst & Ernst owed them a
direct duty under § 17 (a) and Rule 17a-5 of the 1934 Act to conduct a proper audit of Fir~t Securiti~ and :that they may base a, ·
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Federal regulation of transactions in securities emerged
as part of the aftermath of the market crash in 1929.
The Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), 48 Stat. 74, as
amended 15 U. S. C. § 77a et seq., was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors against fraud and, through
the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote
ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing. See H. R.
Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1-5 (1933). The
1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors
against manipulation of stock prices through regulation
of transactions upon securities exchanges and in overthe-counter markets, and to impose regular reporting
requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national securities exchanges. See S. Rep. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5 (1934). Although the Acts contain numerous carefully drawn express civil remedies
and criminal penalties, Congress recognized that efficient
regulation of securities trading could not be accomplished under a rigid statutory program. As part of the
1934 Act Congress created the Commission, which is provided with an arsenal of flexible enforcement powers. See,
e. g., 1933 Act §§ 8, 19, 20, 48 Stat. 79, 85, 86, aff
amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 77h, 77s, 77t; 1934 Act §§ 9,
19, 21, 48 Stat. 889, 898, 899, as amended, 15 U. S. C.
§§ 78i, 78s, 78u.
private cause of action against Ernst & Ernst for violation of that
duty. Respondents cause of action, however, was premised solely
on the alleged violation of § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5. During the
lengthy history of th1s litigatiOn they have not amended their
original complaint to aver a cause of action under § 17 (a) and
Rule 17a-5. We therefore do not consider that a claim of liability
under § 17 (a) is properly before us even assuming respondents.
cmlld assert such a claim mdependently of § 10 (b) .

ERNST & ERNST v. HOCHFELDER

Section 10 of the 1934 Act makes it "unlawful fort
any person . . . (b) [ t] o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . .. any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors." 15
U. S. C. § 78j. In 1942, acting ·pursuant to the power
conferred by § 10 (b) , the Commission promulgated
Rule lOb- 5, which now provides :
"Employment of manipulative and deceptive·
devices.
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly ot
indirectly, by "the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or'
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
" ( 1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud,
"(2) To make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
"(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, in connection with -the
purchase or sale of any security."
Although § 10 (b) does not by its terms create an
express civil remedy for its violation, and there is nO'
indication that Congress,14 or the Commission when
See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 5-6 (1934);
Note, Implied Liability Under the Securities Exchange Act, 61 Harv,
L, R~v. 858, 860 (1948} .
14

'

'I

..
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adopting Rule 10b~5, 1 5 contemplated such a remedy,
the existence of a private cause of action for violations
of the statute and the rule is now well established. Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 730
(1975); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 150--154 (1972); Superintendent of Insurance v.
Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U. S. 6, 13 n. 9
(1971). During the 30-year period since a private cause
of action was first unplied under§ 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5/6
a substantial body of case law and commentary has developed as to its elements. Courts and commentators
long have differed with regard to whether scienter is a
necessary element of such a cause of action, or whether
negligent conduct alone is sufficient.17 In addressing this
question, we turn first to the language of § 10 (b), for
" [ t] he starting point in every case involving construction
of a statute is the language itself." Blue Chip Stamps,
supra, at 756 (PowELL, J., concurring); e. g., FTC v..
Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312 U. S. 349, 350 (1941).
A
Section 10 (b) makes unlawful the use or employment of "any manipulative or deceptive device or conSEC Securities Exchange Release No. 3230 (1942); Birnbaum·
v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F . 2d 461 , 463 (CA2), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952) .
16 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co ., 69 F. Supp. 512 (ED Pa.
1946) .
17 See cases cited in n
12, supra Compare, e. g., Comment,.
Scienter and Rule lOb-5, 69 Col. L. Rev. 1057, 1080-1081 (1969);
Note, Neghg;ent l\Iisrepesentat10ns under Rule lOb-5, 32 Chi. L. Rev ..
824, 839-844 (1965) , Note, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 938, 947 (1969); Note,
Civil Liability Under Section lOB and Rule IOB-5: A Suggestion
for Replacing the Doctrme of Privity, 74 Yale L. J. 658, 682-689·
(1965), with, e g. , 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1766 (2d eeL
1961); 6 td., at 3883-38&'> (Supp. 1969),
:1 5
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trivance" in contravention of Commission rules. The
words "manipulative or deceptive" used in conjunction
with "device or contrivance" strongly suggest that § 10
(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional
misconduct. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.
2d 833, 868 (CA2 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert.
denied sub nom. Kline v. SEC, 394 U. S. 976 (1969);
Loss, Sumary Remarks, 30 Bus. Lawyer 163, 165 (1975).
See also Kahn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F. 2d
255, 280 (CA3 1972) (Adams, J., concurring),
In its amicus curiae brief, however, the Commission
contends that nothing in the language "manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance" limits its operation to
knowing or intentional practices. 18 In support of its view,
the Commission cites the overall congressional purpose
in the 1933 and 1934 Acts to protect investors against
false and deceptive practices that might injure them. See
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, supra, at
18 The Commission would not permit recovery upon proof of
negligence in all cases. In order to harmonize civil liability under
§ 10 (b) with the express civil remedies contajned in the 1933 and
1934 Acts, the Commission would limit the circumstances in which
civil liability could be imposed for negligent violation of Rule
lOb-5 to situations in which (1) the defendant knew or reasonably
could forsee that the plaintiff would rely on his conduct, (ii) the
plaintiff did in fact so rely, and (iii) the amount of the plaintiff's
damages caused by the defendant's conduct was definite and ascertainable. Brief of Amicus Curiae 23-33. The Commission concludes that the present record does not establish these conditions
since Ernst & Ernst could not reasonably have forseen that the financial statements of First Securities would induce respondents to
invest in the escrow accounts, respondents in fact did not rely on
Ernst & Ernst's audits, and the amount of respondents' damages
was unascertainable. !d., 33-36. Respondents accept the Commission's basic analysis of the operative language of the statute and rule,
but reject these additional reqmrements f9r recovery for negligent
violations.
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151; Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co., 404 U. S., at 11-12; J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 432-433 (1964). See also SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 195
( 1963). The Commission then reasons that since the
"effect" upon investors of given conduct is the same regardless of whether the conduct is negligent or intentional,
Congress must have intended to bar all such practices and
not just those done knowingly or intentionally. The logic
of this effect-oriented approach would impose liability for
wholly faultless conduct where such conduct results in
harm to investors, a result the Commission would be unlikely to support. But apart from where its logic might
lead, the Commission would add a gloss to the operative
language of the statute quite different from its commonly accepted meaning. See, e. g., Addison v. Holly
Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617-618 (1944).19
The argument simply ignores the use of the words "manipulative," "device," and "contrivance," terms that make
unmistakable a congressional intent to proscribe a type of
conduct quite different from negligence. 20 Use of the
19 "To let general words draw on some purpose is one thing.
To
draw on some unexpressed spirit outside the bounds of the normal
meaning of words is quite another . . . . After all, legislation when
not expressed in technical terms is addressed to the common run of
men and is therefore understood according to the sense of the thing,
as the ordinary man has a right to rely on ordinary words addressed
to him." Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 U. S. 607,
617-618 (1944) . See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading
of Statutes, 47 Col. L. Rev. 527,536-537 (1947).
20 Webster's Int'l Dictionary (2d ed. 1934) defines "device" as
"[t]hat which is devised, or formed by design; a contrivance; an
invention; project; scheme; often a scheme to deceive; a stratagem;
an artifice;" and "contrivance" in pertinent part as "[a] thing contrived or used in contriving ; a scheme, plan, or artifice." In turn,
"contrive" in pertinent part lS defined a.s " [t]o devise; to plan; to
plot . . . [ t 1o fabricate . . . design ; invent . . . to scheme . . . .'"
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word "manipulative" is especially significant. It is and
was virtually a term of art when used in connection with
securities markets. It connotes intentional or willful
conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities. 21
In addition to relying upon the Commission's argument with respect to the operative language of the statute, respondents contend that since we are dealing with
"remedial legislation," Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S.
332, 336 (1967), it must be construed "'not technically
and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial
purposes.'" Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
supra, at 151, quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, supra, at 186. They argue that the "remedial
purposes" of the Acts demand a construction of § 10 (b)
that embraces negligence as a standard of liability. But
in seeking to accomplish its broad remedial goals, Congress did not adopt uniformally a negligence standard
even as to express civil remedies. In some circumstances.
and with respect to certain classes of defendants, Congress did create express liability predicated upon a failure
to exercise reasonable care, E. g., 1933 Act § 11 (b) (3)
(B), 48 Stat. 82 as amended 15 U.S. C. § 77k (b) (3)(B)
(liability of "experts," such as accountants, for misleading statements in portions of registration statements for
which they are responsible). 22 But in other situationsgood faith is an absolute defense. 1934 Act § 18, 48 Stat.
897, as amended 15 U.S. C. § 78r (misleading statements
The Commission also ignores the use of the terms "[t]o use or
employ," language that is supportive of the view that Congress~
did not intend § 10 (b) to embrace negligent conduct.
21 Webster's Int'l Dictionary,
supra, defines "manipulate" aB'
" .• . to manage or treat artfully or fraudulently; as to manipulate
accounts . . . . 4. Exchanges . To force (prices) up or down, as;
·by matched orders, wash sales, fictitious reports . .. ; to rig."
::J! Seep. 21 & n. 26, infra.

74-1042-0PINION

l4

ERNST & ERNST v. HOCHFELDER

in any document filed pursuant to the 1934 Act). And
in still other circumstances Congress created express liability regardless of the defendant's fault, 1933 Act § 11
(a) (issuer liability for misleading statements in the registration statement).
It is thus evident that Congress fashioned standards of fault in the express civil remedies in the
1933 and 1934 Acts on a particularized basis. Ascertainment of congressional intent with respect to the
standard of liability created by a particular section of
the Acts must therefore rest primarily on the language
of that section. Where, as here, we deal with a judicially implied liability, the statutory language certainly
is no less important. In view of the language of
§ 10 (b) which so clearly connotes intentional misconduct, and mindful that the language of a statute controls when sufficiently clear in its context, United States
v. Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 648 (1961); Packard Motor
Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485, 492 (1947), further
inquiry may be unnecessary. We turn now, nevertheless, to the legislative history of the 1934 Act to ascertain
whether there is support for the meaning attributed to
§ 10 (b) by the Commission and respondents.

B
Although the extensive legislative history of the 1934
Act is bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress'
intent, we think the relevant portions of that history
support our conclusion that § 10 (b) was addressed to
practices that involve some element of scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for negligent conduct
alone.
The onginal version of what would develop into the
1934 Act was contained in identical bills introduced by
Senator Fletcher and Representative Rayburn. S. 2693~
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73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H. R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. ( 1934) . Section 9 (c) of the bills, from which pres~
ent § 10 (b) evolved, proscribed as unlawful the use of
1
'any device or contrivance which, or any device or con~
trivance in a way or manner which the Commission may
by its rules and regulations find detrimental to the public interest or to the proper protection of investors." The
other subsections of proposed § 9 listed specific practices
that Congress empowered the Commission to regulate
through its rulemaking power. See §§ 9 (a) (short
sale), (b) ("stop-loss order"). Soon after the hearings
on the House bill were held, a substitute bill was intr~
duced in both Houses which abbreviated and modified
§ 9 (c)'s operative language to read "any manipulative
device or contrivance." S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.,
§ 10 (b) (1934); H. R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (c)
(1934). Still a third bill, retaining the Commission's
power to regulate the specific practices enumerated in
the prior bills, and omitting all reference to the Commission's authority to prescribe rules concerning manipulative or deceptive devices in general, was introduced and
passed in the House. H. R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.,
§ 9 (1934). The final language of § 10 is a modified
version of a Senate amendment to this last House bill.
See H. R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 32-33
(1934) (Conference Report).
Neither the intended scope of§ 10 (b) nor the reasons
for the changes in its operative language are revealed
explicitly in the legislative history of the 1934 Act, which
deals primarily with other aspects of the legislation.
There is no indication, however, that § 10 (b) was in.
tended to proscribe conduct not involving scienter. The
extensive hearings that preceded passage of the 1934
Act touched only briefly on § 10, and most of the dis<eussion was devoted to the enumerated devices that the
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Commission is empowered to proscribe under § 10 (a).
The most relevant exposition of the provision that was
to become § 10 (b) was by Thomas G. Corcoran, a
spokesman for the drafters. Corcoran indicated:
"Subsection (c) [ § 9 (c) of H. R. 7852-later § 10
(b)] says, 'Thou shalt not devise any other cunning
devices.' ...
"Of course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to
prevent manipulative devices. I do not think there
is any objection to that kind of clause.' The Com..
mission should have the authority to deal with new
manipulative devices."
Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720 before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess., 115 (1934). This brief explanation of§ 10 (b)
by a spokesman for its drafters is significant. The
section was described rightly as a "catch-all" clause to
enable the Commission ((to deal with new manipulative
[or cunning l devices." It is difficult to believe that any
lawyer, legislative draftsman, or legislator would use
these words if the intent was to create liability for merely
negligent acts or omissions. 23 Neither the legislative
history nor the briefs supporting respondents identify
any usage or authority for construing ((manipulative [or
cunnin~ devices" to include negligence. 24
Seen. 21, sup1·a.
In support of 1ts position the Commission cites statement"
by Corcoran in the Senate hearings that "in modern society there
are many things you have to make crimes which are sheer matters
of negligence" and "intent is not necessary for every crime." Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6509-6510 (1934). The
comments, taken in coni CJd, s11ed no light on the meaning of § 10 (b).
Corcoran's remarks were made during a discussion of whether mimi.,.
n!Ll. violations could arise under § 8 (a) (3) of S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d
23

24
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The legislative reports do not address the scope of
§ 10 (b) or its catch-all function directly. In considering specific manipulative practices left to Commission

regulation, however, the reports indicate that liability
would not attach absent scienter, supporting the conclusion that Congress intended no lesser standard under
§ 10 (b). The Senate Report of S. 3420 discusses generSess., which in material part was incorporated in § 9 of the 1934 Act,
15 U. S. C. § 78i, in the absence of specific intent to influence security
prices for personal gain. The remarks, moreover, were not adA
dressed to the scope of § 8, but were general observations concerning activity society might proscribe under criminal law. Ferdinand Pecora, counsel to the committee and a draftman of S. 2693,
Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co.,- U.S.-,
n. 24 (1976), described the language as "[e]xcluding from its
scope an act that is not done with any ulterior motives or purposes, as set forth in the act." !d., at 6510. Further, prior to
the passage of the 1934 Act, proposed § 8 was amended to require
willful behavior as a prerequisite to civil liability for violations.
Compare § 9 (e) of the 1934 Act with § 8 (c) of S. 2693. See H. R.
Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 21 (1934).
The Commission also relies on objections to a draft versi011
of § 10 (b)-§ 9 (c) of S. 2693 and H. R. 7852, see pp. 14-15,
supra-raised by representatives of the securities industry in the
House and Senate hearings. They warned that the language was
so vague that the Commission might outlaw anything. E. g., Hearings on Stoc"k Exchange Practices, supra, at 6988; Hearings on
H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720 before the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 258 (1934). Remarks
of this kind made in the course of legislative debate or hearings other
than by persons responsible for the preparation or the drafting of a
bill, are entitled to little weight. See, e. g., United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 275-277 (1947); United States v.
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110, 125 (1942). This is especially so with regard to the statements of legislative opponents who
·" [i]n their zeal to defeat a bill . . . understandably tend to overstate its reach." NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964).
See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394395 (1951).
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ally the various abuses that precipitated the need for the
legislation and the inadequacy of self-regulation by the
stock exchanges. The Report then analyzes the compo·
nent provisions of the statute, but does not parse § 10.
The only specific reference to § 10 is the following:
"In addition to the discretionary and elastic powers conferred on the administrative authority, effec·
tive regulation must include several clear statutory
provisions reinforced by penal and civil sanctions,
aimed at those manipulative and deceptive practices
which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful
function. These sanctions are found in sections 9, 10
and 16." S. Rep. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934).
In the portion of the general analysis section of the
Report entitled "Manipulative Practices," however, there
is a discussion of specific practices that were considered
so inimical to the public interest as to require express
prohibition, such as "wash" sales and "matched" orders/ 5
and of other practices that might in some cases serve
legitimate purposes, such as stabilization of security
prices and grants of options. !d., at 7-9. These latter
practices were left to regulation by the Commission.
1934 Act§§ 9 (a)(6) , (c) , 48 Stat. 890, 15 U.S. C.§§ 78i
(a)(6), (c). Significantly, we think, in the discussion of
"Wash" sales are transactions involving no change in beneficial
ownership. "Matched" orders are orders for the purchase/sale of a
security that ar e entered with the knowledge that orders of sub-stantially the same size, at substantially the same time and price,
have been or will be entered by thr same or different persons for
the sale/ purchase of such security. Section 9 (a) (1) of the 1934
Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78i (a) (1), proscribes wash sales and matched
orders when effectuated " [f]or the purpose of creating a false or
misleading appearance of active t rading in any security registered
on a national securities exchange, or , . . with respect to the market
for any such security." See In re J . A. Latimer & Co., 38 S. E . C.
790 (1958) ; In re Thornton -& Co., 28 S. E. C. 208 (1948) .
25
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the need to regulate even the latter category of practices
when they are manipulative, there is no indication that
any type of criminal or civil liability is to attach in the
absence of scienter. Furthermore, in commenting on the
express civil liabilities provided in the 1934 Act, the Re~
port explains :
H • • • if an investor has suffered loss by reason of
illicit practices, it is equitable that he should be
allowed to recover damages from the guilty party ... ,
The bill provides that any person who unlawfully manipulates the price of a security, or who
induces transactions in a security by means of false
or misleading statements, or who makes a false or
misleading statement in the report of a corporation,
shall be liab1e in damages to those who have bought
or sold the security at prices affected by such violation or statement. In such case the burden is on the
plaintiff to show the violation or the fact that the
statement was false or misleading, and that he relied
thereon ·-to his damage. The defendant may escape
liability by showing that the statement was made in
good faith." I d., at 12-13 (emphasis supplied).
The Report therefore reveals with respect to the specified practices, an overall congressional intent to prevent
"manipulative and deceptive practices . . . which fulfill
no useful function" and to create private actions for
damages stemming from "illicit practices," where the defendant has not acted in good faith. The views expressed
in the House Report are consistent with this interpretation. H. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11, 2021 ( 1934) (H. R. 9323). There is no indication that
Congress intended an{1me to be made liable for such
practices unless he acted other than in good faith. Thecatch-all provision of § 10 (b) should be interpreted n~
more broadly.
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c
The 1933 and 1934 Acts constitute interrelated com·
ponents of the federal regulatory scheme governing trans·
actions in securities. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U. S., at
727-730. As the Court indicated in SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), "the interdependence
of the varwus sections of the securities laws is certainly
a relevant factor in any interpretation of the language
Congress has chosen . ... " Recognizing this, respondents
and the Commission contrast § 10 (b) to other sections of
the Acts to support their contentiOn that civil liability may
be imposed upon proof of negligent conduct. We think
they misconceive the significance of the other provisions.
of the Acts.
The Commission argues that Congress has been explicit
in requiring willful conduct when that was the standard
of fault intended, citing § 9 of the 1934 Act, 48 Stat. 889,
15 U. S. C. § 78i, which generally proscribes manipulation
of securities prices. Sections 9 (a)(1) and (a)(2), for
example, respectively prohibit manipulation of security
prices "[f] or the purpose of Cl'eating a false or misleading
appearance of actual trading in any security ... or ...
with respect to the market for any such security," and
"for the purpose of including the purchase or sale of such
security by others." See also § 9 (a)( 4). Section 9 (e)
then imposes upon "[a] ny person who willfully participates in any act or transaction in violation of" other provisions of § 9 civil liability to anyone who purchased or
sold a security at a price affected by the manipulative·
activities. From this the Commission concludes that
since § 10 (b) is not by 1ts terms explicitly restricted to ·
willful, knowing, or purposeful conduct, it should not be
construed in all cases to reqmre more than negligent
action or inactiOn as a precondition for civil liability.
The str.uct_ure of the. Act.s. does_ not support the Com:--
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mission's argument. In each instance that Congress
created express civil liability in favor of purchasers
or sellers of securities it clearly specified whether
recovery was to be premised on knowing or intentional
conduct, negligence, or entirely innocent mistake. See
1933 Act, §§ 11, 12, 15, 48 Stat. 82, 84, as amended 15
U. S. C. §§ 77k, 77l, 77o; 1934 Act §§ 9, 18, 20, 48 Stat.
889, 897, 899, as amended 15 U. S. C. §§ 78i,
78r, 78t. For example, § 11 of the 1933 Act unambiguously creates a private action for damages when a
registration statement includes untrue statements of material facts or fails to state material facts necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading. Within the
limits specified by § 11 (e), the issuer of .the securities is
held absolutely liable for any damages resulting from such
misstatement or omission. But experts such as accountants who have prepared portions of the registration statement are accorded a "due diligence" defense. In effect,
this is a negligence standard. An expert may avoid civil
liability with respect to the portions of the registration
statement for which he was responsible by showing tha.t
"after reasonable investigation" he had "reasonable
ground[s] to believe" .that the statements for which he
was responsible were true and there was no omission of a
material fact. 26 § 11 (b)(3)(B)(i). See, e. g., Escott v.
26

Other individuals who sign the registra.tion statement, directors
of the issuer, and the underwriter of the securities similarly are
accorded a complete defense against civil liability based on the exercise of reasonable investigation and a reasonable belief that the
regist.ration statement was not misleading. §§ 11 (b) (3) (A), (C),
(D), (c). See, e. g., Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 575-583 (EDNY 1971) (underwriters, but
not officer-directors, established their due diligence defense). See
generally R. .Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation 1018-1027
(3d ed. 1972), and sources cited therein; Folk, Civil Liabilities under
the Federal Securities Acts: The B:uchris Case, 55 Va. L. Rev. 199
(1969) ,
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Barchris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697-703
(SDNY 1968). The express recognition of a cause of
action premised on negligent behavior in § 11 stands in
sharp contrast to the language of § 10 (b), and signifi~
cantly undercuts the Commission's argument.
We also consider it significant that each of the express
civil remedies in the 1933 Act allowing recovery for negligent conduct, see§§ 11, 12 (2), 15, 15 U.S. C.§§ 77k, 77l,
77o, 27 is subject to significant procedural restrictions not
applicable under § 10 (b). 28 Section 11 (e) of the 1933
Section 12 (2) crea.tes potential civil liability for a seller of
securities in favor of the purchaser for misleading statements or
omissions in connection with the transaction. The seller is exculpated if he proves that ht? did not know, or in the exercise of
reasonable care, could not have known of the untruth or omission.
Section 15 of the 1933 Act, as amonded by § 208 of Title II of the
1934 Act, makes persons who "control" any person liable under § 11
or § 12 liable jointly and severally to the same extent as the controlled
person, unless he "had no knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by reason of which the liability of
the controlled person is alleged to exist." 15 U.S. C. § 77o. See Act
of June 6, 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, c. 404, Title II § 208, 48 Stat. 908.
28 Each of the provisions of the 1934 Act that expressly create
civil liability, except those directed to specific classes of individuals
such as directors, officers, or 10% bC'nt?ficial holders of securities, see
§ 16 (b), 15 U. S. C. § 78p, 1i'oremos~-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident
Securittes Co., supra; Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petro~
leum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973), contains a state-of-mind condition
requiring something more than negligence. Section 9 creates potential civil liability for any person who "willfully participates" in the
manipulation of secunties on a national exchange. § 9 (e) . 15
U.S. C. §78i (e). Section 18 creates potential ctvilliability for misleading statements filed with the CommissiOn, but provides the defendant with the defense that "he acted in good faith and had no
knowledge that such statement was false or misleading." 15 U.S. C.
§ 78r. And § 20 , wluch imposes liability upon "controlling persons"
for violations of the Act by those they control, exculpates a defend.ant. who "actrd m good faith and did not
. mduce the act . . .
27
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Act, for example, authorizes the court to require a plaintiff bringing a suit under § 11, § 12 (2), or § 15 thereof to
post a bond for costs, including attorneys' fees and in
specified circumstances to assess costs at the conclusion
of the litigation. Section 13 specifies a statute
of limitations of one year from the time the
violation was or should have been discovered, in
no event to exceed three years from the time of offer or
sale, applicable to actions brought under § 11, § 12 (2),
or § 15. These restrictions, significantly, were imposed
by amendments to the 1933 Act adopted as part of the
1934 Act. Prior to amendment § 11 (e) contained no
provision for payment of costs. 48 Stat. 83. Act of
May 27, 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, c. 38, Title I, § 11 (e).
See Act of June 6, 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, c. 404, Title II
§ 206 (e), 48 Stat. 908. The amendments also substantially shortened the statute of limitations provided by
§ 13. Compare Pub. L. No. 22, supra, § 13, 48 Stat. 84,
with 15 U. S. C. § 77m. See 1934 Act, § 207, 48 Stat. 908.
We think these procedural limitations indicate that the
judicially created private damage remedy under § 10
(b)-which has no comparable restrictions 29-cannot be
constituting the vwlation .... " 15 U. S. C. § 78t. Emphasizing the
important difference between the op(;'rative language and purpose of
§ 14 (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S. C. § 14n (a), as contrasted with
§ 10 (b )J however, some courts have concluded that proof of scienter
is unnecessary in an action for damages by the shareholder recipients
of a materially misleading proxy statement against the issuer corporation. See Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. , 478 F. 2d 1281, 1299
(CA2 1973) ; Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., supra, at
289-290.
29
Since no statute of limitations is provided for civil actions
under § 10 (b), the law of limitations of the forum state is followed
as in other cas(;'s of judicially implied remedies. See Holmberg v.
Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 395 (1946), and cases cited therein. Although it is not always C(;'rtain which state statute of limitations
should be followed, such ~tatutes of limitations usually are longer
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extended, consistently with the intent of Congress, to ac..
tions premised on negligent wrongdoing. Such extension
would allow causes of action covered by § 11, § 12 ( 2),
and § 15 to be brought instead under § 10 (b) and thereby
nullify the effectiveness of the carefully drawn procedural
restrictions on these express actions. 30 See, e. g., Fisch ...
man v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co., 188 F. 2d 783, 786-,
787 (CA2 1951); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F. 2d, at 867-868 (Friendly, J., concurring); Rosenberg
v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124 (ED Pa.
1948); 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1787-1788 (2d
ed. 1961); R. Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regu ...
lation 1070-1074 (3d cd. 1972). We would be un ...
willing to bring about this result absent substantial support in the legislative history, and there is none. 31

...

than the period provided under § 13. 3 L. Loss, supm, at 17731774. As to costs seen. 30 infra.
8 °Congress regarded these restrictions on private damage actions
as significant. In mtroducing Title II of the 1934 Act, Senator
Fletcher indicated that the am£>ndment to § 11 (e) of the 1933 Act,
providing for potential payment of costs, including attorneys' fees,
"i~:~ the most important [amendment.j of all." 78 Cong. Rec. 8669 .
One of its purpo~:~es was to deter actions brought solely for their potential settl£>ment value. S£>e ibid.; H. Rep. 1838, 73d Cong., 2q
Sess., 42 (1934) (Conference Report); Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at
740-741. This deterrent is laekmg in the § 10 (b) context, in which
a district court's power to award attorneys' fees is sharply circumscribed. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,
421 U. S. 240 (1975) ("bad faith" requmment); F. D. Rich Co. v.
Industrial LumbPr Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974)
a1 Section 18 of the 1934 Act creates a private cause of action
against persons, such as accountants, who "make or cause to be
made" materially misleading statements m reports or other documents filed with the CommissiOn. 15 U. S. C. § 78r. We need not
consider the questiOn whether a cause of action may be maintained
under § 10 (b) on the basis of actions that would constitute a violation of § 18. Under § 18 habihty extends to persons who, in reliance on such statements, purchased or sold a secunty whose price
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D
We have addressed, to this point, primarily the language and history of § 10 (b). The Commission contends, however, that subsections (2) and (3) of Rule
lOb-5 are cast in language which-if standing alonecould encompass both intentional and negligent behavior.
These subsections respectively provide that it is unlawful "[t]o make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading ... "
and "to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person. . . ." Viewed in isolation the language of subsection (2), and arguably that of subsection (3), could be read as proscribing, respectively, any
type of material misstatement or omission, and any
was affected by the statement . Liability is limited, however, in
the important respect that the defendant is accorded the defense
that he acted in "good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading." Consistent with this language the
legislative history of the section suggests something more than negli~
gence on the part of the defendant is required for recovery. The
original version of §18 (a), § 17 (a) of S. 2693, H. R. 78~
H . R. 7855, see pp. 14-15, supra, provided that the defendant would
not be liable if "he acted in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable care had no ground to believe that such statement was false
or misleadmg." The accounting profession objected to this provision on the ground that liability would be created for honest errors·
in judgment. See Senate Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices,
supra, at 7175-7183; House Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720.
supra, at 653. In subsequent drafts the current formulation was
adopted. It is also significant that actions under § 18 are limited
by a relatively short statute of limitations similar to that provided
in § 13 of the 1933 Act. § 18 (c). Moreover, as under § 11 (e)
of the 193:3 Act the District Court is authorized to require the·
plaintiff to post a bond for costs, mcluding attorney's fees, and to
assess such costs at the cQUc!usian Qf the. litigation. § 18 (a)...
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course of conduct, that has the -effect of defrauding investors, whether the wrongdoing was intentional or not.
We note first that such a reading cannot be harmo~
nized with the administrative history of the rule, a history making clear that when the Commission adopted
the rule it was intended to apply only to activities that
involved scienter. 32 More importantly, Rule lOb-5 was
Apparently the rule was a hastily drafted response to a situation clearly involving it intentional misconduct. The Commission's Regional Administrator m Boston had reported to the
Director of the Trading and Exchange Division that the president
of a corporation was telling the other shareholders that the corporation was doing poorly and purchasing their shares at the resultant
depressed prices, when in fact the business was doing exceptionally
well. The Rule was drafted and approved on the day this report
was received. See Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. Law. 793, 922 (1967) (remarks of Milton
Freeman, one of rule's co-drafters); Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at
767 (BLACKMUN, J., dissenting) . Although adopted pursuant to
§ 10 (b), the language of the rule appears to have been derived in
significant part. from § 17 of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77q.
E . g., ibid.; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d, at 867
(Friendly, J. , concurring). There is no indication in the administrative history of the Rule that any of the subsections was intended
to proscribe conduct not involving scienter. Indeed the Commission's release issued contemporaneously with the mle explained:
"The Securities and Exrhange Commission today announced the
adoption of a rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection
with the purchase of securities. The previously 'existing rules
against fraud in the purchase of securities applied only to brokers
and dealers. The new rule closes a loophole in the protections
against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting individuals or companies from buymg securities if they engage in fraud
in their purchase." SEC Release No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
That same year, in its Annual Report, the Commission again stated
that the purpose of the rule was to protect investors against "fraud":
"During the fi."cal year the Commission adopted Rule X-10B-5
as an additional protection to investors. The new rule prohibits·
fraud by any person m connection with the purchase of securities.
82
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adopted pursuant to authority granted the Commission
under § 10 (b). The rulemaking power granted to an
administrative agency charged with the administration
of a federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather,
it is " 'the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect
the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.'" Dixon
v. United States, 381 U. S. 68, 74 (1965), quoting Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297
U. S. 129, 134 (1936). Thus, despite the broad view
of the Rule advanced by the Commission in this case,
its scope cannot exceed the power granted the Commission by Congress under § 10 (b). For the reasons
stated above, we think the Commission's original interpretation of Rule lOb-5 was compelled by the language
and history of § 10 (b) and related sections of the Acts.
See, e. g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F. 2d
1281, 1299 (CA2 1973); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.
2d 1277, 1304--1305 (CA2 1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., supra, at 86~3 L. Loss, supra, 1766; 6 id., at
3883-3885 (Supp. 1969).. When a statute speaks so specifically in terms of manipulation and deception, and of
implementing devices and contrivances-the commonly
understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing-and
when its history reflects no more expansive intent, we
are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the statute to
negligent conduct.83
while the previously existing rules against fraud in the purchase of
securities applied only to brokers and dealers." 8 SEC Ann. Rep.
10 (1942).
88 As we find the language and history of § 10 (b) dispositive of
the appropriate standard of liability, there is no occasion to examine
the additional considerations of "policy," set forth by the parties,
that may have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of the
statute. We do note that the standard urged by respondents would
significantly broaden the class of plaintiffs who may seek to impos&
liability upon accou.ntan~ and other experts who perform services or
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III
Recognizing that § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5 might be held
to require proof of more than negligent misfeasance by
Ernst & Ernst as a precondition to the imposition of
civil liability, respondents furth~r contend that the case
should be remanded for trial under whatever standard
is adopted. Throughout the lengthy history of this case
respondents have proceeded on a theory of liability
premised on negligence, specifically disclaiming that
Ernst & Ernst had engaged in fraud or intentional misconduct.84 In these circumstances, we think it inappropriate to remand the action for further proceedings.
express opinions with respect to matters under the Acts. Last Term,
in Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at 747-748, the Court pertinently
observed:
"While much of the development of the law of deceit has been the
elimination of artificial barriers to recovery on just claims, we are not
the first court to express concern that the inexorable broadening of
the class of plaintiffs who may sue in this area of the law will ultimately result in more harm than good. In Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 255 N, Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931), Chief Judge Cardozo
observed with respect to 'a liability in an indeterminate amount for
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate cause':
" 'The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so
extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the
implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences.' !d., at
179-180, 174 N. E., at 444."
This case, on its facts, illustrates the extreme reach of the standard
urged by respondents. As investors in transactions initiated by
Nay, not First Securities, they were not foreseeable users of the
financial statements prepared by Ernst & Ernst. Respondents conceded that they did not rely on either these financial statements or
Ernst & Ernst's certificates of opinion. See n. 9, supra. The class
of persons eligible to benefit from such a standard, though small in
this case, could be numbered in the thousands in other cases. Acceptance of respondents' view would extend to new frontiers the
"hazards" of rendering expert advice under the Acts, raising serious
policy questions not yet addressed by Congress.
84 See 503 F. 2d, at 1104, 1119 ; n. 5, supra.
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.
MR. JusTICE STEVENS
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took no part in the consideration

OPy
PLEASE RETURNTO FILE

2nd DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATm
No. 74-1042
Ernst & Ernst Petitioner ) On Writ of Certiorari to the
v.'
'
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir01ga H oc hfelder eta.
1
't
CUI •
[March -,

1976]

MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opm10n of the
Court.
The issue in this case is whether an action for civil
damages may lie under § 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), 48 Stat. 891, 15 U. S. C.
§ 78j (b), and Securities and Exchange Commission R . le
10b-5, 17 CFR § 240.10b-5, in the absence of an allegation of intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud on the
part of the defendant.
]

Petitioner, Ernst & Ernst, is an accounting firm. From
1946 through 1967 it was retained by First Securities
Company of Chicago (First Securities), a small brokerage firm and member of the Midwest Stock Exchange
and of the National Association of Securities Dealers, to
perform periodic audits of the firm's books and records.
In connection with these audits Ernst & Ernst prepared
for filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the Commission) the annual reports required of First
Securities under § 17 (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S. C. § 78q
(a) .1 It also prepared for First Securities responses
Section 17 (a) reqmres that secunt1es brokers or dealers
"make ... and preserve .
such accounts ... books, and other
1
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to the financial questionnaires of the Midwest Stock
Exchange (the Exchange) .
Respondents were customers of First Securities who
invested in a fraudulent securities scheme perpetrated
by Leston B. Nay, president of the firm and owner of
92% of its stock., Nay induced the respondents to invest funds in "escrow" accounts that he represented
would yield a high rate of return. Respondents did so
from 1942 through 1966, with the majority of the transactions occurring in the 1950's. In fact, there were no
escrow accounts as Nay converted respondents' funds to
his own use immediately upon receipt. These transactions were not in the customary form of dealings be ..
tween First Securities and its customers. The respondents drew their personal checks payable to Nay or a designated bank for his account. No such escrow accounts
were reflected on the books and records of First Securities, and none was shown on its periodic accounting to
respondents in connection with their other investments.
Nor were they included in First Securities' filings with
the Commission or the Exchange.
records, and make such reports, as the Commission by its rules and
regulations may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors." During the period relevant here, Commission Rule 17a-5, 17 CFR § 240.17a-5, required
that First Securities file an annual report of its financial condition
that included a certificate stating "clearly the opinion of the accountant with respect to the financial statement covered by the certificate
and the accounting principles and practices reflected therein." See
SEC Release No. 3338 (Nov. 28, 1948), X-17A-5 (h). The rule required Ernst & Ernst to state in its certificate, inter alia, "whether
the audit was made in accordance w1th generally accepted auditing
standards applicable in the circumstances" and provided that nothing in the rule should "be constnwd to imply authority for the
omission of any procedure which independent accountants would
mdinarily employ in the course of an audit for the purpose of
expressing the opmions required" by the rule.
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This fraud came to light in 1968 when Nay committed
suicide, leaving a note that described First Securities as
bankrupt and the escrow accounts as "spurious." Respondents subsequently filed this action 2 for damages
against Ernst & Ernst 8 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois under
§ 10 (b) of the 1934 Act. The complaint charged that
Nay's escrow scheme violated §10 (b) and Commission
Rule 10b-5/ and that Ernst & Ernst had "aided and
abetted" Nay's violations by its "failure" to conduct
proper audits of First Securities. As revealed through
discovery, respondents' cause of action rested on a
theory of negligent nonfeasance. The premise was that.
Ernst & Ernst had failed to utilize "appropriate auditing procedures" in its audits of First Securities, thereby
failing to discover internal practices of the firm said
to prevent an effective audit. The practice principally relied on was Nay's rule that only he could open
2 Two separate, but substantially identical, complaints initially
were filed by different members of the present group of respondents.
Subsequently the respondents jointly filed a First Amended Complaint. The two cases were treated by the District Court as if they
were consolidated and were consolidated formally on appeal.
8 The first count of the complaint was directed against the·
Exchange, charging that through its acts and omissions it had
aided and abetted Nay's fraud. Summary judgment in favor·
of the Exchange was affirmed on appeal. Hochfelder v. Midwest·
Stock Exchange, 503 F. 2d 364 (CA7), cert. denied, 419 U. S. 875
(1974) .
4 Immediately after Nay's suicide the Commission commenced receivership proceedings against First Securities. In those proceedings
all of the respondents except two asserted claims based on the
fraudulent escrow accounts. These claims ultimately were allowed'
in SEC v. First Securities Co., 463 F. 2d 981, 986 (CA7 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U. S. 880 (1973), where the court held that Nay's conduct violated § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5, and that First Securities:
was liable for Nay's fraud as an aider and abettor. The question
oi Ernst & Ernst's liability was UQt cQUsi.dered in that case.
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mail addressed to him at First Securities or addressed
to First Securities to his attention, even if it arrived in
his absence. Respondents contended that if Ernst &
Ernst had conducted a proper audit, it would have discovered this "mail rule." The existence of the rule then
would have been disclosed in reports to the Exchange
and to the Commission by Ernst & Ernst as an irregular
procedure that prevented an effective audit. This
would have led to an investigation of Nay that would
have revealed the fraudulent scheme. Respondents specifically disclaimed the existence of fraud or intentional
misconduct on the part of Ernst & Ernst. 5
After extensive discovery the District Court granted
Ernst & Ernst's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. The court rejected Ernst & Ernst's
contention that a cause of action for aiding and abetting
a securities fraud could not be maintained under § 10 (b)
and Rule lOb-5 merely on allegations of negligence. It
concluded, however, that there was no genuine issue of
material fact with respect to whether Ernst & Ernst had
conducted its audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards.6
6 In their response to interrogatories in the District Court respondents conceded that they did "not accuse Ernst & Ernst of
deliberate, intentional fraud," merely with "inexcusable negligence." ·
App. 81.
6 The District Court also held respondent's action was barred by
the doctrine of equitable estoppel and the applicable Illinois statute of limitations of three years. See n. 29, infra. As customers of
First Securities respondents were sent confirmation forms as required under § 17 (a) and Rule 17a-5 requesting that they verify
the accuracy of the statements and notify Ernst & Ernst as to
any exceptions. Although the confirmation forms contained no·
reference to the escrow accounts, Ernst & Ernst was not notified
of this fact . The last aud1t of First Securities by Ernst & Ernst
was completed in December 1967 and· the first complaint in this;
a.ction was not filed until February 1971.
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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed
and remanded, holding that one who breaches a duty
of inquiry and disclosure owed another is liable in damages for aiding and abetting a third party's violation of
Rule lOb-5 if the fraud would have been discovered or
prevented but for the breach. 503 F. 2d 1100 (1974).7
The court reasoned that Ernst & Ernst had a common-law
and statutory duty of inquiry into the adequacy of First
Securities' internal control system because it had contracted to audit First Securities and to prepare for filing
with the Commission the annual report of its financial
condition required under § 17 of the 1934 Act and Rule
17ar-5, 17 CFR § 240.17ar-5.8 The Court further reaIn support of this holding, the Court of Appeals cited its decision
in Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, supr-a, where it detailed
the elements necessary to establish a claim under Rule 10b-5 based
on a defendant's aiding and abetting a securities fraud solely by
inaction. See n. 3 supra. In such a case the plaintiff must show
"that the party charged with aiding and abetting had knowledge of
or, but for the breach of a duty of inquiry, should have had knowledge of the fraud, and that possessing such knowledge the party
failed to act due to an improper motive or breach of a duty of
disclosure." I d., at 374. The court explained in the instant case
that these "elements constitute a flexible standard of liability which
should be amplified according to the peculiarities of each case." 503
F. 2d, at 1104. In view of our holding that an intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud is required for civil liability under § 10 (b)
and Rule 10b-5, we need not consider whether civil liability for
aiding and abetting is appropriate under the section and the rule,
nor the elements necessary to establish such a cause of action. See,
e. g., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673'
(1966), 286 F . Supp. 702 (ND Ind. 1968), aff'd, 417 F. 2d 147 (CA7
1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 989 (1970) (defendant held liable for
giving active and knowing assistance to a third party engaged in
violations of the securities laws). See generally Ruder, Multiple
Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Pari Delicto, Indemnification and Contribution, 12()
U. Pa. L. Rev. 597, 620-645 (1972),.
s Seen. 1, .vupra.
7
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soned that respondents were beneficiaries of the statu~
tory duty to inquire 0 and the related duty to disclose
any material irregularities that were discovered.. I d.,
at 1105-1111. The court concluded that there were
genuine issues of fact as to whether Ernst & Ernst's
failure to discover and comment upon Nay's mail rule 10
constituted a breach of its duties of inquiry and dis~
closure, id., at 1111, and whether inquiry and disclosure
would have led to the discovery or prevention of Nay's
fraud. Id., at 1115.11
The court concluded that the duty of inquiry imposed on Ernst
& Ernst under § 17 (a) was "grounded on a concern for the protection of investors such as Lrespondents]," without reaching thequestion whether the statute imposed a "direct duty" to the respondents. 503 F. 2d, at 1105. The court held that Ernst &
Ernst owed no common-law duty of inquiry to respondents arisingfrom its contract with First Securities since Ernst & Ernst did not
specifically foresee that respondents' limited class might sulfer from
a negligent audit, compare Glanze1· v. Shepard, 233 N. Y. 236, 135
N. E. 275 (1922), with Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170,
174 N. E. 441 (1931); see, e. g., R.I. Hospital Trust Nat'l Bank v.
Swartz, 455 F. 2d 847, 851 (CA4 1972). Moreover, respondents
conceded that they did not rely on the financial statements and
reports prepared by Ernst & Ernst, or on its certificate of opinion ..
503 F. 2d, a,t 1107.
10 In their briefs respondents allude to several other alleged failings by Ernst & Ernst in its audit of First Securities, principally its:
fa1lure to inquire into the collectibility of certam loans by First Secunties to Nay and and its failure to follow up on a 1965 memorandum that characterized Fir;;t Secunties' overall system of internal
control a::; weak because of the centralization of functions in the
cashier. The Court of Appeals mentioned none of these alleged
deficiencies in 1ts opmion m this case, although it did discuss the
loans to Nay and certain other related matters in its opinion in
Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exchange, supra, at 370-371, hold·ing that the existence of these facts was insufficient to put the
Exchange on notice that further mquiry into First Securities' finan•cial affairs was required .
11 The Court. of Appeals also rt>versed. the District Court's holding
0
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We granted certiorari to resolve the question whether
a private cause of actwn for damages will lie under
§ 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5 m the absence of any allegation of "scienter"-intent to deceive, manipulate, or
with respect to equitable estoppel and the statute of limitations.
See n. 6, supra. In view of our disposition of the case we need not
address these issues.
12 Although the verbal formulations of the standard to be applied
have varied, several courts of appeals have held m substance that
negligence alone is sufficient for civil liability under § 10 (b) and
Rule 10l:r-5. See, e. g., Whtte v. Abrams, 495 F. 2d 724, 730 (CA9
1974) ("flexible duty" stand.a.rd), Myzel v. Fields, 386 F. 2d 718,
735 (CAS 1967), cert. demed, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (negligence sufficient); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F. 2d 634 (CA7 1963) (knowledge not required) Other courts of appeals have held that some
type of scienter-i. e., mtent to defraud, reckless disregard for the
truth, or knowmg use of some practice to defnmd-is necessary in
such an action. See, e. g., Clegg v. Conk, 507 F. 2d 1351, 13611362 (CAlO 1974), cert. demed, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975) (an element
of "scienter or conscious fault") ; Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F. 2d
1277, 1306 (CA2 1973) ("willful or reckless disregard" of the
truth) . But few of the deCisiOns announcmg that some form of
negligence sttffices for civil habihty under § 10 (b) and Rule 10l:r-5
actually have mvolved only negligent conduct. Smallwood v. Pearl
Brewing Co ., 489 F . 2d 579, 606 (CA5), cert. denied, 419 U. S.
879 (1974), Kohn v Amencan Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F. 2d 255,
286 (CA3 1972) (Adams, J ., concurrmg); Bucklo, Scienter and Rule
10b-5, 67 Nw. U L Rev . 562, 568-570 (1972)
In this opimon the term "scienter" refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, mampulate, or defraud. In certain
areas of the law recklessness 1s considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act.
We need not. address here the questwn whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior 1~ sufficient for civil liability under§ 10 (b)
and Rule lOb-5.
Smce this case concerns an actiOn for damages we also need not
consider the question whether sc1enter IS a necessary element in an
actiOn for mjuncttve rehef under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5. Cf.
SEC v Ca7?ital Gatru; Research Bureau, Inc ., 375 U. S. 180 (1963).

J
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defraud. 12 421 U. 8. 909 (1975). We conclude that it
will not and therefore we reverse.13

II
Federal regulation of transactions 'in securities emerged
as part of the aftermath of the market crash in 1929.
The Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act), 48 Stat. 74, as
amended 15 U. S. C. ~ 77a et seq., was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material information concerning public offerings of securities in commerce, to protect investors against fraud and, through
the imposition of specified civil liabilities, to promote
ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing. See H. R.
Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 1-5 (1933). The
1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors
against manipulation of stock prices through regulation
of transactions upon securities exchanges and in overthe-counter markets, and to impose regular reporting
requirements on companies whose stock is listed on national securities exchanges. See S. Rep. No. 792, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess., 1-5 (1934). Although the Acts contain numerous carefully drawn express civil remedies
and criminal penalties, Congress recognized that efficient
regulation of securities trading could not be accomplished under a rigid statutory program. As part of the
13 Re:spondent.<.; further contend that Ernst & Ern::;t owed them a
·direct duty under § 17 (a) and Rule 17a-5 of the 1934 Act to con·duct a proper audit of First Securities and that they may base a
private cause of action against Ernst & Ernst for violation of that
·duty. Respond<:>nts cau~:>e of actwn, how<:>ver, was premised solely
·on the alleged violatiOn of § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5. During the
lengthy history of tim; ht1gatwn they hav<:> not amended their·
original complaint to a.ver tt cause of aetwn under § 17 (a) and
Rule 17a-5. WP therefor<:> do not con~:>Id<:>r that <t claim of liability
under § 17 (a) 1:s propf'rly bf'forf' us even assuming respondents.:
coqJd a,<;sert. such 11 ch1.im md<:>pPnd<:>ntly of § 10 (h) .
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1934 Act Congress created the Commission, which is pro.
vided with an arsenal of flexible enforcement powers. See,
e. g., 1933 Act §§ 8, 19, 20, 48 Stat. 79, 85, 86, as
amended, 15 U. S. C. §§ 77h, 77s, 77t; 1934 Act §§ 9,
19, 21, 48 Stat. 889, 898, 899, as amended, 15 U. S. C.
§§ 78i, 78s, 78u.
Section 10 of the 1934 Act makes it "unlawful for
any person . . . (b) [t]o use or employ, in connec.
tion with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors." 15
U. S. C. § 78j. In 1942, acting pursuant to the power
conferred by § 10 (b), the Commission promulgated
Rule 10b-5, which now provides :
"Employment of manipulative and deceptive
devices.
"It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or
indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or
of any facility of any national securities exchange,
" ( 1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud,
11
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary
in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading, or
" ( 3) To engage m any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, m connection with the
purchase or sale of any security."
Although § 10 (b) does not by its terms create an
$:press. civil remedy for ita violation, and there is no
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indication that Congress,-'"'1 or the Commission when
adopting Rule 10b-5,t 5 contemplated such a remedy,
the existence of a pnvate cause of action for violations
of the statute and the rule is now well established. Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 730
(1975); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S.
128, 150-154 (1972); Superintendent of Insurance v.
Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U. S. 6, 13 n. 9
(1971). During the 30-year period since a private cause
of action was first implied under § 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5,16
a substantial body of case law and commentary has developed as to Its elements. Courts and commentators
long have differed with regard to whether scienter is a
necessary element of such a cause of action, or whether
negligent conduct alone is sufficient. 17 In addressing this
question, we turn first to the language of § 10 (b), for
" [ t] he starting point in every case involving construction
of a statute is the language itself.'' Blue Chip Stamps,
supra, at 756 (PowELL, J., concurring); e. g., FTC v.
Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312 U. S. 349, 350 (1941).
See, e. g., S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 5-6 (1934);
Note, Implied L1ab1lity Under the Securities Exchange Act, 61 Harv.
L. Rev. 858, 860 (1948)
n SEC Secunties Exchange Release No. 3230 (1942); Birnbaum
v. Newport Steel Corp ., 193 F 2d 461,463 (CA2), cert. denied, 343
U.S.956 (1952) .
16 Kardon v National Gypsum Co, 69 F. Supp. 512 (ED Pa.
1946) .
17 See cases cited in n. 12, supra.
Compare, e. g., Comment,
Scienter and Rule lOb-5, 69 Col. L. Rev . 1057, 1080-1081 (1969);
Note, Negligent Mll:;rrpesentations under Rule 10b-5, 32 Chi. L. Rev.
S24, 839-844 (1965) ; Note, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 938, 947 (1969); Note,
Civil Lmbility Under Section lOB and Rule lOB-5: A Suggestion
for Replacmg tlw Doctrme of Pnv1ty, 74 Yale L. J. 658, 682-689
(1965), w1th, r g., 3 L. Lolis, Securit1es Regulation 1766 (2d ed,
19tH) ; 6 uf :tt , 3&1:~-3R85 (Supp . 1969).
14

74-1042-0PINION
ERNST & ERNST v. HOCHFELDER

11

A
Section 10 (b) makes unlawful the use or employment of "any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in contravention of Commission rules. The
words "manipulative or deceptive" used in conjunction
with "device or contrivance" strongly suggest that § 10
(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional
misconduct. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.
2d 833, 868 (CA2 1968) (Friendly, J., concurring), cert.,
denied sub nom. Kline v. SEC, 394 U. S. 976 (1969);
Loss, Sumary Remarks, 30 Bus. Lawyer 163, 165 (1975).
See also Kahn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F. 2d
255, 280 (CA3 1972) (Adams, J., concurring),
In its amicus curiae brief, however, the Commission
contends that nothing in the language "manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance" limits its operation to
knowing or intentional practices.' 8 In support of its view,
the Commission cites the overall congressional purpose
18 The Commission would not permit recovery upon proof of
negligence in all cases. In order to harmonize civil liability under
§ 10 (b) with the express civil remedies contained in the 1933 and
1934 Acts, the Commission would limit the circumstances in which
civil liability could be imposed for negligent violation of Rule
lOb-5 to situations in which (i) the defendant knew or reasonably
could forsee that the plaintiff would rely on his conduct, (ii) the
p1'1intiff dJd in fact so rely, and (iii) the amount of the plaintiff's
damages caused by the defendant's conduct was definite and ascertainable. Brief of Amicus Curiae 23-33 . The Commission concludes that the present record does not establish these conditions
since Ernst & Ernst could not reasonably have forseen that the financial statements of First Securities would induce respondents to
invest in the escrow accounts, respondents in fact did not rely on
Ernst & Ernst's audits, and the amount of respondents' damages
was unascertainable. !d., 33-36. Respondents accept the Commission's basic analysis of the operative language of the statute and rule,
but reject these additional requirements for recovery for negligent
violations,
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in the 1933 and 1934: Acts to protect investors against
false and decept1ve practices that might injure them. See
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, supra, at
151; Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co., 404 U. S., at 11-12; J. I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U. S. 426, 432-433 (1964). See also SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U. S. 180, 195
( 1963). The CommissiOn then reasons that since the
"effect" upon mvestors of given conduct is the same regardless of whether the conduct is negligent or intentional,
Congress must have intended to bar all such practices and
not JUSt those done knowingly or intentionally. The logic
of this effect-oriented approach would impose liability for
wholly faultless conduct where such conduct results in
harm to investors, a result the Commission would be unlikely to support. But apart from where its logic might
lead, the Commission would add a gloss to the operative
language of the statute quite different from its commonly accepted meaning. See, e. g., Addison v. Hally
Hill Fruit Products, inc., 322 U.S. 607, 617-618 (1944). 19
The argument simply ignores the use of the words "manipulative," "device," and "contrivance," terms that make
unmistakable a congressional intent to proscribe a type of
conduct quite different from negligence. 20 Use of the
"To let general words draw on 8ome purpose is one thing. To
draw on some unexpressed spirit outside the bounds of the normal
meaning of words is quite another . . . After all, legislation when
not expressed m techmcal terms is addressed to the common run of
men and is therefore understood accordmg to the sense of the thing,
as the ordinary man has a right to rely on ordinary words addressed
to him." Addtson v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc ., 322 U. S. 607 •
617-618 (1944) . See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading
of Statutes, 47 Col. L. Rev 527, 536-537 (1947) .
20 Webster's Int'l D1et10nary (2d ed. 1934) defines "device" as
" [t]hat which IS devised, or formed by design ; a contrivance ; an
invention , proJect , scheme; often a scheme to deceive ; a stratagem ;
an art1fice," and "contrlVanrp'' m (>f'rtinPnt pa.rt as "[a] thing con10
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word ''manipulative" is especially significant. It is and
was virtually a term of art when used in connection with
securities markets. It connotes intentional or willful
conduct designed to deceive or defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of securities. 21
In addition to relying upon the Commission's argument with respect to the operative language of the statute, respondents contend that since we are dealing with
"remedial legislation," Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S.
332, 336 (1967), it must be construed "'not technically
and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial
purposes.' " Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
supra, at 151, quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, supra, at 186. They argue that the "remedial
purposes" of the Acts demand a construction of § 10 (b)
that embraces negligence as a standard of liability. But
in seeking to accomplish its broad remedial goals, Congress did not adopt uniformly a negligence standard
even as to express civil remedies. In some circumstances
and with respect to certain classes of defendants, Congress did create express liability predicated upon a failure
to exercise reasonable care. E. g., 1933 Act § 11 (b)(3)
(B), 48 Stat. 82 as amended 15 U. S. C. § 77k (b)(3) (B)
(liability of "experts," such as accountants, for misleading statements in portions of f\egistration statements for
which they are responsible). 22 But in other situations
trived or used in contriving ; a scheme, plan, or artifice." In turn,
"contrive" in pertment part is defined as " [ t] o devise; to plan; to
plot ... [t]o fabricate ... design, mvent . .. to scheme . . . ."
The Commission also ignores the use of the terms "[t]o use or
employ," language that is supportive of the view that Congress
did not mtend § 10 (b) to embrace negligent conduct.
21 Webster's
Int'l Dictionary, supra, defines "manipulate" a8'
" . , . to manage or t.reat artfully or fraudulently; as to manipulate
accounts . . . . 4. Exchanges. To force (prices) up or down, as;
by matched orders, wash sales, fictitious reports . . . ; to rig."
ll.2 See p. 21 & n 2fi, mjr11,,
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good faith is an absolute defense. 1934 Act § 18, 48 Stat.
897, as amended 15 U.S. C. § 78r (misleading statements
in any document filed pursuant to the 1934 Act). And
in still other circumstances Congress created express liability regardless of the defendant's fault, 1933 Act § 11
(a) (issuer liability for misleading statements in the registration statement) .
It is thus evident that Congress fashioned stand·
ards of fault in the express civil remedies in the
1933 and 1934 Acts on a particularized basis. Ascertainment of congressional intent with respect to the
standard of liability created by a particular section of
the Acts must therefore rest primarily on the langua.ge
of that section. Where, as here, we deal with a judicially implied liability, the statutory language certainly
'is no less important. In view of the language of
§ 10 (b) which so clearly connotes intentional misconduct, and mindful that the language of a statute controls when sufficiently clear in its context, United States
v. Oregon, 366 U. S. 643, 648 (1961); Packard Motor
Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U. S. 485, 492 (1947), further
inquiry may be unnecessary. We turn now, nevertheless, to the legislative history of the 1934 Act to ascertain
whether there is support for the meaning attributed to
§ 10 (b) by the Commission and respondents.

B
Although the extensive legislative history of the 1934
Act is bereft of any explicit explanation of Congress'
intent, we think the relevant portions of that history
support our conclusion that § 10 (b) was addressed to
practices that involve some element of scienter and cannot be read to impose liability for negligent conduct
alone.
The original version of what would develop into the
1934 Act was contained in identica-l bills introduced by
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Senator Fletcher and Representative Rayburn. S. 2693,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); H. R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. ( 1934) . Section 9 (c) of the bills, from which present § 10 (b) evolved, proscribed as unlawful the use of
"any device or contrivance which, or any device or contrivance in a way or manner which the Commission may
by its rules and regulations find detrimental to the public interest or to the proper protection of investors." The
other subsections of proposed § 9 listed specific practices
that Congress empowered the Commission to regulate
through its rulemaking power. See §§ 9 (a) (short
sale), (b) ("stop~loss order"). Soon after the hearings
on the House bill were held, a substitute bill was introduced in both Houses which abbreviated and modified
§ 9 (c)'s operative language to read "any manipulative
device or contrivance." S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.,
§ 10 (b) (1934); H . R. 8720, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 9 (c)
(1934). Still a third bill, retaining the Commission's
power to regulate the specific practices enumerated in
the prior bills, and omitting all reference to the Commission's authority to prescribe rules concerning manipulative or deceptive devices in general, was introduced and
passed m the House. H. R. 9323, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.,
§ 9 (1934)
The final language of § 10 is a modified
version of a Senate amendment to this last House bill.
See H. R. Rep. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 32-33
(1934) (Conference Report) .
Neither the intended scope of § 10 (b) nor the reasons;
for the changes in its operative language are revealed
explicitly in the legislative history of the 1934 Act, which
deals primarily with other aspects of the legislation~
There is no indication, however, that § 10 (b) was in-tended to proscribe conduct not involving scienter. The·
extensive hearings that preceded passage of the 1934
Act touched only briefly on § 10, and most of the disQUssiQJJ. was devoted to the enumerated devices that the
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,Commission is empowered to proscribe under § 10 (a).
The most relevant exposition of the provision that was
to become § 10 (b) was by Thomas G. Corcoran, a
·spokesman for the drafters. Corcoran indicated:
"S ubsection (c) [~ 9 (c) of H. R. 7852-later § 10
(b)] says. 'Thou shalt not devise any other cunning
devices.' ..•
"Of course subsection (c) is a catch-all clause to
prevent manipulative devices. I do not think there
is any objection to that kind of clause. The Commission should have the authority to deal with new
manipulative devices."
·Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720 before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess., 115 (1934). This brief explanation of § 10 (b)
by a spokesman for its drafters is significant. The
section was described rightly as a "catch-all" clause to
enable the Commission "to deal with new manipulative
[or cunning] devices." It is difficult to believe that any
lawyer, legislative draftsman, or legislator would use
these words if the intent was to create liability for merely
·negligent acts or omissions. 23 Neither the legislative
history nor the briefs supporting respondents identify
any usage or authority for construing "manipulative [or
cunning] devices" to include negligence/ 4
Seen. 21, supra.
In support of its position the Commission cites statements
by Corcoran in the Senate hearings that "in modern society there
are many things you have to make crimes which are sheer matters
of negligence" and "intent is not necessary for every crime." Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices before the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6509-6510 (1934) . The
comments, taken in context, shed no light on the meaning of § 10 (b) .
Corcoran's remarks were made during a discussion of whether crimi·
nal violations could anse under § 8 (a) (3) of S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d
23

24
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The legislative reports do not address the scope of
§ 10 (b) or its catch-all function directly. In considering specific manipulative practices left to Commission
regulation, however, the reports indicate that liability
would not attach absent scienter, supporting the conclusion that Congress intended no lesser standard under
§ 10 (b). The Senate Report of S. 3420 discusses generSess., which in material part was incorporated in § 9 of the 1934 Act,
15 U. S. C. § 78i, in the absence of specific intent to influence security
prices for personal gain. The remarks, moreover, were not ad~
· dressed to the scope of § 8, but were general observations concerning activity society might proscribe under criminal law. Ferdinand Pecora, cotmsel to the committee and a draftman of S. 2693,
·Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co.,- U.S.-,
n. 24 (1976), described the language as "[e]xcluding from its
scope an act that is not done with any ulterior motives or purposes, as set forth in the act." !d., at 6510. Further, prior to
the passage of the 1934 Act, proposed § 8 was amended to require
willful behavior as a prerequisite to civil liability for violations.
Compare § 9 (e) of the 1934 Act with § 8 (c) of S. 2693. See H. ·R.
Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 21 (1934) .
The Commission also relies on objections to a ·draft version
of § 10 (b)-§ 9 (c) of S. 2693 and H. R. 7852, see pp. 14-15,
supra-raised by representatives of the securities industry in the
House and Senate hearings. They warned that the language was
so vague that the Commission might outlaw anything. E. g., Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices, supra, at 6988; Hearings on
H. R. 7852 and H . R. 8720 before the House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 258 (1934). Remarks
of this kind made in the course of legislative debate or hearings other
than by persons responsible for the preparation or the drafting of a
bill, are entitled to little weight. See, e. g., United States v. United
Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 276-277 (1947) ; United States v.
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U. S. 110; 125 ( 1942). This is especially so with regard to the statements of legislative opponents who
·" [i]n their zeal to defeat a bill ... understandably tend to overstate its reach:" NLRB v. Fruit Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 66 (1964).
See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert /)istillers Corp., 341 U. S. 384, 394395 (l95l).
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ally the various abuses that precipitated the need for the
legislation and the inadequacy of self-regulation by the
stock exchanges. The Report then analyzes the compo~
nent provisions of the statute, but does not parse § 10.
The only specific reference to § 10 is the following:
"In addition to the discretionary and elastic powers conferred on the administrative authority, effective regulation must include several clear statutory
provisions reinforced by penal and civil sanctions,
aimed at those manipulative and deceptive practices
which have been demonstrated to fulfill no useful
function. These sanctions are found in sections 9, 10
and 16." S. Rep. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 6 (1934).
In the portion of the general analysis section of the
Report entitled "Manipulative Practices," however, there
is a discussion of specific practices that were considered
so inimical to the public interest as to require exp~ess
prohibition, such as "wash" sales and "matched" orders/ 5
and of other practices that might in some cases serve
legitimate purposes, such as stabilization of security
prices and grants of options. Id., at 7-9. These latter
practices were left to regulation by the Commission.
1934 Act§§ 9 (a)(6), (c), 48 Stat. 890, 15 U.S. C. §§ 78i
(a)(6), (c). Significantly, we think, in the discussion of
25

"Wash" sales are transactions involving no change in beneficial
ownership. "Matched" orders are orders for the purchase/sale of a
security that are entered with the knowledge that orders of substantially the same size, at substantially the same time and price,
have been or will be entered by the same or different persons for
the salejpurchase of such security . Section 9 (a) (1) of the 1934
Act, 15 U. S. C. § 78i (a) (1), proscribes wash sales and matched
orders when effectuated " [ f] or the purpose of creating a false or
misleading appearance of active trading in any security registered
on a national securities exchange, or , .. with respect to the market
for any such security." See In re J. A. Latimer & Co., 38 S. E. C.
790 ( 1958) ; In re Thornton & Co ., 28 S. E . C 208 ( 1948) .
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the need to regulate even the latter category of practices
when they are manipulative, there is no indication that
any type of criminal or civil liability is to attach in the
absence of scienter. Furthermore, in commenting on the
express civil liabilities provided in the 1934 Act, the Report explains :
" . , . if an investor has suffered loss by reason of
illicit practices, it is equitable that he should be
allowed to recover damages from the guilty party ... ,
The bill provides that any person who unlawfully manipulates the price of a security, or wh~
induces transactions in a security by means of false
or misleading statements, or who makes a false or
misleading statement in the report of a corporation,
shall be liable in damages to those who have bought
or sold the security at prices affected by such violation or statement. In such case the burden is on the
plaintiff to show the violation or the fact that the
statement was false or misleading, and that he relied
thereon to his damage. The defendant may escape
liability by showing that the statement was made in
good faith." ld., at 12-13 (emphasis supplied).
The Report therefore reveals with respect to the specified practices, an overall congressional intent to prevent
"manipulative and deceptive practices ... which fulfill
no useful function" and to create private actions for
damages stemming from "illicit practices," where the defendant has not acted in good faith. The views expressed
in the House Report are consistent with this interpreta~
tion. H. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 10-11, 2021 (1934) (H. R. 9323). There is no indication that
Congress intended anyone to be made liable for such
practices unless he acted other than in good faith. The
catch-all provision of § 10 (b) should be interpreted ne
rnore
·broadly,
.
' .
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The 1933 and 1934 Acts constitute interrelated com~
ponents of the federal regulatory scheme governing trans~
actions in securities. See Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S., at
727-730. As the Court indicated in SEC v. National Se~
curities, Inc., 393 U. S. 453 (1969), "the interdependence
of the various sections of the securities laws is certainly
a relevant factor in any interpretation of the language
Congress has chosen . ... " Recognizing this, respondents
and the Commission contrast § 10 (b) to other sections of
the Acts to support their contention that civil liability may
be imposed upon proof of negligent conduct. We think
they misconceive the significance of the other provisions
of the Acts.
The Commission argues that Congress has been explicit
in requiring willful conduct when that was the standard
of fault intended, citing § 9 of the 1934 Act, 48 Stat. 889r
15 U. S. C. § 78i, which generally proscribes manipulation
of securities prices. Sections 9 (a) (1) and (a) (2), for
example, respectively prohibit manipulation of security
prices "[f] or the purpose of creating a false or misleading·
appearance of actual trading in any security ... or ...
with respect to the market for any such security," and
"for the purpose of including the purchase or sale of such
security by others." See also§ 9 (a)(4). Section 9 (e}
then imposes upon "[a]ny person who willfully participates in any act or transaction in violation of" other provisions of § 9 civil liability to anyone who purchased or
sold a security at a price affected by the manipulative·
activities. From this the Commission concludes that
since § 10 (b) is not by its terms explicitly restricted to·
willful, knowing, or purposeful conduct, it should not be
construed in all cases to requrre more than negligent
action or inaction as a precondition for civil liability.
The structure of thr Acts does nat support the Com-
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mission's argument. In each instance that Congress
created express civil liability in favor of purchasers
or sellers of securities it clearly specified whether
recovery was to be premised on knowing or intentional
conduct, negligence, or entirely innocent mistake. See
1933 Act, §§ 11, 12, 15, 48 Stat. 82, 84, as amended 15
U. S. C. §§ 77k, 771, 77o; 1934 Act §§ 9, 18, 20, 48 Stat.
889, 897, 899, as amended 15 U. S. C. §§ 78i,
78r, 78t. For example, § 11 of the 1933 Act unambiguously creates a private action for damages when a
registration statement includes untrue statements of material facts or fails to state material facts necessary to
make the statements therein not misleading. Within the
limits specified by § 11 (e), the issuer of the securities is
held absolutely liable for any damages resulting from such
misstatement or omission. But experts such as accountants who have prepared portions of the registration statement are accorded a "due diligence" defense. In effect,
this is a negligence standard. An expert may avoid civil
liability with respect to the portions of the registration
statement for which he was responsible by showing that
"after reasonable investigation" he had "reasonable
ground[s] to believe" that the statements for which he
was responsible were true and there was no omission of a
material fact. 26 § 11 (b)(3)(B)(i). See, e. g., Escott v.
Other indlViduals who sign the registra.tion statement, directors
of the issuer, and tht> underwriter of the securities similarly are
accorded a complete defense agamst civil liability based on the exercise of reasonable invcotigation and a reasonable belief that the
rt>gistration statrmrnt was not misleading. §§ 11 (b) (3) (A), (C),
(D), (c) . See, e. g. , Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment
Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 575-583 (EDNY 1971) (underwriters, but
not officer-dirrctors, established their due diligence defense). See
generally R . .Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation 1018-1027
(3d ed. 1972) , and sources Cited therein; Folk, Civil Liabilities under
the Federal Securities Acts: The Batchtis Case, 55 Va. L. Rev. 19\J
(1969) .
·26
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Barchris Construction Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697-703
(SDNY 1968). The express recognition of a cause of
action premised on negligent behavior in § 11 stands in
sharp contrast to the language of § 10 (b), and signifi~
cantly undercuts the Commission's argument.
We also consider it significant that each of the express
civil remedies in the 1933 Act allowing recovery for negligent conduct, see§§ 11, 12 (2), 15, 15 U.S. C.§§ 77k, 77l,
77o, 27 is subject to significant procedural restrictions not
applicable under § 10 (b). "8 Section 11 (e) of the 1933
27

SectiOn 12 (2) creates potential civil liability for a seller of
securities in favor of the purchaser for misleading statements or
omissions m connection with the transaction. The seller is exculpated if he proves that hr did not know, or in the exercise of
reasonable care. could not have known of the untruth or omission.
Section 15 of the 1933 Act, a.~ amonded by § 208 of Title II of the
1934 Act, makes persons who "control" any person liable under § 11
or § 12 liable joint!~· and sew•rally to the same extent as the controlled
person, unless he "had no knowledgE' of or reasonable grotmd to believe in the ex1stence of the facts by reason of which the liability of
t.he controllrd pen;on 1:; alleged to ex1st." 15 U.S. C. § 77o. See Act
of JunE' 6, 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, c. 404, Title II § 208, 48 Stat. 908.
28 Each of the provisiOns of the 1934 Act that expressly create
civil habiht.y, rxcept thosE' dirrcted to specific classes of inclividuals
such a.<; directors, officers, or 10% beneficial holders of securities, see
§ 16 (b), 15 l J. S. C. § 78p, F01·emost-M cKesson, Inc. v. Provident
Securities Co., supra ; Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petro.
leum Corp., 411 U.S. 582 (1973), contams a state-of-mind condition
requiring something more than negligence. Section 9 creates potential civil liability for any person who "willfully participates" in the
manipulation of securities on a national exchange. § 9 (e). 15
U . S. C. § 78i (e) . Sect JOn 18 creates potential civil liability for misleading statements filed with the Commission, but provides the defendant with the defense that "he acted in good faith and had no
knowledge that such statement was false or misleading." 15 U.S. C.
§ 78r. And § 20, which imposes liability upon "controlling persons"
for violations of the Act by those they control, exculpates a defend<~ont. who ."nctrd in good faith and did not . . induce the act .. . •
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Act, for example, authorizes the court to require a plaintiff bringing a suit under§ 11, § 12 (2), or§ 15 thereof to
post a bond for costs, including attorneys' fees and in
specified circumstances to assess costs at the conclusion
of the litigation.
Section 13 specifies a statute
of limitations of one year from the time the
violation was or should have been discovered, in
no event to exceed three years from the time of offer or
sale, applicable to actions brought under § 11, § 12 (2),
or ~ 15. These restrictions, significantly, were imposed
by amendments to the 1933 Act adopted as part of the
1934 Act. Prior to amendment § 11 (e) contained no
provision for payment of costs. 48 Stat. 83. Act of
May 27, 1933, Pub. L. No. 22, c. 38, Title I, § 11 (e).
See Act of June 6, 1934, Pub. L. No. 291, c. 404, Title II
§ 206 (e), 48 Stat. 908. The amendments also substantially shortened the statute of limitations provided by
§ 13. Compare Pub. L. No. 22, supra, § 13, 48 Stat. 84,
with 15 U. S. C. § 77m. See 1934 Act, § 207, 48 Stat. 908.
We think these procedural limitations indicate that the
judicially created private damage remedy under § 10
(b)-which has no comparable restrictions 29-cannot be

cf·

constituting the violatwn .... " 15 U. S. C. § 78t. Emphasizing the
important difference between the operative language and purpose of
§ 14 (a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 14n (a), as contrasted with
§ 10 (b), however, some courts have concluded that proof of scienter
is unnecessary in an action for damages by the shareholder recipients
of a materially misleading proxy statement against the issuer corporation. •
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F. 2d 1281, 1299
(CA2 1973) ;.., Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., supra, at
289-290.
29 Since no statute of lrmitations is provided for civil actions
under § 10 (b), the law of limitations of the forum state is followed
as in other cases of judicially implied remedies. See Holmberg v.
Armbrecht, 327 U. S. 392, 395 (1946), and cases cited therein. Although it is not always certain which state statute of limitations
should be followed, such ~tat111es of limitations usually are longer
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extended, consistently with the intent of Congress, to ac..
tions premised on negligent wrongdoing. Such extension
would allow causes of actwn covered by § 11, § 12 (2),
and~ 15 to be brought mstead under§ 10 (b) and thereby
nullify the effectiveness of the carefully drawn procedural
restrictions on these express actions. 80 See, e. g., Fischman v. Raytheon Manufacturing Co., 188 F. 2d 783, 786787 (CA2 1951); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F . 2d, at 867-868 (Friendly, J., concurring); Rosenberg
v. Globe Aircraft Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124 (ED Pa.
1948) ; 3 L. Loss, Securities Regulation 1787-1788 (2d
ed. 1961); R. Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regu..
lation 1070-1074 (3d ed. 1972) . We would be un ..
willing to bring about this result absent substantial support in the legislative history, and there is none.31.
than t.he period provided under § 13. 3 L . Loss, supra, at 1773-.
1774. As to co~t;:; seen. :30 infm .
8 Congress regarded the;;e restnctwns on private damage actions
as ~ngmficant . ln mtrodurmg Title II of the 1934 Act, Senator
Fletcher mdicated that the amendment to § 11 (e) of the 1933 Act,
providing for potential pnyment of costs, including attorneys' fees,
"Is the most Important I amendment] of all." 78 Cong. Rec. 8669.
One of 1ts purposes wa;:; to deter actiOns brought solely for their potential settlement value. See ~btd., H. Rep. 1838, 73d Cong., 2<1
Sess., 42 {1934) (Conference Report) ; Blue Ch~p Stamps, supra, at
'740-741 This deterrent is lackmg m the § 10 (b) context, in which
a distnct court';; power to award attorneys' fees is sharply circum::;cribed. See Alyeska Pipeline Service Co . v. Wilderness Society,
421 U.S. 240 (1975) (''bad fmth " reqUirement); F. D . Rich Co. v.
Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U. 8.116,129 (1974).
31 Section 18 of the 1934 Act create~; a pnvate cause of action
against per~ons, such a..~ accountants, who "make or cause to be·
made" matenally misleadmg :>tatements in reports or other documents filed with th!.' Commis,;Ion. 15 U S. C. § 78r. We need not
consider the question whether a cause of action may be maintained
under § 10 (b) on the basis of achous that would constitute a violation of § 18. Under § 18 habihty extends to persons who, in reli;wce on sttch Htatement:s, purchased or sold a security whose price·

°
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D
We have addressed, to this point, primarily the language and history of § 10 (b). The Commission contends, however, that subsections (2) and (3) of Rule
lOb-S are cast in language which-if standing alonecould encompass both intentional and negligent behavior.
These subsections respectively provide that it is unlawful "[t]o make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order
to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading ... "
and "to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit
upon any person.
" Viewed in isolation the language of subsection (2), and arguably that of subsection (3), could be read as proscribing, respectively, any
type of material misstatement or omission, and any
was affected by the statements. Liability is limited, however, in
the important respect that the defendant is accorded the defense
that he acted m "good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading." Consistent with this language the
legislative history of the section suggests something more than negligence on the part of the defendant IS required for recovery. The
original versiOn of § 18 (a), § 17 (a) of S. 2693, H. R. 7852 and
H . R. 7855, see pp. 14-15, supra, provided that the defendant would
not be liable 1f "he acted m good faith and in the exercise of reasonable care had no ground to believe that such statement was false
or misleading." The accountmg profession objected to this provision on the ground that liability would be created for honest errors
in judgment. See Senate Hearmgs on Stock Exchange Practices,
supra, at 7175-7183; House Hearings on H. R. 7852 and H. R. 8720,
supra, at 653. In subsequent drafts the current formulation was
adopted. It is also sigmficant that actions under § 18 are limited
by a relatively short statute of limitatiOns similar to that provided
in § 13 of the 1933 Act . § 18 (c). Moreover, as under § 11 (e)
of the 1933 Act the D1stnct Court is authorized to require the
plaintiff to post a bond for costs, including attorney's fees, and tQI
~ss.ess S"QJ)h cos.ts at the concl't~iQn of th.El litigation. § 18 (al.

·,
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course of conduct. that has the effect of defrauding in~
vestors, whether the wrongdoing was intentional or not.
We note first that such a reading cannot be harmonized with the administrative history of the rule, a his~
tory making clear that when the Commission adopted
the rule It was intended to apply only to adivities that
involved scienter.32 More importantly, Rule lOb-5 was
82
Apparently the rule was a hastily drafted response to a situ~
ation clearly involving mtentional misconduct. The Commission's
Regional Admm1strator m Boston had reported to the Director of the Trading and E~hange Division that the president
of a corporntion was telling the other shareholders that the corporation wm; doing poorly and purchasing their shares at the resultant
depre:;:;ed price:;, when 111 fact the business was doing exceptionally
well. The Rule wa:; drafted and approved on the day this report
was received . See Confereuce on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws, 22 Bus. Law. 793, 922 (1967) (remarks of Milton
Freeman, one of rule's co-drafters); Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at
767 (BLACKMUN, J ., di:;senting) . Although adopted pursuant to
§ 10 (b), the language of the rule appears to have been derived in
significant part. from § 17 of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77q.
E . g., !bid.; SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F. 2d, at 867
(Friendly, J ., concurring) . There is no indication in the adminis~
trative history of the Rule that any of the subsections was intended
to proscribe conduct not mvolving scienter. Indeed the Commission's release issued contemporaneously with the rule explained:
'The Secunties and Exchange Commission today announced the
adoption of a rule prohibiting fraud by any person in connection
with the purchase of securities. The previously existing rules
against fraud m the purchase of securities applied only to brokers
and dealers The new rule clo::;es a loophole in the protections
agamst fraud admm1stered by the Commis:;ion by prohibiting individttals or companie:; from bu~•ing securities if they engage in fraud
in the1r purcha:;e," SEC Releasr No. 3230 (May 21, 1942).
That :;arne year, m its Annual Report, the Commission again stated
that the purpose of the rulr wa::; to protect investors against "fraud":
"Durmg the fi~cal year the Commi:ss1on adopted Rule X-10B-5
m; an additional protection to mve~:;tors . The new rule prohibits
fral.ld by an · person in connection with the purchase of ~ecurities,
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adopted pursuant to authority granted the Commission
under § 10 (b). The rulemaking power granted to an
administrative agency charged with the administration
of a federal statute is not the power to make law. Rather,
it is " 'the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect
the will of Congress as expressed by the statute.' " Dixon
v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965), quoting Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner, 297
U. S. 129, 134 (1936). Thus, despite the broad view
of the Rule advanced by the Commission in this case,
its scope cannot exceed the power granted the Commission by Congress under § 10 (b). For the reasons
stated above, we think the Commission's original interpretation of Rule 10b-5 was compelled by the language
and history of § 10 (b) and related sections of the Acts.
See, e. g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F. 2d
1281, 1299 (CA2 1973); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.
2d 1277, 1304-1305 (CA2 1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., supra, at 868; 3 L. Loss, supra, 1766; 6 id., at
3883-3885 (Supp. 1969). When a statute speaks so specifically in terms of manipulation and deception, and of
implementing devices and contrivances-the commonly
understood terminology of intentional wrongdoing-and
when its history reflects no more expansive intent, we
are quite unwilling to extend the scope of the statute to
negligent conduct.33
while the previously exi;;ting rules against fraud in the purchase of
securities applied only to brokers and dealers." 8 SEC Ann. Rep.

10 (1942) .
33 As we find the language and history of § 10 (b) dispositive of
the appropriate standard of li~tbility, there is no occasion to examine
the additional considerations of "policy," set forth by the parties,
that may have influenced the lawmakers in their formulation of the
statute. We do note that the standard urged by respondents would
significantly broaden the class of plaintiffs who may seek to impose
n.ability upon accoUJltant~ and other experts, who perform services or
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Recognizing that § 10 (b) and Rule lOb-5 might be helq
to require proof of more than negligent misfeasance by
Ernst & Ernst as a precondition to the imposition of
civil liability, respondents further contend that the case
should be remanded for trial under whatever standard
is adopted. Throughout the lengthy history of this case
respondents have proceeded on a theory of liability
premised on .negligence, specifically disclaiming that
Ernst & Ernst had engaged in fraud or intentional misconduct.34 In these circumstances, we think it inap ..
propriate to remand the action for further proceedings.
express opinions with respect to matters under the Acts. Last Term,
in Blue Chip Stamps, supra, at 747-748, the Court pertinently
observed:
"While much of the development of the law of deceit has been the
elimination of artificial barriers to recovery on just claims, we are not
the first court to express concern that the inexorable broadening or
the class of plaintiffs who may sue in this area of the law will ultimately result in more harm than good. In Ultramares Co1·p. v.
Touche, 255 N, Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931), Chief Judge Cardozo
observed with respect to 'a liability in an indeterminate amount for
an indeterminate time to an indeterminate cause':
" 'The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so
extreme as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the
implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences.' !d., at
179-180, 174 N. E., at 444.''
This case, on its facts, illustrates the extreme reach of the standard
urged by respondents. As investors in transactions initiated by
Nay, not First Securities, they were not foreseeable users of the
financial statements prepared by Ernst & Ernst. Respondents conceded that they did not rely on either these financial statements ot
Ernst & Ernst's certificates of opinion. See n. 9, supra. The class
of persons eligible to benefit from such a standard, though small in
this case, could be numbered in the thousands in other cases. Acceptance of respondents' view would extend to new frontiers the
"hazards" of rendering expert advice under the Acts, raising serious
policy questions not yet addressed by Congress.
3 4 See 503 F . 2d, at 1104, 1119; n. 5, supra.
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The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Reversed.

MR. JusTICE STEVENS took no part in the consideration
or decision of this case.

